The Strait of Hormuz, located between Oman and Iran, connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. The Strait of Hormuz is the world’s most important oil chokepoint because of the large volumes of oil that flow through the strait. In 2018, its daily oil flow averaged 21 million barrels per day (b/d), or the equivalent of about 21% of global petroleum liquids consumption.

Chokepoints are narrow channels along widely used global sea routes that are critical to global energy security. The inability of oil to transit a major chokepoint, even temporarily, can lead to substantial supply delays and higher shipping costs, resulting in higher world energy prices. Although most chokepoints can be circumvented by using other routes that add significantly to transit time, some chokepoints have no practical alternatives.

Volumes of crude oil, condensate, and petroleum products transiting the Strait of Hormuz have been fairly stable since 2016, when international sanctions on Iran were lifted and Iran’s oil production and exports returned to pre-sanctions levels. Flows through the Strait of Hormuz in 2018 made up about one-third of total global seaborne traded oil. More than one-quarter of global liquefied natural gas trade also transited the Strait of Hormuz in 2018.

There are limited options to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. Only Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have pipelines that can ship crude oil outside the Persian Gulf and have the additional pipeline capacity to circumvent the Strait of Hormuz. At the end of 2018, the total available crude oil pipeline capacity from the two countries combined was estimated at 6.5 million b/d. In that year, 2.7 million b/d of crude oil moved through the pipelines, leaving about 3.8 million b/d of unused capacity that could have bypassed the strait.

Based on tanker tracking data published by ClipperData, Saudi Arabia moves the most crude oil and condensate through the Strait of Hormuz, most of which is exported to other countries (less than 0.5 million b/d transited the strait in 2018 from Saudi ports in the Persian Gulf to Saudi ports in the Red Sea).

EIA estimates that 76% of the crude oil and condensate that moved through the Strait of Hormuz went to Asian markets in 2018. China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore were the largest destinations for crude oil moving through the Strait of Hormuz to Asia, accounting for 65% of all Hormuz crude oil and condensate flows in 2018.

In 2018, the United States imported about 1.4 million b/d of crude oil and condensate from Persian Gulf countries through the Strait of Hormuz, accounting for about 18% of total U.S. crude oil and condensate imports and 7% of total U.S. petroleum liquids consumption.

BRUSSELS: The European Union imposed five-year tariffs on biodiesel from Indonesia to counter alleged subsidies to producers in the country, a move that could prompt the Indonesian government to retaliate.

The EU duties on Indonesian exporters of this type of biofuel, which is made from vegetable oils and animal fats for use in diesel engines, range from 8% to 18%, the European Commission, the bloc’s executive arm, said on Monday.

The levies mark the definitive outcome of an EU probe into claims by the European biodiesel industry that the Indonesian government gives trade-distorting aid to the likes of PT Ciliandra Perkasa, PT Wilmar Bioenergi Indonesia and PT Musim Mas.

Subsidised exports of Indonesian biodiesel to the EU are causing “a threat of material injury to the union industry, ” the Brussels-based commission said in the bloc’s Official Journal. The definitive anti-subsidy duties will take effect on Tuesday and follow provisional levies introduced in August at the same levels.

The five-year import taxes are the latest twist in a long-running EU trade dispute with Indonesia over biodiesel and mirror a fight the bloc has had with Argentina.

The duties restore a degree of protection that European biodiesel producers such as Verbio Vereinigte BioEnergie AG lost in 2018 when the EU scrapped tariffs aimed at countering alleged below-cost — or “dumped” — sales in the bloc by Indonesian exporters.

That move followed successful Indonesian challenges against the anti-dumping duties, which had been introduced in 2013, at the World Trade Organization and in the EU courts.

Indonesian retaliation

The EU opened the subsidy inquiry in December 2018 and the Indonesian trade minister said in August this year that, should the bloc decide to apply new biodiesel levies of 8% to 18%, Indonesia would raise its tariffs on European dairy goods to the same levels (from 5% to 10%).

The EU duty rates vary depending on the Indonesian producer. The levels are 8% for Ciliandra Perkasa, 15.7% for the Wilmar Group, 16.3% for the Musim Mas Group and 18% for the Permata Group and all other Indonesian biodiesel exporters.

