

Energy programme proceeding as planned, president tells oil and gas forum



Cyprus is promoting three projects that were selected by the European Commission as projects of common interest, because of

their benefits to the European energy market, President Nicos Anastasiades said on Tuesday.

The president was addressing the 9th Mediterranean Forum on Oil and Gas in Nicosia, telling delegates that recently, two of the projects had secured EU funding. Specifically, €101 million will be allocated to the CyprusGas2EU project, while the EastMed Pipeline had been awarded €34.5m for technical studies.

The CyprusGas2EU" project aims at allowing the transport of gas from the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe. By 2020, Cyprus will construct a Floating Storage and Regasification Unit (FSRU) in order to import gas in the form of LNG from international markets, Anastasiades said. The EastMed Pipeline aims to transport gas from Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe via Crete and mainland Greece.

A third project, the EuroAsia Interconnector, is an electricity connection between Israel, Cyprus and Greece that is supported by all three governments.

"We intend to continue exercising Cyprus' rights as an independent and fully integrated Member State of the European Union, proceeding with our exploration programme as planned," said Anastasiades.

He said this was also part of a broader policy in that the discoveries of significant quantities of natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as potential future discoveries, could be a driver for stabilization in the region.

"After all, together with the respect by all parties of international law and national sovereign rights, this is the kind of stable and predictable environment that we are obliged to jointly create, in order to bring in the multibillion investments needed for developing the East Med's hydrocarbons wealth," he said.

Anastasiades also addressed Turkey's provocations in the island's exclusive economic zone recently.

The president said Cyprus' policy has traditionally been based on regional cooperation and the establishment of long-lasting relationships with all neighbouring countries.

"As we have always maintained, collaboration and synergies achieved in the hydrocarbons sector of the Eastern Mediterranean can feed into the political relations between countries, building the foundations for regional stability and peace," he said.

Initiatives undertaken by Cyprus had been "highly successful" at the bilateral and multilateral levels, with countries such as Lebanon, Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Greece.

At the same time, he added, the recent deal struck between Israel and Egypt was concrete proof that collaborations between countries in the region were already taking place, "and Cyprus, I can assure you, will be an active participant in future developments".

The developments were aligned with the EU's recent Energy Union strategy, which has confirmed the Mediterranean as a strategic priority for reducing EU's dependency on existing energy suppliers and routes, Anastasiades said.

"Our aim remains to support the EU in its diversification efforts, with Cyprus, as an EU member state, having a stable legal and political environment and constituting a reliable partner for both neighbouring countries and oil and gas companies." It was also necessary to lift the island's energy isolation, he said.

Next on the agenda would be the drilling activities of the ExxonMobil/Qatar Petroleum consortium in block 10, which included two back-to-back exploration wells during the second half of this year, Anastasiades said "Over the past few years we have, in fact, made some remarkable steps towards the

realization of our exploration program, which we aspire will soon establish Cyprus as a natural gas producer and a transit country," he added.

He referred to ongoing projects in the field. At present, the ministry of energy and the Aphrodite consortium were engaged in advanced discussions to establish, "the soonest possible", the development and production plan for Aphrodite.

Following the third licensing round and the decision to grant hydrocarbon exploration licences for blocks 6, 8 and 10, to ENI/Total, ENI and ExxonMobil/Qatar Petroleum respectively, "we anticipate with eagerness" the completion of the exploration programme of all licensed companies. The second wave of exploration in Cyprus' EEZ was initiated by the Total/ENI consortium, he said.

After the renewal of its exploration license for block 11, in February 2016, the consortium went ahead with its exploration programme, drilling their first well between June and September 2017. The "Onesiphoros West 1" well resulted in a technical discovery that confirmed the existence of a petroleum system and the presence of a "Zohr"-like, reservoir, the president said.

"A mere two months ago, in January, we also had the completion of the first exploration well in Block 6 by the consortium of ENI and Total. The "Calypso" well encountered an extended gas column with excellent characteristics. This discovery also confirms the presence of the "Zohr"-like play in the Cypriot EEZ," he added.

Lebanon-Israel maritime dispute: Rules of (diplomatic) engagement



Thus far attempts to resolve the dispute have been unsuccessful, but while the challenge is clearly a difficult one, the situation is far from irretrievable if the parties practice restraint and resolve to settle their differences via diplomacy and dialogue.

