By Roudi Baroudi

Lebanon, Beirut – 07/01/2026

January 1 marked a watershed moment for Cyprus, the first day of a six-month stint in the rotating presidency of the European Union that will give the tiny island nation massive influence, not just over the current agenda, but also the future direction of the entire EU and the destiny of the Eastern Mediterranean region.

The real significance of the moment lay not in the position itself, though, nor even in the considerable (but temporary) increase of Nicosia’s raw political power. In fact, this is not even the first time that Cyprus has held the presidency; that came in the second half of 2012.

Instead, what makes this time different is that a) the Cypriot leadership has laid out a highly ambitious agenda, one designed to generate recurring benefits for both the EU and its Mediterranean neighbors; b) regional circumstances cry out for precisely the kind of engagement that Nicosia envisions; and c) Cyprus today is far better-equipped to advance its politico-diplomatic goals than it was in 2012, not just because its economy and finances are in better shape, but also because it is now on the verge of becoming become an oil and gas producer and exporter. If well-managed, this latter point figures to drive growth for decades to come, enabling historic investments in education, healthcare, transport, and other drivers of greater economic competitiveness and better living standards, not to mention greater ability to influence – and stabilize – the surrounding region.

None of this has happened overnight. Geography and history have situated Cyprus – both literally and figuratively – athwart what is both our planet’s most long-lived maritime trade route and its most famous crossroads of different languages, cultures, faiths, and ethnicities. The island’s copper and other resources have always had their own attractiveness, rising or falling in value depending on the period, but it was location – specifically its proximity to each of Asia, Africa, and Europe – that made Cyprus a strategic prize for millennia, and that same location gives it enormous potential today.

None of this has happened overnight. Geography and history have situated Cyprus – both literally and figuratively – athwart what is both our planet’s most long-lived maritime trade route and its most famous crossroads of different languages, cultures, faiths, and ethnicities. The island’s copper and other resources have always had their own attractiveness, rising or falling in value depending on the period, but it was location – specifically its proximity to each of Asia, Africa, and Europe – that made Cyprus a strategic prize for millennia, and that same location gives it enormous potential today.

For decades, the centerpiece of this toolkit has been a foreign policy which seeks friendly relations with as many countries – especially neighboring ones – as possible. And it has worked. Both during and since the Cold War, for example, Nicosia has been able to maintain working relationships with governments on both sides of the East/West divide, and its search for neutrality has been equally assiduous on the Arab-Israeli front. By habitually staking out the middle ground, Cyprus has not only insulated itself against most external problems, but also steadily burnished its bona fides as a helpful player on the international stage.

All of this helped, but it was not enough. Try as Cyprus might to parlay its neutrality into tangible benefits at home and abroad, its economy remained fragile and unbalanced, distracting and undermining the freedom of action of successive governments. After its banks had to be rescued with EU bailout funds in 2012-2013, support began to grow for reforms that would prevent future meltdowns, restore the stability of the financial services industry, and rebuild its ability to finance private and public activities alike.

By the time President Nikos Christodoulides took office in early 2023, Cypriots of all persuasions were fed up with “business as usual”. Because he had run as an independent and attracted support from a broad cross-section of society, he had a strong mandate to make sweeping changes, and these have included an increase in the minimum wage, income tax cuts for working people, more effective financial regulation, and a far-reaching program for digital transformation. His administration also has run a tight fiscal ship, dramatically reducing public debt (from 115% of GDP in 2020 to a forecast 65% for 2025) and thereby making more credit available to the private sector. As a result, Cyprus’ sovereign rating was upgraded by all three of the major credit rating agencies in 2024, and as of this writing, two of them regard its outlook as positive, while the third views it as stable.

At the same time, Christodoulides’ background as a professional diplomat has empowered him to focus closely and effectively on foreign policy, recognizing its capacity to help shield the island against exogenous shocks, shore up the stability required to pursue its domestic social and economic development goals, and restore regional stability in the aftermath of the war in Gaza. It is no surprise, therefore, that his government has been at the center of international efforts to assist Palestinian refugees affected by the conflict, making Cyprus the staging ground for a vital flow of relief supplies.

Earlier this year, Christodoulides also teamed up with his Lebanese counterpart, President Joseph Aoun, to make sure their respective negotiating teams finally concluded a long-awaited maritime boundary agreement. The MBA clearly defines who owns what on the seabed, making both countries’ offshore hydrocarbon sectors more attractive, especially to the major oil and gas companies whose capabilities will be required to explore, develop, and extract the resources in question. Nicosia and Beirut are considering several other agreements as well, including ones that would expand cooperation in electricity and other fields, but the MBA was crucial because of the doubts it removed and the doors it opened.

All of these factors are steering the entire Eastern Mediterranean region to what can only be described as its “Cyprus moment”: the day when this miniscule country finally rises to its full stature as an exemplar of effective governance at home and a voice for peace and prosperity abroad. By some measures, this moment has already arrived, but the first exports of Cypriot natural gas to the European mainland will leave no doubt, and those are currently planned for late 2027.

Some say that timeline will be difficult to meet, but the positive effects are already being felt, and historians looking back will rightly regard the precise start state as a footnote. The economy has responded well to treatment, growth is expected to average 3% for the next couple of years, and diversification is already under way, including a variety of technology-related businesses that are helping to reduce the island’s traditional reliance on tourism and construction.

Most importantly, the buzz generated by offshore hydrocarbons has attracted the attention of international investors, and they like what they see: in addition to its prime location and increasingly sophisticated workforce, Cyprus also offers some of the EU’s most favorable tax conditions, strong investment protections, and a common law legal system modeled on the United Kingdom’s, making it more familiar and easier to use for many outsiders. The result? Over the past few years, hundreds of companies have relocated to Cyprus, including some 270 in 2024 alone, adding at least 10,000 new jobs to the island’s economy.