Indonesian exporters’ combined share of the EU biodiesel market rose to 3.3% — or 516,088 metric tons — in the 12 months through September 2018 from 0.2% in 2017 and 0.3% in 2016, according to the commission.

Renewable-energy trade tensions between Europe and Indonesia have also grown as a result of a separate EU decision this year restricting the types of biofuels from palm oil that may be counted toward the bloc’s renewable-energy goals. In Indonesia, palm oil is the main raw material for making biodiesel.

Both sides are fighting over steel as well. The EU has complained to the WTO about Indonesian export curbs on raw materials including nickel that are used to make stainless steel and is threatening to hit flat-rolled stainless steel from Indonesia with duties to counter alleged subsidies and below-cost sales. – Bloomberg

Russian company Gazprom is set to initiate the feasibility study in the first quarter of 2020 for laying down undersea pipeline starting from Gulf to Pakistan, India and Bangladesh initially that will ultimately end to China after touching Myanmar and Thailand, a senior official of the Petroleum Division privy to the development said.
The pipeline will pass through shallow waters of Pakistan, India and Bangladesh and every country will get the gas from the pipeline as per requirements.
The total cost of the undersea pipeline will hover around $20bn-$25bn when it will be extended to China at last.
The most important aspect of the project, the official said, is that every country will provide the transit fee to Pakistan, which will run into billions of dollars when the said pipeline will ultimately have access to China.
Pakistan will be getting transit fee from India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand and China. Pakistan’s Navy will provide services with regard to monitoring the pipeline and its security.
Pakistan and India have already signed MoUs and agreements with Russia separately for the project under which both countries would get gas from the undersea pipeline through the spur pipelines.
However, the three countries, at the outset Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, will benefit from the billions of dollars Russian investment as buyer countries.
According to the official, the undersea pipeline would be laid down with an estimated investment of $10 for the regional three countries and Pakistan will get gas from the undersea pipeline up to 1bcfd.
More importantly Russia-Pakistan economic corridor will also be set up and Russia will also invest in fibre optic link, roads and power projects as ancillary facilities.
Pakistan will take the gas up to 1bcf per day when the said pipeline will come on stream with massive rollover impact on economy.
Russia is already engaged with Pakistan on North South Gas Pipeline, which will cost $2bn-2.5bn. However, Gazprom has also shown interest in building gas storages in Pakistan with investment of $400mn-$500mn. Russia is also interested in investing in exploration and production activities in Pakistan and to this effect Gazprom is currently engaged with the top management of OGDCL.
However, under the agreement, another top Petroleum Division official said Gazprom Company from gas deposits in Iran and in other Middle East countries owned by Russia will ensure gas sourcing in the pipeline for the said buyer countries. The buyer countries under separate agreements with the said Russian company will have gas intakes from the said pipeline.
The official said Pakistan will share its credible data with Russian company about the demand of gas with future projections in next one decade keeping in view existing pricing structure, and regulatory and taxation regimes. The data for demand would be worked out keeping in view the renewable power policy and future LNG terminal being installed by private companies.
The same data India will provide to Russian company too.
After having the required data from Pakistan and India, the Russian company will ink commercial agreements with buyer countries. Based on data from both the countries, Gazprom will start the feasibility in the first three months of 2020 and the whole process staring from sharing the data to completion of feasibility report will be finished in one year time and if the project is found feasible, the pipeline will be laid down undersea in 3-4 years.
To a question, the official said that Pakistan had the option to build spur pipeline to connect the undersea pipeline and the spur pipeline can also be connected to S-N pipeline.

KARACHI: When you think of electric vehicles, you think of Elon Musk, a noiseless Tesla and luxury more than zero emissions. But today the government wants to use the same technology for the common man — to run bikes, rickshaws and even buses, jeeps and trucks. Will this transition from fossil fuel vehicles to electric vehicles in Pakistan happen anytime soon?

Cities are witnessing the worst ever smog. This was followed by a climate march with youth demanding climate justice.

Thus the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf government could not have chosen a better time than when the UN climate summit COP 25 is taking place to make a strong case against tailpipe emissions from urban transportation, a major contributor to air pollution and climate change.

Little wonder then they quickly got the nod of approval by the cabinet for the first national electric vehicle (EV) policy.

