LONDON, Nov 28 (Reuters) – From mid-2021 until late 2022, Europe and parts of Asia were gripped by an energy crisis, as oil, gas, coal and power prices surged, in some cases to record highs, forcing households and firms to cut use rapidly.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and sanctions imposed in response by the U.S. and its allies disrupted energy supplies that were already stretched by the rebound in industrial production after the coronavirus epidemic.LONDON, Nov 28 (Reuters) – From mid-2021 until late 2022, Europe and parts of Asia were gripped by an energy crisis, as oil, gas, coal and power prices surged, in some cases to record highs, forcing households and firms to cut use rapidly.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and sanctions imposed in response by the U.S. and its allies disrupted energy supplies that were already stretched by the rebound in industrial production after the coronavirus epidemic.
But 18-24 months later, the acute phase of the adjustment is complete, with energy inventories comfortable and prices reverting towards long-term inflation-adjusted averages.
Chartbook: Europe’s energy supplies and prices
There will undoubtedly be more shocks in future, but the disruption associated with the end of the pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is over. Markets have adapted.
Europe’s residual issue is that it has swapped relatively cheap Russian pipeline gas for relatively expensive LNG, putting its industrial competitiveness at risk, but that is a chronic problem rather than a crisis.
OIL
In the oil market, U.S. domestic crude and condensates production has continued to increase and surpassed its pre-pandemic peak in August 2023. Other non-OPEC production sources are also growing steadily.
High-frequency data from the U.S. shows commercial crude inventories were 12 million barrels (+3% or +0.26 standard deviations) above the prior ten-year seasonal average in mid-November, an indication the market is comfortably supplied.
Front-month Brent crude futures have averaged $82 per barrel so far this month, exactly in line with the median since the start of the century after adjusting for inflation.
Brent’s six-month calendar spread has traded in an average backwardation of $1.57, only modestly above the long-term average of $1.04.
By late 2022 and early 2023, fears about over-production and the potential accumulation of oil inventories had replaced concerns about insufficient supplies and the rapid depletion of stocks.
In response, Saudi Arabia and its OPEC+ partners have cut output multiple times to avert an incipient inventory build, in stark contrast to pressure on them a year earlier to raise output to relieve anticipated shortages.
GAS
Rapid adjustment has also been evident in gas, where U.S. inventories have been consistently above the prior ten-year seasonal average since February 2023, and exports have increased to record rates.
Front-month U.S. gas futures prices have traded close to their lowest levels for 30 years, once adjusted for inflation, confirming the market is responding to an incipient surplus.
In Europe, gas storage has been at record seasonal levels continuously since the end of the first quarter of 2023 following an unusually warm winter in 2022/23 and sharp falls in industrial gas consumption.
Germany’s energy-intensive manufacturing production is down by around 17% since the start of 2022 and shows no sign of recovering.
Total gas use in the European Union’s top 7 consuming countries – Germany, Italy, France, Netherlands, Spain, Belgium and Poland – was down by 13% in the first nine months of 2023 compared with the pre-invasion ten-year seasonal average for 2012-2021.
Inflation-adjusted futures prices for the year ahead have averaged 48 euros per megawatt hour so far in November, down from 223 euros at the height of the crisis in August 2022.
In real terms, year-ahead prices have averaged 53 euros so far in 2023 compared with 23 euros in the five years between 2015 and 2019 and 32 euros between 2010 and 2014.
While prices are still high, they are no longer at crisis levels, and are likely to retreat further in the course of 2024.
COAL
An even more profound adjustment has occurred in coal, with demand falling sharply as gas supplies have become more plentiful while mine production has ramped up.
Real year-ahead prices for coal delivered to Northwest Europe have averaged just $112 per tonne in November 2023 (69th percentile since 2010) from a record of almost $300 per tonne in September 2022.
On the production side, China, the world’s largest coal miner, increased output by 425 million tonnes (10%) in 2022 and has boosted it by another 144 million tonnes (4%) so far in the first ten months of 2023.
ADJUSTMENT
Each market has experienced a slightly different adjustment process, but all have been variations of faster production growth and slower consumption increases.
In oil, consumption has grown more slowly owing to a slowdown in the business cycle, while production outside OPEC+ has increased faster, pushing the market towards a surplus.
Russia’s exports have remained high despite sanctions through avoidance (exploiting legal loopholes designed to keep exports flowing and increasing use of dark fleet tankers) and evasion (mis-declaring cargo prices).
In gas, Europe experienced an unusually warm winter in 2022/23 which cut consumption, and has also seen a large reduction in industrial demand from the most energy-intensive users as factories have suspended output.
Europe was able to replace piped gas from Russia with more LNG imports, outbidding other customers in South and East Asia in winter 2022/23, forcing some of the adjustment burden onto poorer countries.
In coal, China’s increasing mine output plus an exponential increase in renewable generation from wind and especially solar have eased shortages and enabled generators to boost fuel inventories.
Other factors that have contributed to the adjustment include high levels of hydro production in Brazil cutting the need for LNG imports, and an unusually mild autumn in Northwest Europe in 2023.
But the common factor is the enormous scale of the price rises in 2021 and 2022, which accelerated and telescoped the adjustment process into a relatively short period.
As a result, after a brutally painful adjustment in 2021 and 2022, production, consumption and inventories have become much more comfortable by the end of 2023 and into 2024, and the crisis phase is over.