When gas production starts adding extra motive force to the economy, even more opportunities will open up. The advent of domestic energy production will not only spur employment both directly and indirectly, but also reduce the country’s need for expensive energy imports, and put downward pressure on domestic energy prices across the board, imparting a key competitive advantage on the entire economy. If all goes according to plan, this would be just the beginning, because while the savings and security enabled by production will be significant, the really lucrative next step will be exports, and Western Europe – the world’s hungriest energy market – is right next door.

As luck would have it, one of the island’s first commercially operational undersea gas fields figures to be Cronos, which lies within easy distance of existing Egyptian infrastructure, meaning its production can be easily piped to the Egyptian processing facility at Damietta and then delivered to European customers by LNG carrier. Nicosia’s plan is for this flow to begin in 2027, but again, that is just the beginning: Cyprus also expects the nearby Aphrodite field to be a major money spinner, and the plan there is to install a Floating Production Storage and Offloading Unit directly above the deposit. This would enable both dry gas shipments for use in Egypt and further production of LNG for export further afield.

In the longer term, other streams are under consideration as well, including undersea pipelines to Greece, Italy, and/or (one day) even Turkey, and possibly a fully fledged liquefaction plant onshore that would be far and away the largest infrastructure project in Cypriot history. The investments being made and planned now are expected to fundamentally alter the path of Cyprus’ economic and social development. What is more, if and when the time comes, the same infrastructure could also be used to help neighbors like Lebanon and Syria, both of whose coasts are less than 100 nautical miles away, to get their own gas to market. That could be crucial in enabling both of those countries to start recovering and rebuilding after decades of stagnation, and like Cyprus itself, the EU at large has a vested interest in seeing peace and prosperity spread across the Levant.

These and other factors give Cyprus’ strategy a level of importance that goes beyond the purely national. Gas exports to Europe also will help increase the EU’s energy independence, for example, further reducing continuing dependance on Russian energy supplies, and strengthening Europe’s position in any negotiations over the situation in Ukraine. An LNG plant also would make affordable primary energy supplies available to several African countries, enabling them to pursue the electrification strategies they need to modernize their own economies. Again, Europe has countless reasons to want a stabler, happier Africa on its doorstep, beginning with the fact that this would automatically reduce the flow of undocumented migrants making their way across the Med.

The Cypriot approach is nothing less than inspiring, especially since it springs from the very same wells of good will, good governance, and good sense that inspired the Barcelona Declaration more than 30 years ago. The EU envisioned by Barcelona, a strong and cohesive bloc closely integrated with vibrant neighborhoods in the MENA region, has been long-delayed by the collapse of what was then a promising Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and some countries have largely given up on that dream.

Clearly, Cyprus is not one of those countries. Instead, it has wagered on cooperation, weaving good governance and sensible diplomacy into a bold and hopeful venture.

No longer is Cyprus just a sunny little island filled with charming holiday homes and ringed with the Mediterranean’s cleanest beaches; now it is also going to be a regional energy hub, a magnet for international investment, a docking mechanism to help its non-EU neighbors access European markets, and a catalyst for EU dialogue and engagement with Africa and Asia. In short, the country has refashioned itself into the ultimate “project of common interest” – a venture that serves so many useful purposes, both inside and outside the bloc, that it verily demands support from Brussels.

The before and after contrast is increasingly striking. Once a fragile neophyte dependent on handouts from Brussels, today’s Cyprus has transformed itself into the very model of a Euro-Mediterranean country envisioned by the Barcelona process: a hopeful, peaceful, and universally useful land whose success promises only more opportunities for its friends and neighbors.

Cyprus: The Euro-Med region’s ultimate ‘country of common interest’ is about to have its moment            

Following criticism of the Lebanon-Cyprus Maritime Boundary Agreement (MBA) by the governments of Israel and Turkiye, LebTalks spoke with energy and policy expert Roudi Baroudi, who has authored several books and studies on sea borders in the Eastern Mediterranean. Baroudi praised the pact as “full of positives” for the interests of both parties and stressed the words of Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, who pledged after signing the MBA that “this agreement targets no one and excludes no one.”

LebTalks: How significant is the signing of the maritime boundary agreement between Lebanon and Cyprus?

RB: The official signing of the Lebanon-Cyprus deal is a major achievement, one that confers important advantages on both parties. This process was delayed for a very long time for no good reason, so President Joseph Aoun and the government deserve congratulations for having seized the initiative, and for having seen the job through to completion. So do Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides and his team, because they did the same thing. What made this historic agreement possible – after an impasse lasting almost two decades – was that Lebanon finally had a president who both understood the need for an MBA and made achieving it a top priority.

LebTalks: What does Lebanon gain by signing this deal?

RB: The agreement, which was reached by the negotiating teams in September, provides several benefits for both countries in the short, medium, and long terms.

The new equidistance line between the two states, defined according to the rules and guidelines of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), provides a fair and largely uniform boundary between the two brotherly countries’ maritime zones. Most of the new turning points used to draw the line have moved in Lebanon’s favor compared to the earlier negotiation in 2011, giving it an extra 10,200 meters on its western front while Cyprus received 2,760 meters.

Crucially, the MBA wipes away all overlapping claims caused by previous uncertainty over the precise location of the border. Accordingly, this eliminates 108 km2 of (map attached) Lebanese offshore blocks that were actually in Cypriot waters, as well as 14 km2 of Cypriot blocks which were also on the wrong side of the line.