With 43 per cent of the airborne emissions in the country coming from the transport sector, federal Minister for Climate Change Malik Amin Aslam said that transitioning to EV provided a “huge opportunity” for the country.

“These will have many advantages for Pakistan — it will reduce pollution, will cut the cost of fuel by 70pc thereby [leading to] huge saving for FFV (fossil fuel vehicle) owners, and will cut the country’s import bill tremendously.”

There are three million private cars and 20m motorcycles and motorised rickshaws plying the roads, according to the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, as cited in the Economic Survey 2018-19, mainly due to the absence of a good public transport system.

Riaz Haq, who has worked in various tech firms for 35 years in the Silicon Valley and is an EV enthusiast, said that with 32m households and 17.5m motorcycles registered in Pakistan, the motorcycle ownership increased from 41pc in 2015 to 53pc in 2018.

The new policy envisions using electricity to get 100,000 cars, 500,000 two- and three-wheelers, 1,000 buses and trucks to ply the roads in the next five years. By 2030 it sees 30pc of all new cars, big and small trucks, vans, and jeeps and 50pc of all two-, three- and four-wheelers to be electric vehicles reducing tailpipe emissions by 65pc. By 2040, if all goes well, 90pc of all vehicles on the roads will be EVs.

“The PM wants all new buses coming on the road to be electric hybrid — run both on electricity and CNG (compressed natural gas),” said the federal minister.

Most experts are lauding the policy as a step in the right direction. “It is a forward-looking step needed to deal with climate concerns from growing transport sector emissions with rapidly rising vehicle ownership,” Mr Haq wrote in his blog.

Another proponent for EVs, Islamabad-based energy expert Vaqar Zakaria, said that “surplus power generation capacity, building off-peak demand for better utilisation of generation capacity which also brings down generation costs, poor urban air quality, high levels of noise from traffic and safer cars” are some of the reasons to make the move.

The automobile industry remains sceptical though. “I would love to see EV launched in Pakistan, but it means developing a huge set-up anew,” said Juzer Amreliwala, the chief executive officer of a Honda partner in Karachi.

“On the face of it, it looks great. But establishing proper after-sales set-up requires both capital and human investment. Although most dealerships have come quite far in technology development, much training is still needed,” he added.

Aware of the infrastructure that will be needed for EVs, the minister for climate change sees it as an opportunity with a whole new service industry and numerous livelihood options opening up. “Pakistan is thirsting for new business opportunities and markets. If we build our capacity technologically, Pakistan can become a hub for exporting EVs — especially two- and three-wheelers,” Mr Aslam said.

However, a potential problem with the policy is the plethora of government supervisors — nine ministries, the Higher Education Commission, the State Bank of Pakistan and various authorities in energy sectors. “This industry transcends so many domains that all these stakeholders had to be included,” ex­­plained Mr Aslam. “Interaction and cooperation between stakeholders are the mark of good governance.”

Vaqar Zakaria warns of the “vested interests” who may not like the transition. “Those that sell low quality fuel and cheat on quantity sold will not like it, the refiners will not like it, the car traders will not like it as the EVs will last longer, the industry as it presently will not like it, the FBR may say the government will lose taxes on imported fuel which are huge at the moment and a significant source of revenue for the government. But as a consumer I will be delighted… if they only let me import EVs and E-bikes at reasonable cost.”