BEIRUT: Tensions between Lebanon and Israel are flaring once again, this time over the demarcation of their maritime border and, therefore, the rightful ownership of offshore oil and gas deposits.

Thus far attempts to resolve the dispute have been unsuccessful, but while the challenge is clearly a difficult one, the situation is far from irretrievable if the parties practice restraint and resolve to settle their differences via diplomacy and dialogue, however indirect.

Diplomatic efforts are complicated by several factors which block many of the usual avenues of dispute resolution. Awareness of these factors and the conditions they impose is a must, especially from the perspective of Lebanon, which will need to walk a virtual tightrope if it is to protect its rights while avoiding both further escalation of the conflict and any erosion of its refusal to recognize Israel.

First and foremost, Lebanon and Israel have no diplomatic relations, having remained in a legal state of war since 1948. Lebanon does not recognize Israel, armed non-stated groups have periodically used its territory as a staging area for attempts to liberate Palestine from Israeli occupation, and Israel has attacked, invaded, and/or occupied Lebanon numerous times, the most recent large-scale conflict having taken place in 2006.

The plain fact is that the absence of diplomatic relations is highly problematic for disputes over offshore resources. Most maritime demarcations are set out in treaties between the countries in question, which then serve as legal bases for any necessary adjudication of disputes. Israel and Lebanon have no such treaty, and there is no prospect in the foreseeable future of any kind of reconciliation that would allow them to so much as discuss one.

In addition, the two parties appear to disagree not just on the angle at which the southern boundary of Lebanon's EEZ should extend from the border along the coast, but also on where, precisely, that coastal border lies. Obviously, then, a purely bilateral process is out of the question. And as we shall see below, the absence of relations also throws up obstacles for the conventional use of international institutions.

Second, while Lebanon has signed and ratified the primary international agreement on maritime border demarcation, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Israel has not. Accordingly, there is no binding mechanism

under which either state can refer the maritime border dispute for resolution without the express agreement of the other. However, since Israel has signed an Exclusive Economic Zone agreement with Cyprus, Lebanon does have options on this level.

One could lodge some form of protest against Cyprus on the basis that its EEZ pact with Israel prejudices Lebanon's borders, but that seems unlikely and even more inadvisable as it would jeopardize Beirut's strong relations with Nicosia. Alternatively, Lebanon could invite Cyprus to join it in seeking conciliation under Article 284 of UNCLLOS in order to resolve the dispute caused by the Israel-Cyprus EEZ agreement with Israel. Cyprus would have the right to reject such an approach, but it is certainly worth investigating what the Cypriot stance would be. If Cyprus has no objections, this kind of proceeding would demonstrate Lebanon's commitment to its obligation, under the UN Charter, to seek the peaceful resolution of disputes.

Third, while states regularly refer maritime border disputes for resolution to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) this is typically done by way of a special agreement between the states. This is because, as is, in fact, the case for Lebanon and Israel, very few states have signed up to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. Unless a state has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, claims cannot be brought against it before the ICJ without its express agreement in relation to a specific claim.

It is unlikely that either Lebanon or Israel would consider submitting the maritime border dispute to the ICJ for fear that this might set a legal and/or politico-diplomatic precedent. Israel has only ever invoked the ICJ's jurisdiction once, in 1953, while Lebanon has been involved in two cases before the ICJ, most recently in 1959. Since the ICJ's 2004 advisory opinion reprimanded Israel for the construction of its wall around the Occupied West Bank, it is unlikely that

Israel would consider referring any dispute, let alone one with Lebanon, to the ICJ. Lebanon's reservations with regard to appointing the ICJ or any third party to resolve the maritime border dispute are two-fold.

First, it has concerns that Israel would seek to condition any agreement to refer the maritime dispute to the ICJ or any other international tribunal provided that Lebanon agrees to subject all border issues for resolution by such body. Second, it worries that any direct agreement with Israel to seek third-party involvement to resolve the dispute may be considered as de facto and de jure recognition of the state of Israel.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, even if the Lebanese-Israeli dispute were to be heard by ITLOS, the ICJ, or some other legal forum (e.g. ad hoc arbitration), the process would have to root its decision(s) in a body of law that would necessarily include what is referred to as "Customary International Law" (CIL) – which neither Israel nor Lebanon accepts in its entirety.