Apart from removing a key risk for would-be investors, the agreement also contributes to stability and security by providing clarity and thereby enabling easier cooperation, not just bilateral, but also, potentially, involving other states as well. It really is full of positives for both Lebanon and Cyprus, and therefore for the region as a whole.

LebTalks: What should Lebanon do to follow up on this agreement?

RB: To make the most of this clearer playing field, the logical next step is for Lebanon and Cyprus to immediately start drafting a joint development agreement, which would allow them to have a smooth partnership in place for any hydrocarbon reserves which are found to straddle their maritime boundary.

Perhaps the most important feature of the Lebanon-Cyprus MBA is that it provides a clear and stable starting point, putting Lebanon in ideal position to finish defining its maritime zones. The new line means that Lebanon’s existing maritime boundary arrangements with Israel, signed in 2022, should be tweaked a little, but it also makes it easier to do that – and to negotiate a similar agreement in the north with Syria when that country’s new leadership is ready to do so.

LebTalks: What about the objections voiced by Irael and Turkiye?

RB: With all due respect, these claims and complaints are completely baseless. As President Aoun has stressed from the very day it was signed, this accord targets no one, excludes no one, challenges no one else’s borders, and undermines no one else’s interests. I know there has been some negative commentary from both Israel and Turkiye, but there really is nothing here for anyone to be upset about. The line agreed to by Lebanon and Cyprus, which Turkiye has claimed is ‘unfair’ to residents of the self-styled ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’, is literally several kilometers away from any waters claimed by the TRNC. Beirut and Nicosia were very careful to make sure of this.

As for the Israelis, the only material change relating to the Lebanon-Cyprus line is that it pushes the Israel-Cyprus line in Cyprus’ favor. But that’s not Lebanon’s fault. Or Cyprus’ or anyone else’s. It’s just a fact of new mapping technologies, which today are far more precise and more accurate than those used when the Israel-Cyprus line was drawn in their 2011 treaty.

On that subject, I would also note for all stakeholders in the East Med that while Lebanon and Cyprus are the region’s only full-fledged members of UNCLOS, all states are subject to its rules and precedents, which have become part of Customary International Law. Since the Lebanon-Cyprus deal adheres strictly to those rules and the science behind them, the criticisms haven’t got a legal leg to stand on. This is especially true with regard to Israel, whose own treaty with Cyprus was negotiated on the basis of the very same laws, rules, and science.

I have to assume that a lot of this is posturing, that both Israel and Turkiye will settle down once they’ve had more time to analyze the deal and see that, far from damaging them in any way, it could help all concerned by contributing to regional stability and economic growth. And again, I would go back to Aoun’s words on signing day, when he declared that “this agreement should be a foundation for wider regional cooperation, replacing the language of violence, war, and ambitions of domination with stability and prosperity.”

The official signing of the Maritime Boundary Agreement (MBA) between Lebanon and Cyprus is a major achievement, one that confers important advantages on both parties. This process was delayed for a very long time for no good reason, so President Joseph Aoun and the government deserve congratulations for having seized the initiative and for having seen the job through to completion. So do Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides and his team, because they did the same thing.

The agreement, which was reached by the negotiating teams in September, provides several benefits for both countries in the short, medium, and long terms.

The new equidistance line between the two states, defined according to the rules and guidelines of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), provides a fair and largely uniform boundary between the two brotherly countries’ maritime zones. Most of the new turning points used to draw the line have moved in Lebanon’s favor compared to the earlier negotiation in 2011, giving it an extra 10,200 meters on its western front while Cyprus received 2,760 meters.

Crucially, the MBA wipes away all overlapping claims caused by previous uncertainty over the precise location of the border. Accordingly, this eliminates 108 km² of Lebanese offshore blocks that were in Cypriot waters, as well as 14 km² of Cypriot blocks that were also on the wrong side of the line.

Apart from removing a key risk for would-be investors, the agreement also contributes to stability and security by providing clarity and thereby enabling easier cooperation. To make the most of this clearer playing field, the logical next step is for Lebanon and Cyprus to immediately start drafting a joint development agreement, which would allow them to have a smooth partnership in place for any hydrocarbon reserves that are found to straddle their maritime boundary.

Perhaps the most important feature of the Lebanon-Cyprus MBA is that it provides a clear and stable starting point, putting Lebanon in an ideal position to finish defining its maritime zones. The new line means that Lebanon’s existing maritime boundary arrangements with Israel, signed in 2022, should be tweaked a little, but it also makes it easier to do that—and to negotiate a similar agreement in the north with Syria when that country’s new leadership is ready to do so.

The upcoming UN Climate Change Conference (COP30) will be the first to take place in the Amazon, sending a powerful symbolic message about the central role developing economies must play in the global response to the climate crisis. But at a time of geopolitical fragmentation and low trust in multilateralism, symbolism is not enough. Developing economies must plan and propel the green transition. Africa is no exception.

So far, Africa’s climate narrative has been one of victimhood: the continent contributes less than 4% of global greenhouse-gas emissions, but it is highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. This disparity fuelled the calls for “climate justice” that helped to produce ambitious climate-financing pledges from the industrialised economies at past COPs. But with those pledges going unfulfilled, and Africa’s climate-finance needs rising fast, moral appeals are clearly not enough.

A shift to a more strategy-oriented discourse is already underway. The Second Africa Climate Summit (ACS2), which took place in Addis Ababa last month, positioned the continent as a united actor capable of shaping global climate negotiations. It also produced several initiatives, such as the Africa Climate Innovation Compact and the African Climate Facility, that promise to strengthen Africa’s position in efforts to ensure a sustainable future.