HE Ali bin Ahmed al-Kuwari, Minister of Commerce and Industry, is leading Qatar’s delegation to the OIC High Level Public and Private Investment Conference, which is taking place in Istanbul from yesterday, under the theme of “Unleashing Intra-OIC Investment Opportunities: Investment for Solidarity and Development.” The conference will end today.
Qatar’s participation in the conference comes within the framework of its keenness to strengthen bilateral relations with Turkey and to bolster co-operation with OIC member states, while providing insight into the investment climate in Qatar and the opportunities that the State offers in various promising sectors.
In his remarks, al-Kuwari said the conference represented a key step towards promoting trade and investment co-operation and integration among Islamic countries.
Al-Kuwari noted that numerous international institutions have lowered their estimates for global growth for the current year, including the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which noted in its latest November 2019 report that the global economy will grow at the slowest pace since the global financial crisis at a rate of 2.9% in 2019 and an average of 2.9%-3% between 2020 and 2021.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) also projects that over 70% of economies around the world will experience a decline in GDP growth to 3.3% in the first half of the year compared to 3.6% in 2018, al-Kuwari added.
Al-Kuwari explained that these estimates reflect delicate geostrategic and economic changes that coincided with a slowdown in multilateral trade and the negative repercussions of political uncertainties, which are leading to rising economic nationalism and protectionist measures at the global trade level, which resulted in a slowdown in various global economic sectors, especially foreign direct investments.
Al-Kuwari said the decline in investment inflows was evident across OIC Member States, noting that FDI inflows into the OIC region stood at $107.4bn in 2018, dropping by $35.6bn compared 2011. Al-Kuwari noted that this decline reflects the magnitude of the challenges faced by investors in OIC countries, particularly in terms of restrictions imposed on the transfer of profits and foreign capital. Al-Kuwari called for the adoption of a comprehensive economic strategy to encourage investment inflows and stimulate growth in a way that reflects the economic capabilities and potential of member states in a bid to achieve economic integration and promote joint Islamic action.
Touching on Qatar’s economic performance, al-Kuwari explained that the Qatari economy saw a balanced and flexible performance in the midst of these global conditions.
In this context, al-Kuwari highlighted Qatar’s efforts to support the private sector and to diversify its economy in line with the National Development Strategy 2018-2022, which aims to promote the growth of added value sectors including the industrial, financial services and tourism sectors.
Al-Kuwari highlighted that Qatar has sought to speed up the implementation of key initiatives and measures aimed at cementing the country’s position as an attractive business and investment destination.
Touching on Qatar’s legislative environment, al-Kuwari emphasised Qatar’s keenness to consolidate foreign investment-friendly laws such as the law regulating the investment of non-Qatari capital in economic activity and the Free Zones Investment law, which allow investors up to 100% ownership.
Al-Kuwari noted that Qatar is embracing a policy of economic openness to effectively engage with global markets, and build fruitful international partnerships, by capitalising on its developed infrastructure such as Hamad International Airport and Hamad Port as well as free zones and logistical and industrial areas, which represent an important incentive for foreign companies to invest in non-oil sectors to tap local markets and expand their business into new regional markets.
Al-Kuwari elaborated on the Qatari-Turkish strategic partnership, which represents an inspiring model of bilateral regional alliances.
Al-Kuwari explained that Qatar and Turkey enjoy close and friendly relations, noting that these relations reflected positively on bilateral trade, which reached about QR5.69bn, the equivalent of $1.55bn between January and September 2019.
Al-Kuwari added that the growth in bilateral trade reflects the effectiveness of Qatari-Turkish joint measures and initiatives particularly the Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement that was signed in November 2018.
Al-Kuwari noted that this agreement represents a decisive step in bolstering economic integration between Qatar and Turkey, adding that the benefits of the agreement outweigh those secured within the framework of the World Trade Organisation in terms of preferential transactions and customs exemptions for goods and services as well as the incentives it offers to investment companies in both countries.
Al-Kuwari praised Turkish companies for contributing to the growth of the Qatari economy, noting that more than 535 Qatari-Turkish joint companies are currently operating in Qatar.
Al-Kuwari concluded his remarks, noting that the purpose of his participation in the conference is to bolster joint Islamic action in line with the OIC principles and objectives, and to develop co-operation and co-ordination mechanisms among member states to promote investments and to serve the developmental orientations and aspirations of people in terms of stability and prosperity.
During its participation in the conference, the Qatari delegation showcased the most prominent laws and legislations that the State ratified to stimulate foreign direct investments, in addition to the incentives and services offered to investors to streamline the submission of investment applications and the processing of transactions, and to eliminate obstacles that may face investors with relevant authorities, which will contribute to attracting foreign direct investments and enhancing Qatar’s competitive position in the region and beyond.
The conference aims to promote investments within the framework of the OIC by reducing obstacles that impede the flow of goods, services and financing between OIC member states and adopting mechanisms that facilitate business procedures.
The conference provides a platform for public and private policymakers in OIC member states to discuss issues of common interest including innovative financing sources for the development of the private sector and the enhancement of the global value chain as well as the role of export credit agencies in mitigating trade and political risks to encourage and protect investments, in addition to the dynamics of the private sector to enhance investment flows within OIC and the role of investment promotion agencies in promoting investments within the organisation’s framework among other topics aimed at enhancing sustainable partnerships between public and private sector stakeholders in member countries and stimulating investments in the region.
The High Level Public and Private Investment Conference is organised and sponsored by Turkey, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and the Islamic Development Bank. The conference, which sheds light on various sectors including the trade, agricultural and infrastructure sectors, brings together 750 participants from 56 countries, including heads of states, ministers, senior officials, decision makers and business leaders.