Israel's policy has long been to stay out of multilateral agreements that presume its acceptance of any international law – customary or otherwise – that might expose its occupation and settlement policies, inter alia, to independent scrutiny and/or sanction. In other words, when Israel "rejects" "accusations" that its settling of occupied land violates international law, it does not deny that it commits the acts in question: it simply states its refusal to be bound by a law it does not recognize.

In practice, CIL allows for countries to remain largely outside its reach, but only if they consistently reject its applicability; governments cannot "cherry-pick" which laws to obey based on how they are affected in a particular case. Once you accept CIL in any way, shape, or form, you risk coming under its jurisdiction – a fate that Israel has worked hard to

avoid for more than 70 years.

Beirut's approach is subtly different. Basically, it is happy to enter into multilateral agreements that commit it to meet certain standards, but only provided that doing so neither implies any recognition of Israel nor subjects all of Lebanon's borders to the judgment of the ICJ, whose verdicts are final and cannot be appealed. That leaves room – not a lot, but some – for the Lebanese state to achieve satisfaction on the offshore issue without sacrificing its general positions vis-à-vis Israel and borders.

In addition, while there are particular elements that make the Lebanon-Israel dispute unique in some ways, the general conditions, in this case, are not unusual. Every coastal state on the planet, for instance, has at least one maritime zone that overlaps with that of another state, and many of these disputes remain unresolved. In the Eastern Mediterranean alone, several pairs of countries have yet to sign bilateral agreements on the boundaries between their respective EEZs, including Cyprus and Turkey, Cyprus and Syria, Greece and Turkey, and Israel and Palestine. Moreover, many of the bilateral maritime treaties that have been reached are opposed by neighboring countries with overlapping zones – as is the case with Lebanon's opposition to the Israel-Cyprus deal.

What these cases demonstrate is that even when there is plenty of bad blood but no delineation agreement between two states, there is no need to go to war. Quite the contrary, states with sharply opposed interests can and do coexist despite the absence of an agreed maritime boundary. All they have to do is show restraint and practice a modicum of common sense – which is what all states are supposed to do in any event, under their UN Charter obligations.

Restraint and (indirect) dialogue should be especially attractive in this case, not least because there is likely to be significant outside support for some kind of solution. In

addition to the UN and US efforts, the involvement of France's TOTAL, Italy's ENI, and Russia's Novatek in the region means that each of their respective governments, plus the European Union as a whole, has a vested interest in using their own good offices to mediate an understanding that would, at the very least, open up Lebanon's Block 9 – thus far its most promising acreage – for exploration.

The real difference between this dispute and others is in the urgency, and that works both ways. It is true, for instance, that the threshold for conflict between Lebanon and Israel is lower than those between other neighbors: threats and even the actual use of force are habitual features of Israeli foreign policy, memories of shooting wars are fresher in Israel and Lebanon than most other places, and the value of the resources means there is plenty to fight over.

On the other hand, those same memories should serve as useful reminders that war is an inherently expensive business, and that any future conflict will extract a heavy cost – human, financial, reputational, etc. – from all concerned. The same goes for the stakes: with so much to gain from drilling and so much to lose from fighting, both countries have a clear interest in removing obstacles so that their respective oil and gas sectors can be developed as quickly as possible.

The important thing for Lebanon is to keep showing good faith and demonstrating commitment to its obligations to uphold peace and security as a signatory to the UN Charter, and thus far it has lived up to this responsibility. While remaining consistent in its refusal to even tacitly acknowledge Israel as a state, Beirut has engaged with two consecutive US envoys who have used a form of shuttle diplomacy to mediate the dispute. It also has made repeated appeals to the UN to help settle the matter. Whatever happens in the future, it is crucial that Lebanon retains this cooperative stance, for it not only protects its legal rights but also helps contain tensions that might otherwise cause Israel to act

unilaterally.

One of the levers Lebanon can use to keep demonstrating a constructive position is in UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 war.

Paragraph 10 of that document gives Lebanon (and Israel) the option to request that the UN Secretary-General proposes the delimitation of the Lebanese-Israeli border. Beirut has indeed asked for the Secretary General's intervention, but it can help its cause by remaining focused on the issue, particularly the application of UNSCR 1701(10). Again, even if this effort falls short, it cannot but help to have a positive influence on tensions and to further burnish Lebanon's stature as a responsible state seeking peaceful resolution of a dispute with another party.