Instead of continuing to wait for aid, Africa is now seeking to attract investment in its green transition, not because rich countries “owe” Africans – though they do – but rather because Africa can help the world tackle climate change. But success will require progress on four fronts, all of which will be addressed at COP30.

The first is the cost of capital. Because systemic bias is embedded in credit-rating methodologies and global prudential rules, African countries face the world’s highest borrowing costs. This deters private capital, without which climate finance cannot flow at scale. While multilateral development banks (MDBs) can help to bridge the gap, they typically favour loans – which increase African countries’ already-formidable debt burdens – rather than grants.

At COP29, developed economies agreed to raise “at least” $300bn per year for developing-country climate action by 2035, as part of a wider goal for all actors to mobilise at least $1.3tn per year. If these targets are to be reached, however, systemic reform is essential. This includes changes to MDB governance, so that African countries have a greater voice, and increased grant-based financing. Reform also must include recognition of African financial institutions with preferred creditor status, and the cultivation of a new Africa-led financial architecture that lowers the cost of capital.

The second area where progress is essential is carbon markets. Despite its huge potential for nature-based climate solutions, Africa captures only 16% of the global carbon-credit market. Moreover, the projects are largely underregulated and poorly priced, with limited community involvement. Africa is now at risk of falling into a familiar trap: supplying cheap offsets for external actors’ emissions, while reaping few benefits for its people.

While some African countries are developing their own carbon-market regulations, a fragmented system will have limited impact. What Africa needs is an integrated carbon market, regulated by Africans, to ensure the quality of projects, set fair prices, and channel revenues toward local development priorities, including conservation, renewable energy, and resilient agriculture. This system should be linked with Article 6 of the Paris climate agreement, which aims to facilitate the voluntary trading of carbon credits among countries.

The third imperative for Africa at COP30 is to redefine adaptation. Rather than treating it primarily as a humanitarian project, governments must integrate adaptation into their industrial policies. After all, investment in climate-resilient agriculture, infrastructure, and water systems generates jobs, fosters innovation, and spurs market integration.

By linking adaptation to industrialisation, Africa can continue what it started at ACS2, shifting the narrative from vulnerability to value creation. Africa should push for this approach to be reflected in the indicators for the Global Goal on Adaptation, which are set to be finalised at COP30. The continent’s leaders should also call for adaptation finance to be integrated into broader trade and technology frameworks.

The final priority area for Africa at COP30 is critical minerals. Africa possesses roughly 85% of the world’s manganese, 80% of its platinum and chromium, 47% of its cobalt, 21% of its graphite, and 6% of its copper. In 2022, the Democratic Republic of the Congo alone accounted for over 70% of global cobalt production.

But Africa knows all too well that natural-resource wealth does not necessarily translate into economic growth and development. Only by building value chains on the continent can Africa avoid the “resource curse” and ensure that its critical-mineral wealth generates local jobs and industries. This imperative must be reflected in discussions within the Just Transition Work Programme at COP30.

These four priorities are linked by a deeper philosophical imperative. The extractive logic of the past – in which industrialisation depended on exploitation and destruction – must give way to a more holistic, just, and balanced approach, which recognises that humans belong to nature, not the other way around. Africa can help to lead this shift, beginning at COP30.

The barriers to progress are formidable. China likes to tout South-South solidarity, but it does not necessarily put its money where its mouth is. The European Union is struggling to reconcile competing priorities and cope with political volatility. The US will not attend COP30 at all, potentially emboldening others to resist ambitious action. If consensus proves elusive, parties might pursue “mini-lateral” deals, which sideline Africa.

When it comes to the green transition, Africa’s interests are everyone’s interests. If the continent is locked into poverty and fossil-fuel dependency, global temperatures will continue to rise rapidly. But if Africa is empowered to achieve green industrialisation, the rest of the world will gain a critical ally in the fight for a sustainable future. – Project Syndicate

• Carlos Lopes, COP30 Special Envoy for Africa, is Chair of the African Climate Foundation Board and a professor at the Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance at the University of Cape Town.

قال الخبير في شؤون الطاقة رودي بارودي في مقابلة حصرية مع LebTalks: “إن اتفاقية الحدود البحرية بين لبنان وقبرص خطوة رائعة وضرورية وتعطينا الأمل، لأنها لا تقتصر على تحديد أساس للتعاون بين الفريقين، بل تسهم أيضاً في تقليص المخاطر عليهما، وتُظهر للمنطقة والعالم مدى فاعلية الحوار والديبلوماسية”.

ولفت بارودي إلى أن “هذه الخطوة تُتوّج مساراً تأخر بلا داعٍ لما يقارب العقدين أذ كان مجمّداً منذ العام 2007، ما يجعل الإنجاز أكثر قيمة،معتبرا أن رئيس الحكومة نواف سلام وفريقه قاموا بدورهم من خلال دعم الاتفاق، لكن الفضل في تحريك الملف من الجانب اللبناني يعود بالدرجة الأولى إلى الرئيس عون، ولذلك يُعتبر هذا إنجازاً شخصياً له،وينطبق الأمر ذاته على الرئيس القبرصي نيكوس خريستودوليدس، فهذه محطة تاريخية للبلدين معاً”.