Spain is undergoing the biggest overhaul of its liquefied natural gas system in an eff ort to boost its role as a key storage and trading hub for the fuel. With more LNG terminals than any other country in Europe, Spain is turning its domestic-focused network into one more accessible to global traders. Starting next year, the country plans to reform its storage limits and fees that have in the past deterred shippers from stockpiling and reloading LNG there. The timing couldn’t be better as new plants from the US to Russia add ever more LNG to a market in a market that’s already testing storage limits. That supply glut resulted in a record number of LNG cargoes sailing to Europe last month, a trend poised to continue through the rest of the year.

“The high costs of using Spanish infrastructure meant that Spain largely lost out to other European countries in the reload arbitrage to Asian markets in 2017-18,” said Leyra Fernández Díaz, a global gas analyst at Energy Aspects Ltd. “This will likely no longer be the case after the reforms.” Spain’s terminals have about the same combined storage capacity as its two closest rivals, Britain and France, put together, according to Gas Infrastructure Europe. Spain also boasts the oldest working terminal in Europe, with its Barcelona facility in operation since 1968. From October next year, LNG traders using Spain’s terminals won’t need so- called bundled deals that oblige them to deliver gas into the nation’s grid. They’ll also be able to tender for space over set periods, a common practice at other European hubs. “LNG storage capacity will be off ered as an unbundled service through regular auctions as standard products: yearly, quarterly, monthly, daily and intra- daily,” said Agustin Alonso of Spain’s National Commission of Markets and Competition.

“Users will have to pay the price resulting from the auction for the whole amount of the capacity booked, regardless of whether they use it or not.” It’s a departure from the present system, which is geared toward supplying Spain, the European Union’s sixth-biggest gas user. Daily fees are charged for storage and stiff penalties are imposed for those who exceed set thresholds including how long they hold supplies. Abolishing those penalties will cut about $0.56/mmbtu from the cost of storing a cargo for a month, according to Energy Aspects. That’s about 10% of the current benchmark rate for LNG in Asia, the biggest user of the fuel. That would be welcome news to LNG traders who this summer and autumn had little choice but to dump cargoes in Spain as a wave of incoming supplies filled Europe’s storage sites. While Spain did import LNG as utilities burned more gas, what traders often need is a place to keep fuel for re-exporting or for use in the future. A reduction in tariff s still needs to be approved by the CNMC. Capacity products will be available from October 1, and the first auction of the yearly products will take place in September. Spain may still have a way to go to rival the trading hubs of Britain’s National Balancing Point and the Title Transfer Facility in the Netherlands.

Both have extensive cross-border pipeline links and liquid trading markets that Spain lacks. “This initiative might increase trading in Spain a little bit but will it make any diff erence to European gas trading? I doubt it,” said Patrick Heather, a senior research fellow at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. Even so, the reforms complement plans unveiled earlier this year to treat all of Spain’s LNG terminals as a single virtual hub. The aim is to boost trading between the ports and reduce congestion at a particular location. Current rules make traders trade within a specific terminal. “Storing at onshore LNG terminals in Spain is to become more competitive than floating storage,” Energy Aspects’ Fernandez Diaz said. “The creation of the virtual LNG hub will abolish costly penalties for storing LNG.”

or decades, gross domestic product has captured the attention of economists and policymakers around the world, offering a single, simple proxy for economic growth. Yet for all of its convenience, it is a poor proxy for human progress, and could easily be improved with a complementary metric that weighs citizens more equally.