Apart from being meticulous about its commitment to peace and security, Lebanon's leadership also needs to be open and transparent with the general public, whose expectations for the oil and gas sector should be based on facts, not wishes. Educating public opinion will serve not only to address concerns that oil and gas revenues will be squandered by domestic mismanagement, but also reduce fears that Lebanese officials will sacrifice the national interest for the sake of their own personal gain.

The average Lebanese needs to understand that diplomacy often requires give-and-take, and that when it comes to energy especially, there are few zero-sum games: both sides often gain by accepting something less than their maximalist positions – or at least by allowing the time for due process to play out. In this instance, much has been made of the fact that Israel could end up sharing the revenues from any oil- or gasfield that straddles the eventual boundary between the two parties' respective EEZs. That is certainly possible, but it is also not especially relevant: the same rules of international law apply to straddling fields the world over,

including some shared by mutually hostile nations. The same fact also cuts both ways because any agreement requiring Lebanon to share straddling fields first identified on its side of the line would likewise require Israel to do the same. While Lebanon might indeed have to share the potential revenues of fields that have yet to produce (or even be explored), therefore, the same international law principle could well require Israel to share in those of fields that already are producing, possibly including some highly lucrative ones.

Of course, simply convincing Lebanese citizens that a fair settlement can be reached is not the same as promising that one will be reached. Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that a) the Lebanese case is a strong one; and that b) Israel might well be convinced to accept an arrangement that falls well short of its stated demands.

The strength of Lebanon's position goes all the way back to the 1923 Paulet-Newcomb Agreement, which sets the border between what were then French Mandate Lebanon and British Mandate Palestine, and the 1949 Armistice Agreement, which ended hostilities in the 1948 war between an independent Lebanon and the recently established "state" of Israel. In the words of Israel's own Ministry of Foreign Affairs (website), the 1949 document "ratified the international border between former Palestine and Lebanon as the armistice line". This is important, not only because the Paulet-Newcomb pact sets Lebanon's southern border at Ras Naqoura, an advantageous point (for Lebanon) from which to delimit the two sides' EEZs, but also because in the absence of bilateral relations and therefore of a substantial record of cross-border trade, diplomacy, or other non-military interaction regarding the border, documents like these carry even more weight than might otherwise be the case.



Other factors also bode well for Lebanon's short- and long-term legal prospects, including the fact that the part of


Block 9 in which TOTAL, ENI, and Novatek are most interested clearly lies well within Lebanon waters – even if one were to accept Israel’s maximalist claims. That leaves plenty of room for at least a short-term compromise that would allow exploration in areas not subject to dispute while leaving more difficult questions for a later time.

The quality of the information Lebanon has submitted to the UN and other interested parties also gives significant weight to its position, and in more than one way. The Lebanese side has used original British Admiralty Hydrographic Charts – widely recognized as the most accurate and authoritative available – as the starting point for the southern boundary of its EEZ, which lends even more credibility to its contentions. And by fortunate coincidence, the Israelis have relied on that very same source for their EEZ agreement with Cyprus (as have the Cypriots for their deal with Egypt).

Even on the issue of accepting CIL, there are signs that Israel may have relaxed its objections. In a March 2017 submission to the UN, the Israeli government said the dispute should be resolved “in accordance with principles of international law”. The missing “the” before “principles” indicates that Israel may well be trying to cherry-pick which elements of CIL it wants to recognize, but the language offers hope that it is ready to be more flexible. Given that there may now be agreement between the parties on certain principles of CIL regarding border delimitation, this could be an opening for a Lebanese submission to the UN Secretary-General to ask that he put forward a proposal.

Even before the 2017 submission, there were already indications of possible Israeli movement. In the December 2010 EEZ agreement between Israel and Cyprus, the preamble refers to both provisions of UNCLOS and principles of international law of the sea applicable to EEZs, even though Israel has never recognized either UNCLOS or international law itself. The same document also allows for review and modification if

this is necessary in order to facilitate a future EEZ agreement acceptable to “the three states concerned”, which cannot be interpreted to mean anything but the signatories and Lebanon.