وعن أهمية هذه المعاهدة، أوضح بارودي أن “تسوية الحدود البحرية أمر بالغ الأهمية في الوقت الراهن، لأنها تفتح الباب أمام فرص جديدة، فالاتفاق يجعل لبنان أكثر جاذبية للشركاء الدوليين الكبار الذين يحتاج إليهم لتطوير قطاع النفط والغاز البحري الناشئ. وإذا تمكّن هذا القطاع من ان يحقق جزء بسيط من إمكاناته، فإن الفوائد ستصل إلى كل الاقتصاد اللبناني تقريباً، ما يجعل من هذا الاتفاق سبباً للاحتفال الوطني. والأمر نفسه ينطبق على قبرص“.

و هنّأ بارودي الحكومة اللبنانية على قرار منح حقوق الاستكشاف في البلوك البحري رقم 8 إلى ائتلاف دولي قوي وذو سمعة ممتازة يضم شركات توتال اينرجي الفرنسية وإيني الإيطالية وقطر للطاقة القطرية، لافتاً إلى أن هذين القرارين يمهّدان الطريق أمام مستقبل يصبح فيه لبنان دولة منتجة ومصدّرة للغاز، ما يوفّر زخماً غير مسبوق لاقتصاد في أمسّ الحاجة إلى كل دعم”.

لكن بارودي حذّر من أن الطريق لا يزال طويلاً أمام التنفيذ الفعلي، قائلاً: “الخطوة الأهم الآن هي المتابعة فعلى الحكومة أن تُنفّذ سلسلة من الإصلاحات المطلوبة منها، وأن تستثمر في بناء القدرات، وتُبقي على الكفاءات والخبرات لإدارة الموارد البحرية وصونها كما أن لبنان يحتاج إلى اتفاق لترسيم الحدود البحرية والبرية مع سوريا،و تحديد نقطة ثلاثية على ذلك الجانب بين لبنان وقبرص وسوريا،وهناك مؤشرات إيجابية مع الحكومة السورية الجديدة”.

وتابع بارودي قائلاً إن على بيروت أيضاً أن تضع خطة واضحة لتطوير قطاع النفط والغاز البحري: و”أغتنم هذه المناسبة لأقترح أن تبادر الحكومة اللبنانية فوراً إلى دعوة نظيرتها القبرصية للتفاوض حول اتفاق تطوير مشترك، ينظّم تقاسم أي موارد نفطية أو غازية مشتركة تقع على جانبي الحدود البحرية،فإبرام اتفاق بهذا الخصوص سيجعل قطاعي الطاقة البحريين في كلا البلدين أكثر جاذبية للمستثمرين”.
وختم بارودي بحماسة قائلاً: “هذه هي الأبواب التي فُتحت أمامنا بفضل اتفاق ترسيم الحدود البحري . لذا، مرة أخرى، نتقدّم بالشكر والتهنئة إلى الرئيس عون والرئيس خريستودوليدس على حكمتهما في السعي وراء هذا الاتفاق، وشجاعتهما في المثابرة حتى النهاية”.

The decision of the Council of Ministers to approve Lebanon’s maritime boundary agreement (MBA) with Cyprus is a genuine tour de force, a feather in the cap for President Joseph Aoun and his government.

This step caps a process that was unnecessarily delayed for almost two decades, but that only makes this achievement more gratifying.

Having settled maritime boundaries is crucial right now because of the opportunities it opens up. The agreement makes Lebanon much more attractive to the major international partners it needs to develop its nascent offshore oil and gas sector. If and when that sector reaches even a small fraction of its potential, the benefits should flow to virtually every corner of the Lebanese economy, so everyone in the country should really celebrate this.

As if to punctuate the moment, the Council of Ministers also awarded the rights to a key offshore area, Block 8, to a reputable international consortium consisting of France’s TotalEnergies, Italy’s ENI, and Qatar’s QatarEnergy.

Together, these moves help to pave the road toward a future in which Lebanon becomes an energy producer and exporter, adding unprecedented momentum to an economy that desperately needs it.

These are both major milestones, and the government – along with President Joseph Aoun, whose own leadership on the border deal was crucial to initiating the negotiations – deserves plenty of credit.

The important part now is the follow-up. The government still needs to implement a long list of reforms, invest in capacity building, and retain competent personnel and managers to steward and safeguard the country’s offshore resources. It also will need to do its homework on how best to nurture that offshore business.

There is so much to be done – but so much to be claimed by doing it! Getting the MBL with Cyprus finalized was at the top of the list, and resolving Block 8 was not far down, so the government deserves congratulations for both.

And since I mentioned nurturing, I also take this opportunity to propose that the Lebanese government immediately invite its Cypriot counterpart to negotiate another crucial deal: a joint development agreement, or JDA, which would govern the sharing of any oil and/or gas resources which straddle their border at sea. Setting up a JDA now would not only prevent possible delays in the future – it also would make both countries’ offshore energy sectors even more attractive to investors.

Οι τεταμένες σχέσεις Ισραήλ-Λιβάνου και οι ραγδαίες εξελίξεις στη Μέση Ανατολή έχουν κινητοποιήσει τη Λευκωσία για επαφές υψηλού επιπέδου για την επικύρωση της ΑΟΖ με το Λίβανο. Ετσι ο  πρόεδρος της Κύπρου Νίκος Χριστοδουλίδης συναντήθηκε  με τον εμπειρογνώμονα περιφερειακής πολιτικής Ρούντι Μπραούντι,  μακροχρόνιος υποστηρικτής του διαλόγου, της διπλωματίας και της ειρηνικής ανάπτυξης,  ως προς τις ασφαλέστερες διαδρομές προς μεγαλύτερη σταθερότητα για ολόκληρη την Ευρω-Μεσογειακή περιοχή και άτυπο  διαμεσολαβητή των δύο χωρών. Μάλιστα έχει γράψει και σχετικά βιβλία, όπως την «οριστικοποίηση Θαλάσσιων Συνόρων στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο: Ποιος Θα Ειναι ο Επόμενος;» και «Ένα Κλειδί, Πολλαπλά Έπαθλα: Οριστικοποίηση Θαλάσσιων Συνόρων ανάμεσα στην Κύπρο, το Λίβανο και τη Συρία».