WASHINGTON, DC – Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo, two of this year’s recipients of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, are the latest among leading economists to remind us that gross domestic product is an imperfect measure of human welfare. The Human Development Index, published by the United Nations Development Programme, aggregates indicators of life expectancy, education, and per capita income and has long been available as an alternative to per capita income alone. In 2008, Joseph E. Stiglitz, Amartya Sen, and Jean-Paul Fitoussi outlined the many failures of GDP for the French government-sponsored Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress. Subsequent OECD-sponsored work elaborated on their findings, and related research by the Brookings Institution’s Carol Graham (on subjective wellbeing) and Duke University’s Matthew Adler (on the measurement of social welfare) has received well-deserved acclaim.

Nonetheless, GDP continues to reign supreme in the halls of power. Policymakers around the world are constantly awaiting the latest quarterly data on GDP growth, and variations of one-tenth of a percentage point are regarded as significant indicators of macroeconomic performance. The International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook may include in-depth analysis across a wide range of topics, but it always starts with GDP.

To see why treating GDP growth as a proxy for progress even in terms of income alone is highly problematic, consider the case of a country with ten citizens and a GDP of $190, where nine citizens start with $10 each and the tenth citizen starts with $100. (Moreover, assume that GDP is equal to national income, so that net factor income from abroad is zero.)

Now, imagine that the first nine citizens experience no income growth in a given year, while the tenth enjoys a 10% increase. GDP will have increased from $190 to $200, implying an annual growth rate of approximately 5.26%. This is reflected in the usual way national income is computed. Individuals are weighed by their share of total income, and that 5.26% rate represents a weighted average in which the income growth of the tenth citizen counts nine times more than that of each of the other nine citizens.

Contrast this example with one in which the same country uses a “democratically” measured growth rate, weighing each individual equally as a share of the population rather than as a share of total income. Here, the growth rate would reflect the weighted sum of nine 0% growth rates and one 10% growth rate, each weighed at one-tenth, with a resulting total growth rate of 1%.

The weighing of individuals by their share of income is not generally perceived by the public. But this implicit practice is important to point out, because it enshrines the principle of one dollar, one vote, rather than one person, one vote. It is essential for assessing the total size of a market or the economic “power” of a country, but it does not capture an economy’s performance for its citizens.

BERLIN — The European Central Bank’s (ECB) decision in September to pursue more monetary-policy easing was controversial, with one board representative, from Germany, resigning over the move. But one of the most remarkable features of the ECB’s position has not gotten enough attention: the admission that inflation expectations have become de-anchored, and that without fiscal-policy support, the central bank will probably fail to fulfill its price-stability mandate for the foreseeable future.

In fact, many observers, and even several members of the ECB’s governing council, now argue that the bank needs to adapt its mandate with a new definition of price stability in mind. They are right, but there is one crucial caveat.

Since central-bank independence was strengthened in the 1990s, it has become clear that, in normal times, the specific mandate does not matter much. The United States Federal Reserve managed to guide expectations and achieve price stability with its dual mandate, price stability and maximum employment, just as well as the Bank of England or the ECB, with their narrower price-stability mandates.

After the global financial crisis, however, the traditional mandate proved inadequate to cope with large-scale financial instability, fickle market confidence and political paralysis. Developed-country central banks had to devise policies on the fly, without a guiding framework. Each in its own way pursued unprecedented monetary easing, massively expanding its balance sheet, in order to provide much-needed support to the economy.

In many ways, these measures succeeded: Monetary expansion played a major role in pulling the economy back from the brink. But, over time, central banks’ capacity to affect the real economy declined. Today, and for the foreseeable future, domestic inflation is increasingly affected by global, rather than local, developments, and financial (in)stability and fiscal policy are far more influential than monetary policy.

For the ECB, this generates a particularly serious challenge. After all, unlike other central banks, it must account for the preferences of 19 sovereign national governments, with little to no structural or fiscal-policy coordination. The eurozone is also highly fragmented financially, lacking a common capital market, a unifying safe asset or macroeconomic stabilisation tools.

The ECB needs a more realistic and flexible mandate. Given the eurozone’s fragmented nature, that mandate should probably still be centered on price stability. But it should also recognise that the current definition of price stability, “below, but close to, 2 per cent inflation over the medium term”, is too narrow.

A broader definition is needed, according to which the ECB pursues a symmetric inflation target of 2 per cent, within a 1.5-2.5 per cent band, over a longer time horizon. Some advocate an even higher target: For example, Olivier Blanchard, a former International Monetary Fund chief economist, has proposed re-anchoring expectations at 4 per cent. A different proposal, from New York Federal Reserve President John Williams, is to target a price level, rather than an inflation rate.