This is not to pretend that the case is cut and dry. On one issue in particular, Israel can be expected to stress that its EEZ Agreement with Cyprus is based on the same maritime starting point that Lebanon used in its own EEZ agreement with Cyprus, which was reached in 2007 but has not been ratified by Parliament. This, however, is basically the only gap in Lebanon’s legal armor in this case, and Beirut has several strong arguments with which to close it: Lebanon could counter a) that in line with the Article 18 of the Vienna Law of the Treaties, which forms part of CIL, the 2007 EEZ agreement is not valid and binding as it was never been ratified by the Lebanese Parliament; b) that point 1 was chosen as the starting point for demarcation of the Cyprus/Lebanese EEZ in order to avoid either implicitly recognizing Israel or giving it a pretext for unilateral action; and c) that the line was

never intended to be a permanent one, just an interim solution until a triple point is defined among itself, Cyprus, and Israel.

In short, the average Lebanese needs to know that a well-negotiated deal through third-party mediation or arbitration would mean a far bigger victory for Lebanon than for Israel. The latter, one should keep in mind, is already producing gas from offshore fields, so opening up new ones represents only an incremental gain, making delay less meaningful. Lebanon, by contrast, has yet to start reaping such rewards at all, so the impact of an early start means an instantly massive improvement on the status quo; the sooner it can do so without fear of Israeli aggression, therefore, the better.

There is always the possibility that Israel could seek to short-circuit any diplomatic process in which it feels unable to dictate the outcome. It might not even have to use military force to achieve its ends, only to keep tensions high enough so that no drilling can even take place.

Even a spoiling strategy could cost Israel dearly, however, by further eroding its standing in the international community, alienating key allies, and discouraging investment in its own energy sector. A shooting war would be even worse for Israel, especially since its vulnerable offshore gas facilities would figure to be the highest-value targets of any conflict and would be almost impossible to defend. It is difficult to imagine how any combination of Israeli political and military objectives in Lebanon could justify losing these facilities, which constitute one of the Israeli government's most productive cash cows.

Once again, there are signs that Israeli officials have performed similar calculations. Most conspicuous has been the absence of Israeli drilling activity in the disputed areas: no licenses have been issued for any of the Israeli blocks that extend into waters claimed by Lebanon. At least for now, and

notwithstanding some of the more strident voices, most of Israel's leadership appears willing to take a wait-and-see approach.

To keep expectations in line with realities, then, Lebanese leaders need to be mindful of what they say in public. While being as transparent as they can for domestic purposes, they also must be politically astute to avoid compromising Beirut's negotiation position, sending mixed signals, and/or closing diplomatic doors. Measured rhetoric is not a common feature of the Lebanese political arena, but the country does have a first-rate diplomatic service, so perhaps some resources could be invested in a program of regular briefings seminars – for the president, prime minister, speaker, all Cabinet ministers and MPs, and relevant senior civil servants – on how to avoid such missteps, whether at a press conference or a gala dinner.

Apart from maintaining a united front and keeping the public informed, the other priority must be to leave no stone unturned in the search for a peaceful solution. This means that in addition to the US and UN avenues, Beirut would do well to enlist other participants as well, starting with the home countries (France, Italy, and Russia) of the companies forming the consortium that won the rights to Block 9. Then there is the European Commission, which knows full well that all of its member-states stand to benefit from the development of an East Mediterranean gas industry, which would diversify the sources of energy imports, improve the security of supply, and even put downward pressure on prices, adding higher living standards and greater economic competitiveness for good measure.

All of these players could potentially help mediate a formula that works for all concerned, but nothing is more important than reanimating and extending the US mediation role. Whatever one thinks of Washington's credibility as an honest broker in the Middle East, no other actor has its capacity to influence Israeli decision-making – and so to create sufficient time and

space for diplomatic efforts to mature.

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مقترحات للدبلوماسية الأميركية "أخرى غير خط هوف"



خلافًا لما تردد بأن وزير الخارجية الأميركي ريكس تيلرسون أعاد التذكير بخط الدبلوماسية الأميركية فريدريك هوف بما يتصل بالنزاع مع إسرائيل على البلوك 9 ضمن المنطقة الاقتصادية الخالصة، تبين من خلال الجولة التي أجراها الجمعة مساعده لشؤون الشرق الأدنى ديفيد ساترفيلد، على المسؤولين اللبنانيين لمتابعة محادثات تيلرسون في بيروت، ان للدبلوماسية الأميركية مقترحات أخرى غير خط هوف الذي يرفضه المسؤولون اللبنانيون، الا ان هؤلاء رفضوا الكشف عن طبيعة هذه المقترحات، أو التأكيد عمّا إذا كانت تتصل بإجراء مفاوضات رباعية مباشرة يُشارك فيها لبنان وإسرائيل والولايات المتحدة والأمم المتحدة على مستوى دبلوماسية لا عسكري، أو الذهاب إلى خيار التحكيم الدولي لتب النزاع مع إسرائيل حول الأراضي لصالحه.

