Japanese LNG buyer seeking price arbitration in possible ‘bellwether’
An effort by a Japanese company to get lower prices on a liquefi ed natural gas contract signed a decade ago could be the first in a fl ood as buyers seek relief from legacy contracts amid cheaper spot supplies, according to an analyst at Credit Suisse Group AG. “This will prove the bellwether for more arbitrations and tougher LNG buyer negotiating stances across the market,” analyst Saul Kavonic said in an e-mail. “We expect other traditional LNG buyers to quickly follow suit.” The market will be awaiting what concessions Osaka Gas Co will be able to wrest from the marketing unit of the Exxon Mobil Corp’s PNG LNG project. They entered into arbitration after a dispute during a price review, a spokesman for the Japanese fi rm said Friday, adding that the company is seeking to lower LNG costs. Exxon declined to comment. The dispute underscores the frustrations of buyers locked in contracts linked to oil benchmarks while spot prices drop to the lowest seasonal level in a decade. Most of Japan’s LNG imports are indexed to oil, which has remained a widespread practice since its inception in the 1960s. Sinking prices have put LNG producers under intense pressure to off er better terms. Even Qatar, one of the world’s largest suppliers, made a “dramatic” break from tradition by offering mid-term LNG contracts at about an 11% oil slope, compared to more than 16% on some contracts signed in 2008, Fereidun Fesharaki, chairman of energy consultant FGE, said in May. The Osaka Gas contract with the PNG LNG project was agreed at a 15% slope to the Japan Crude Cocktail and runs through 2035, according to data compiled by Bloomberg NEF. Prices in the utility’s current PNG LNG contract are more than double those on the spot market and about 30% more than recently signed contracts, Kavonic said. A shift to a buyers’ market has emboldened consumers that historically have been concerned about security of supply to seek greater contract fl exibility and lower prices. “It’s unprecedented for a traditional LNG buyer to initiate arbitration in this way, presenting a new paradigm for LNG contract negotiations,” said Kavonic.
NEW YORK – This month marks the 75th anniversary of the signing of the Bretton Woods agreement, which established the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. For the IMF, it also marks the start of the process of selecting a new managing director to succeed Christine Lagarde, who has resigned following her nomination to be European Central Bank president. There is no better moment to reconsider the IMF’s global role.
The most positive role that the IMF has played throughout its history has been to provide crucial financial support to countries during balance-of-payments crises. But the conditionality attached to that support has often been controversial. In particular, the policies that the IMF demanded of Latin American countries in the 1980s and in Eastern Europe and East Asia in the 1990s saddled the Fund’s programs with a stigma that triggers adverse reactions to this day.
It can be argued that the recessionary effects of IMF programs are less harmful than adjustments under the pre-Bretton Woods gold standard. Nonetheless, the IMF’s next managing director should oversee the continued review and streamlining of conditionality, as occurred in 2002 and 2009.
The IMF has made another valuable contribution by helping to strengthen global macroeconomic cooperation. This has proved particularly important during periods of turmoil, including in the 1970s, following the abandonment of the Bretton Woods fixed-exchange-rate system, and in 2007-2009, during the global financial crisis. (The IMF also led the gold-demonetization process in the 1970s and 1980s.)
But, increasingly, the IMF has been relegated to a secondary role in macroeconomic cooperation, which has tended to be led by ad hoc groupings of major economies – the G10, the G7, and, more recently, the G20 – even as the Fund has provided indispensable support, including analyses of global macro conditions. The IMF, not just the “Gs,” should serve as a leading forum for international coordination of macroeconomic policies.
At the same time, the IMF should promote the creation of new mechanisms for monetary cooperation, including regional and inter-regional reserve funds. In fact, the IMF of the future should be the hub of a network of such funds. Such a network would underpin the “global financial safety net” that has increasingly featured in discussions of international monetary issues.
The IMF should also be credited for its prudent handling of international capital flows. The Bretton Woods agreement committed countries gradually to reduce controls on trade and other current-account payments, but not on capital flows. An attempt to force countries to liberalize their capital accounts was defeated in 1997. And, since the global financial crisis, the IMF has recommended the use of some capital-account regulations as a “macroprudential” tool to manage external-financing booms and busts.
Yet some IMF initiatives, though important, have not had the impact they should have had. Consider Special Drawing Rights, the only truly global currency, which was created in 1969. Although SDR allocations have played an important role in creating liquidity and supplementing member countries’ official reserves during major crises, including in 2009, the instrument has remained underused.
The IMF should rely on SDRs more actively, especially in terms of its own lending programs, treating unused SDRs as “deposits” that can be used to finance loans to countries. This would be particularly important when there is a significant increase in demand for its resources during crises, because it would effectively enable the IMF to “print money,” much like central banks do during crises, but at the international level.
This should be matched by the creation of new lending instruments – a process that ought to build on the reforms that were adopted in the wake of the global financial crisis. As IMF staff have proposed – and as the G20 Eminent Persons Group on Global Financial Governance recommended last year – the Fund should establish a currency-swap arrangement for short-term lending during crises. Central banks from developed countries often enter into bilateral swap arrangements, but these arrangements generally marginalize emerging and developing economies.
Then there are the IMF initiatives that have failed altogether. Notably, in 2001-2003, attempts to agree on a sovereign debt-workout mechanism collapsed, due to opposition from the United States and some major emerging economies.
To be sure, the IMF has made important contributions with regard to sovereign debt crises, offering regular analysis of the capacity of countries in crisis to repay, and advising them to restructure debt that is unsustainable. But a debt-workout mechanism is still needed, and should be put back on the agenda.
Finally, the IMF needs ambitious governance reforms. Most important, building on reforms that were approved in 2010, but went into effect only in 2016, the Fund should ensure that quotas and voting power better reflect the growing influence of emerging and developing economies. To this end, the IMF must end its practice of appointing only European managing directors, just as the World Bank must start considering non-US citizens to be its president.
Lagarde’s departure represents a golden opportunity to put the IMF on the path toward a more effective and inclusive future. Seizing it means more than welcoming a new face at the top.