FLORENCE – The 25th anniversary of the euro’s introduction, which has passed largely under the radar, offers an opportune moment to assess the current state of the greatest monetary experiment in modern history.
The euro’s launch in January 1999 polarized economists. In the face of much skepticism – the late American economist Martin Feldstein even argued that the single currency could trigger a war in Europe – the euro’s architects envisioned a future characterized by macroeconomic stability, anchored by an independent central bank and a fiscal framework geared toward stability. Structural reforms, which the European Union’s member states were expected to implement, were meant to enhance the monetary union’s capacity to adjust to shocks.
None of those scenarios materialized. Over the past quarter-century, the euro has shown extraordinary resilience, navigating through several critical challenges and defying early predictions of its collapse. But while the single currency has delivered on some of its promises – most notably, maintaining price stability for most of its existence – it has failed to boost Europe’s potential growth or facilitate the continent’s full economic and political integration.
This mixed record can be attributed largely to the fact that Europe’s economic union was incomplete from the outset. Despite the significant progress that has been made since its inception, the eurozone’s fiscal and economic frameworks remain woefully underdeveloped compared to its monetary infrastructure.
To understand the consequences of the eurozone’s unfinished architecture, it is useful to divide the past 25 years into four distinct periods. The first phase, from 1999 to 2008, could be labeled the “2% decade”: economic growth, inflation, and budget deficits (as a share of GDP) all hovered around this rate. This phase was characterized by the excessive optimism of the “Great Moderation.”
But the internal imbalances that emerged during this period would haunt the eurozone for years to come. The convergence of interest rates, evidenced by minimal spreads, resulted in overly sanguine portrayals of member states’ public finances. Simultaneously, loose fiscal and monetary conditions reduced European governments’ incentives to undertake structural reforms and bolster their banking systems.
Nominal convergence also masked more profound structural disparities, as capital flowed from the eurozone’s richest members to their poorer counterparts, where it was frequently channeled into less productive sectors, such as real estate and non-tradable services, often through instruments like short-term bank loans. Consequently, while the eurozone’s current accounts appeared balanced, significant imbalances emerged.
The fallout from the 2008 global financial crisis, particularly the discovery that Greece had lied about its budget deficits and debt, eroded trust among member states. The prevailing narrative shifted to one of moral hazard, emphasizing the need for each country to get its own house in order. By the time eurozone governments finally coordinated a response – establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), launching the banking union project, introducing the European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary Transactions program, and expanding the ECB’s balance sheet – the euro appeared to be on the brink of collapse.
The key turning point was the pledge by then-ECB President Mario Draghi to do “whatever it takes” to preserve the euro in July 2012. But with monetary policy increasingly viewed as the “only game in town,” the eurozone’s economic and financial structures remained fragmented.
The COVID-19 crisis changed that. The exogenous nature of the pandemic shock, together with the lack of impending elections, enabled EU leaders – led by French President Emmanuel Macron, then-German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen – to present a unified front, unencumbered by the pressure to avoid moral hazard. The EU suspended the Stability and Growth Pact, which had previously capped member states’ budget deficits at 3% of GDP, and rolled out the Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency and the NextGenerationEU recovery programs, financing both through common borrowing. Meanwhile, the ECB introduced its €1.85 trillion ($2 trillion) Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program.
Although this demonstration of collective leadership reassured markets, fueling an economic rebound, the optimism proved to be short-lived. A global inflationary surge, fueled by robust macroeconomic stimulus and pandemic-related supply-chain disruptions, was exacerbated by the energy-price shock that followed Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Although European policymakers worked together to reduce the EU’s dependence on Russian gas, they failed to mount a collective response akin to the NextGenerationEU initiative. Confronted with rising deficits and debt, not to mention the most aggressive monetary-tightening cycle since the 1980s, EU countries have once again put eurozone reforms on hold.
Two important lessons follow from the euro’s first 25 years. First, the monetary union’s incomplete institutional framework has proven to be both costly and dangerous. Finalizing the banking union, especially the creation of a common resolution fund with the backstop of the ESM and deposit insurance, is essential to ensure stability and bolster the international role of the euro. Thus, Italy’s recent failure to ratify the ESM treaty is a serious setback. Pushing forward the capital market union is essential if Europe is to meet the financial challenges posed by the digital and green transitions. To achieve all of this, EU leaders must strike a balance between risk sharing and risk reduction.
Second, completing the euro is crucial for safeguarding and developing the EU’s greatest achievement: the single market. European countries’ current pursuit of national industrial policies, funded through state aid, undermines the core values of the single-market project. To address this challenge, the EU must formulate a cohesive European industrial policy. This should include an increase in cross-border investments, focusing on European public goods such as human-capital development, the availability of critical materials, and the green and digital transitions.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, French President François Mitterrand, and European Commission President Jacques Delors turned the dream of a single currency into a reality. During the COVID-19 crisis, Macron, Merkel, and von der Leyen managed to overcome seemingly insurmountable obstacles and achieve a historic breakthrough. Now, a quarter-century after its introduction, the euro requires visionary leaders to shepherd European sovereignty to its next phase.
This article draws on the CEPR Policy Insights February 1, 2024, paper “The First 25 Years of the Euro,” written under the auspices of the European University Institute’s Economic and Monetary Union Laboratory (EMU Lab).