Ο  κ. Χριστοδουλίδης και ο ομόλογός του από το Λίβανο, ο πρώην Γενικός Τζόζεφ Αουν, συμφώνησαν τον Ιούλιο να διαπραγματευτούν και να οριστικοποιήσουν μια γραμμή θαλάσσιων συνόρων . Και οι δύο χώρες αναμένουν ότι θα αποκομίσουν πολλά οφέλη από μια τέτοια συμφωνία, και η κατοχύρωση εδαφικών συνόρων στη θάλασσα θα καταστήσει ευκολότερη την προσέλκυση ξένων επενδυτών για την ανάπτυξη των ενεργειακών πηγών τους.

«Η επίτευξη συμφωνίας θα ανοίξει όλες τις πόρτες για την Κύπρο και το Λίβανο», δήλωσε ο κ. Μπαρούντι μετά από τη συνάντηση. «Οι τάσεις πηγαίνουν στη σωστή κατεύθυνση, και όχι μόνο σε σχέση με το Λίβανο. Ο πρόεδρος της Κύπρου έχει φιλόδοξα σχέδια εξωτερικής πολιτικής, ιδιαίτερα σχετικά με τις δραστηριότητες της Κύπρου τους πρώτους έξι μήνες του 2026, όταν θα έχει την προεδρία του συμβουλίου της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης».

«Εκμεταλλεύτηκα επίσης την ευκαιρία να ευχηθώ στο πρόεδρο της Κύπρου  καλή επιτυχία σε αυτή την αποστολή», πρόσθεσε, «ειδικά καθώς αναμένεται να εστιάσει όχι μόνο στην ενίσχυση της συνοχής της Ευρώπης, αλλά και στην ενίσχυση του ρόλου της Κύπρου ως γέφυρα μεταξύ Ευρώπης και γειτονικών χωρών.»

Πράγματι, η Λευκωσία έχει ένα φιλόδοξο πρόγραμμα για την προεδρία της και συνεργάζεται στενά με τη Δανία, που ασκεί την προεδρία αυτό το εξάμηνο , και την Πολωνία, που θα διαδεχθεί την Κύπρο. Η λεγόμενη«τριπλή προεδρία» βοηθά στη διασφάλιση συνέχειας από τη μία προεδρία στην επόμενη.

Ο κ. Μπαρούντι έχει γράψει αρκετά βιβλία και μελέτες σχετικά με το πώς τα υπάρχοντα εργαλεία του ΟΗΕ μπορούν να βοηθήσουν τις παράκτιες χώρες να συμφωνήσουν δίκαια και ισότιμα θαλάσσια σύνορα, να μειώσουν τις εντάσεις και να αποκομίσουν σημαντικά οικονομικά και κοινωνικά οφέλη. Έχει επίσης γράψει και μιλήσει δημόσια για διάφορες ευκαιρίες περιφερειακής συνεργασίας, από διασυνδεδεμένα ενεργειακά δίκτυα και υπεράκτια αιολικά πάρκα μέχρι κοινή διαχείριση θαλάσσιων προστατευόμενων περιοχών.

Το 2023, απονεμήθηκε στον κ. Μπαρούντι  το Βραβείο Ηγεσίας από το Transatlantic Leadership Network, ένα think-tank της Ουάσινγκτον, για τη «πολύτιμη συμβολή του στην οικοδόμηση μιας ειρηνικής και ευημερούσας Ανατολικής Μεσογείου».

Σε δεκάδες άρθρα, μελέτες, εμφανίσεις στα μέσα ενημέρωσης και ομιλίες, για παράδειγμα, ο βετεράνος της κλάδου έχει τεκμηριώσει την επιχειρηματική βάση για το νησιωτικό κράτος να γίνει κέντρο επεξεργασίας και διανομής φυσικού αερίου για τους γείτονές του. Αυτό θα περιελάμβανε την Κύπρο να δημιουργήσει  έναν υπόθαλάσσιο αγωγό φυσικού αερίου προς την ευρωπαϊκή ενδοχώρα, ένα εργοστάσιο υγροποιημένου φυσικού αερίου (LNG) που θα ήταν το μεγαλύτερο έργο που έχει ποτέ η χώρα, ή και  υπεράκτια πλωτά συστήματα αποθήκευσης και υγροποίησης για την εξυπηρέτηση απομακρυσμένων χωρών δια θαλάσσης.

«Όλες αυτές οι μελέτες και οι παράγοντες που ανέδειξαν παραμένουν επίκαιροι σήμερα», δήλωσε ο κ. Μπαρούντι. «Η Κύπρος διαθέτει την εγγύτητα, τις τιμές γης και τις σχέσεις με τους γείτονές της για να γίνει ο συνεταιριστής όλων στις εξαγωγές ενέργειας, αλλά και να λειτουργήσει ως θεμέλιος λίθος για μια πιο σταθερή και ευημερούσα περιοχή.»

NICOSIA – 29, September 2025: Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides met today with the international energy policy expert, Roudi Baroudi, who presented copies of his two latest books, “Settling Maritime Boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean: Who Will Be Next?” and “One Key, Multiple Prizes: Settling Maritime Boundaries Among Cyprus, Lebanon, and Syria”.