A commitment to more broadly defined price stability in the long term would give the ECB more space during times of crisis, thereby enabling it to account better for risks to financial stability and the real economy. This would help it to stabilise prices more quickly, bolstering its credibility.

By contrast, when the ECB consistently fails to meet its price-stability objective, as it has for the last five years, it loses credibility. And, indeed, the ECB has faced harsh criticism, sometimes warranted, often not, over its implementation of untested expansionary monetary policies since 2008, partly because the measures were often poorly understood by the public. The loss of credibility has undermined the ECB’s capacity to fulfill its objectives, creating a vicious circle that threatens its de facto independence.

This is why the timing of any mandate change must be chosen very carefully. If the ECB tries to move the goalpost while it is missing the shot, the short-term blow to its already diminished credibility could be serious. Given this, the ECB must work to strengthen its standing before it adjusts its mandate, including by attempting to reach the existing price-stability objective after years of failure.

At the same time, the ECB must communicate better what its capabilities are. Some have urged the ECB to try addressing the solvency problems of banks or governments during the crisis. Others would like the ECB to discipline governments to do the “right” thing and consolidate spending. A central bank must do neither and would utterly fail if it tried. But these attempts have hurt the ECB’s standing, particularly in Germany, and have diminished its credibility.

Clarifying the contents of the ECB’s policy toolbox, including sovereign-bond purchases and other non-standard measures, would go a long way toward protecting the ECB from such attacks in the future. And when the time comes to shift its objectives, the ECB must communicate the change, which, to be sure, may not need to be as big as many believe, clearly and thoroughly.

US President John F. Kennedy was right: the time to repair the roof is when the sun is shining. The ECB cannot revise its mandate until the current storm has passed. But, with water pouring in, it cannot afford to wait very long. The sooner the ECB does what is needed to restore its credibility, the sooner it can do what is needed to protect itself from future storms.

Marcel Fratzscher, a former senior manager at the European Central Bank, is president of the think tank DIW Berlin and professor of macroeconomics and finance at Humboldt University of Berlin. ©Project Syndicate, 2019 . www.project-syndicate.org

German energy group E.ON plans a £500mn ($642mn) break-up of the struggling British Npower division it inherited from Innogy, which a union said could put up to 4,500 jobs at risk.
The revamp, the latest among established British retail power providers, effectively removes one of the market’s so-called ‘Big Six’ players, which have lost customers to nimbler recent entrants and been hit by a regulatory price cap.
E.ON’s plan includes managing Npower’s residential and small and medium-size business customers on the same platform as its own, while putting Npower’s industrial and commercial customers into a separate business.
The rest of Npower will be closed.
E.ON chief executive Johannes Teyssen said the group would examine options for Npower’s industrial and commercial business, the division’s only profitable part, suggesting it might be sold at some point.
The shake-up will result in up to 4,500 job losses at Npower, British union UNISON said, nearly 80% of the division’s total staff.
“The UK market has been very challenging for several years,” Teyssen said. “Churn (customer switching) rates are high, margins slim, and the price caps introduced this year have exacerbated the situation.
No company operating there has been spared these difficulties.”
Teyssen said talks with British unions about the plans had started. Shares in E.ON were up 1.6% at 0951 GMT.
“We see this initial update as encouraging, given likely low market expectations around the outlook for Npower,” Jefferies analysts wrote, keeping a “buy” rating on E.ON stock.
Npower has been suffering more than its large rivals, including E.ON itself, Centrica’s, SSE, EDF and Iberdrola, partly because of internal billing problems.
E.ON said it expected its combined British business to achieve at least 100mn pounds of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) and positive free cash flow from 2022 onwards. E.ON took over Npower as part of a far-reaching asset swap with RWE that included the break up of Innogy.
The deal, first announced in March 2018, has turned E.ON into a pure energy retail and networks group.
As a result of the transaction, E.ON’s net debt nearly doubled to €39.6bn ($43.7bn) at the end of September.
E.ON also said yesterday the deal had led it to raise its 2019 adjusted EBIT forecast to €3.1-3.3bn from 2.9-3.1bn.
In the first nine months of the year, adjusted EBIT fell 6% at €2.2bn.