Baroudi, a long-time advocate of dialogue, diplomacy, and peaceful development as the surest routes to greater stability for the entire Euro-Med region, said he felt “honored to have been received by the President.”

Christodoulides and his Lebanese counterpart, former General Joseph Aoun, agreed in July to have their respective teams negotiate and finalize a maritime boundary line (MBL). Both countries expect to derive numerous benefits from such a pact, and having treatied borders at sea will make it easier to attract the foreign investors required to develop their respective offshore oil and gas resources.

Reaching a deal “will open up all sorts of doors for Cyprus and Lebanon,” Baroudi said after the meeting. “The trends are going in the right direction, and not just vis-à-vis Lebanon. The President has ambitious foreign-policy plans, particularly with regard to Cyprus’ activities for the first six months of 2026, when it will hold the rotating presidency of the European Union.”

“I also took the opportunity to wish His Excellency every good fortune on that mission,” he added, “especially since it is expected to focus not only on shoring up Europe’s cohesion, but also on beefing up Cyprus’ role as a bridge between Europe and its neighbors.”

Indeed, Nicosia does have an ambitious agenda for its time in the presidency, and is working closely with Denmark, the current holder, and Poland, which will follow Cyprus’ term. The so-called “trio presidency” helps to ensure continuity from one presidency to the next.

Baroudi has published several books and studies on how existing United Nations tools can help coastal states to agree fair and equitable maritime boundaries, reduce tensions, and reap significant economic and social rewards in the bargain. He also has written and spoken publicly about a variety of opportunities for regional cooperation, from interconnected power grids and offshore wind farms to joint management of marine protected areas. In 2023, he was awarded the Transatlantic Leadership Award by the Transatlantic Leadership Network, a Washington think-tank, for what it described as “his valuable contribution in building a peaceful and prosperous Eastern Mediterranean.”

In addition to these works, ever since 2011, when the full potential of the East Med’s offshore hydrocarbon deposits began to emerge, Baroudi’s advocacy role has seen him provide thought leadership for a variety of projects and proposals that would transform Cyprus into a regional energy hub. In dozens of articles, studies, media appearances, and speaking engagements, for example, the industry veteran has made the business case for the island nation to become a gas processing and distribution center for its neighbors. This would include Cyprus hosting one end of an undersea gas pipeline to the European mainland, a liquified natural gas (LNG) plant that would be the country’s largest-ever project, and/or offshore floating storage and gasification units(s) to serve more distant customers by ship.

“All of these studies and the factors they highlighted are still relevant today,” Baroudi said. “Cyprus has the proximity, the land prices, and the relationships with its neighbors to make it everyone’s partner for energy exports, but also to serve as the bedrock for a stabler and more prosperous region.”

تبدو العلاقات اللبنانية القبرصية في حال تطور سريع وقد فتح هذا الباب رئيس الجمهورية العماد جوزاف عون فلاقى استجابة ورغبة عارمة لدى نظيره القبرصي كريستو دوليديس تجاه تطوير العلاقة بين البلدين الجارين وما لفت أن الرئيس القبرصي هو الذي بادر وطرح على الرئيس عون استجرار الكهرباء من قبرص إلى لبنان وقد تلقف رئيس الجمهورية اللبنانية هذه المبادرة وطلب من وزير الطاقة جو صدي متابعة الموضوع.

وفي هذا السياق أثنى خبير الطاقة الدولي رودي بارودي على مبادرة الرئيس القبرصي واللبناني، مؤكّدًا وجوب الترحيب بأي خطوة من هذا النوع باعتبارها نقطة انطلاق مهمة لتأمين الكهرباء للبنانيين وحل أزمة القطاع المستفحلة جزئياً منذ عقود وأن هذه الخطوة تأتي بعد الإعلان عن استئناف مفاوضات ترسيم الحدود البحرية بين البلدين.
كما أثنى بارودي على الدور الذي يلعبه الرئيس عون في ملف الطاقة ككل واعتباره أولوية لما فيه من فائدة على الاقتصاد وتعزيز القدرات الاجتماعية للمواطنين اللبنانيين.

ولفت بارودي إلى أن هذه الخطوة ستتيح تزويد لبنان ما بين 150 و300 ميغاواط وفق مراحل متعددة ولا سيما بعد عام أو عامين على الأكثر عندما تبدأ قبرص بإنتاج الكهرباء من الغاز المستخرج من حقولها البحرية خاصة حقل كرونوس الذي يديره كل من شركتي ENI & TOTAL ENERGIES ما يعزز تنويع مصادر الطاقة وبأسعار مقبولة لا سيما وأن الحقل المعني في قبرص لا يبعد عن حقل زهر المصري سوى ٦٠ كلم ما يعني أن كلفة الإستخراج ستكون مماثلة لتلك المعتمدة في الحقل المصري وهي كلفة رخيصة نوعا ما.

ولفت بارودي إلى وجود محطتين رئيسيتين لإنتاج الكهرباء في قبرص، إحداهما بين لارنكا وليماسول، والأخرى في Vassilikoبين ليماسول وبافوس، بقدرة إجمالية تقار ب 1600 ميغاواط من دون الكهرباء المنتجة من الطاقة الشمسية وبالتالي يمكن للبنان الاستفادة من هذه الطاقة بكلفة يتم التوافق عليها موضحا أن الكلفة ستكون اقل بكثير من كلفة الكهرباء المنتجة في لبنان عندما تبدأ قبرص العام المقبل باستخدام الغاز المستخرج من حقولها البحرية لإنتاج الكهرباء ولاسيما البلوك رقم 6.

بارودي طالب الحكومة اللبنانية بالإسراع بوضع الأطر الإصلاحية والتنظيمية للقطاع بشأن استجرار الكهرباء من قبرص وبإعداد دراسة جدوى اقتصادية تأخذ في الاعتبار كلفة الاستجرار ولفت أن محطة Vassiliko هي المحطة التي تصدر الغاز في 2026، على أن يواصل لبنان مساعيه لربط شبكته بالشبكة السورية للحصول على دعم إضافي كهربائي عن طريق محطة دير نبوح، بما في ذلك محطة الكسارة في منطقة البقاع.

المركزية- على وقع التحديات الأمنية وتهديداتها، يجهد رئيس الجمهورية العماد جوزاف عون لتحريك الملفات الاقتصادية الاستراتيجية التي من شأنها أن تُنهض البلاد من كبوتها التي أوصلتها إلى حدّ الانهيار… فهو لا يوفّر فرصة وجوده في الخارج، حيث يكثّف من رحلاته الرسمية للهدف المنوَّه عنه، إلا ويتطرّق مع نظرائه العرب والأجانب إلى إمكانات التعاون في سبيل تعزيز العلاقات الاقتصادية والمشاريع الاستثمارية مع لبنان.

وليست مفاوضاته المثمرة التي أجراها مع نظيره القبرصي نيكوس خريستودوليدس خلال زيارته الرسمية الأخيرة إلى نيقوسيا، سوى الدليل الثابت على مساعيه الحثيثة إلى وصل لبنان بالخارج بعد انقطاعٍ دام سنوات لأسباب باتت معروفة علّها “تُذكَر ولا تُعاد”! ومن ثمار تلك الزيارة، الإعلان عن تحقيق تقدّم كبير في الجانب التقني من ملف استكمال المفاوضات حول ترسيم الحدود البحرية بين البلدين، والعمل على تحويل النتائج التقنية إلى صيغة سياسية قابلة للتنفيذ، على غرار اتفاق ترسيم الحدود مع إسرائيل الذي أُبرم في تشرين الأول عام 2022 بوساطة أميركية…

لكن هذه الخطوة لم تكن الوحيدة التي خرج بها الرئيسان اللبناني والقبرصي من لقاء نيقوسيا، بل أحدث طرح الرئيس خريستودوليدس مَدّ كابل بحري من الجزيرة لتزويد لبنان بالكهرباء، خرقاً في ملف الطاقة اللبنانية النازف، على رغم أن الطرح يتطلب دراسة جدوى مفصّلة تسبق الحماسة على المضي فيه…

إذ في انتظار وصول وفد تقني قبرصي إلى بيروت في الأيام المقبلة لاستكمال المفاوضات حول ترسيم الحدود البحرية بين البلدين، يستعدّ وزير الطاقة والمياه جو الصدّي لزيارة قبرص ولقاء المسؤولين الرسميين والمعنيين بقطاع الطاقة، بهدف متابعة الطرح القبرصي تزويد لبنان بالكهرباء، والاطلاع على حيثيات المشروع وتفاصيله كافة.

بارودي يرحّب.. ويسأل

في غضون ذلك، يثني الخبير الدولي في شؤون الطاقة والعضو في “معهد شبكة القيادة عبر الأطلسي” في واشنطن رودي بارودي على طرح الرئيس القبرصي، ويشدد عبر “المركزية” على “وجوب الترحيب بأي مبادرة من هذا القبيل”، معتبراً أنها “خطوة جيّدة في مسار تأمين الكهرباء للبنانيين وبالتالي توفير الحلول الضرورية لأزمة القطاع المستفحلة طوال عقود”.

ويُشير في السياق، إلى أن “مسافة 160.9 كيلومتراً تفصل بين لبنان وقبرص بما يدل على القرب الجغرافي بين البلدين، وهو عامل مساعد في تنفيذ المشروع. والعامل الآخر الذي يشجّع على البحث في إمكانية الإفادة من هذه المبادرة، أن قبرص لديها محطة إنتاج كهرباء تقع بين لارنكا وليماسول، كما لديها محطة إنتاج Vassilikoss وهي الأكبر على الإطلاق تقع بين ليماسول وبافوس. والجدير ذكره في هذا الإطار، أن الإنتاج الكهربائي لقبرص يعادل 5 آلاف و400 ميغاواط تقريباً، ومن غير المعلوم حتى الآن الكمية التي ستزوّد بها لبنان من مجموع هذا الإنتاج”.

ويخلص إلى التأكيد على “وجوب الترحيب بالمبادرة القبرصية مهما كانت كمية الكهرباء التي ستزوّدنا بها… وإذ نهنّئ الحكومة اللبنانية على مشروع استجرار الطاقة من قبرص، عليها التنبّه إلى كلفة الاستجرار الباهظة لأن قبرص تبيع الكيلوواط الواحد بمبلغ يتراوح بين 35 و40 سنتاً… وهذا رقم يجب التوقف عنده في دراسة الجدوى، مع الإقرار بأهمية المشروع وانعكاساته الإيجابية على لبنان بما يساعد في حل أزمة قطاع الكهرباء المُزمنة”.

“لذلك من الأهمية بمكان إعداد دراسة جدوى اقتصادية، مع التشديد على ضرورة تشجيع أي مبادرة تساعد الشعب اللبناني في تأمين ساعات تغذية إضافية من الكهرباء، ونحن نشدّ على يد الحكومة للمضي في هذه المبادرة… ولنترقب من أي محطة ستزوّدنا قبرص الكهرباء وبأي كمية…وكلفة” يختم بارودي.

 وفي الصورة أدناه محطة Vassilikoss للطاقة في قبرص