غير ان مصدراً مطلعاً مقرباً من الرئيس نبيه بري في عين التينة التي زارها ساترفيلد بصحبة السفيرة الأميركية اليزابيث ريتشارد، بعد لقائهما وزير الخارجية جبران باسيل في قصر بسترس، وقبل لقاء رئيس مجلس الوزراء سعد الحريري في "بيت الوسط"، أوضح لـ"اللواء"

ان ساترفيلد طرح تعديلات على "خط هوف" الا ان الرئيس برسي ابلغه . بأن هذا الطرح مرفوض وغير قابل للدرس .

ورفض المصدر الكشف عن طبيعة الطرح الأميركي الجديد، واكتفى بالتأكيد ان ساترفيلد تبلغ الموقف نفسه من الرئيس الحريري . والوزير باسيل .

اما مصادر الخارجية فقد اشارت لـ"اللواء" إلى ان ساترفيلد الذي يتوقع ان يتوجه إلى إسرائيل في الساعات المقبلة لاستكمال وساطته بين الطرفين، نقل أجواء إيجابية عن زيارة تيلرسون إلى بيروت . بمحطاتها الثلاث، وتحديداً مع الرئيس ميشال عون .

وأضافت ان اللقاء جاء تكملة لاجتماع باسيل مع تيلرسون والذي تركز حول المبادرة الأميركية لحل مشكلة الحدود وترسيمها والنقاط الخلافية مع اسرائيل، وان ساترفيلد قدم مقترحات سوف يدرسها باسيل على ان لا تتناقض مع ثوابت المواقف اللبنانية التي اتخذت سابقاً ، وان باسيل أصرّ على ان يكون القرار اللبناني متخذاً تحت مظلة . الوحدة الوطنية والإجماع الوطني بعيداً من التفرد .

وكانت مصادر اطلعت على محادثات تيلرسون مع المسؤولين اللبنانيين أوضحت ان المسؤول الأميركي ابلغهم بأن الاقتراح الذي أشار إليه مساعده ساترفيلد يعطي مكاسب للبنان قد لا تكون مضمونة في حالات . "أخرى، الا انه لم يسم "خط هوف" .

وقالت ان تيلرسون أكد على ضرورة معالجة الخط الأزرق مع الخط الأبيض لكي يكون ذلك مدخلاً لحلحلة الوضع في الجنوب، مشيراً إلى ان ما قدم من مقترحات في هذا المجال مناسب لحلحلة الوضع، لافتاً إلى ان مصلحة لبنان يمكن ان تتأمن بمثل هذا الحل، مع انفتاح على . اقتراحات يمكن ان تكون مشجعة على تسوية يتم التوصل إليها .

خلافاً لما تردد بأن وزير الخارجية الأميركي ريكس تيلرسون أعاد التذكير بخط الدبلوماسية الأميركي فريدريك هوف بما يتصل بالنزاع مع إسرائيل على البلوك 9 ضمن المنطقة الاقتصادية الخالصة، تبين من خلال الجولة التي اجراها الجمعة مساعده لشؤون الشرق الأدنى ديفيد ساترفيلد، على المسؤولين اللبنانيين لمتابعة محادثات تيلرسون في بيروت، ان للدبلوماسية الأميركية مقترحات أخرى غير خط هوف الذي يرفضه المسؤولون اللبنانيون، الا ان هؤلاء رفضوا الكشف عن طبيعة هذه المقترحات، أو التأكيد عمّا إذا كانت تتصل باجراء مفاوضات رباعية مباشرة يشارك فيها لبنان وإسرائيل والولايات المتحدة

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غير ان مصدراً مطلعاً مقرباً من الرئيس نبيه بري في عين التينة التي زارها ساترفيلد بصحبة السفيرة الأميركية اليزابيث ريتشارد، بعد لقائهما وزير الخارجية جبران باسيل في قصر بسترس، وقبل لقاء رئيس مجلس الوزراء سعد الحريري في "بيت الوسط"، أوضح لـ"اللواء" ان ساترفيلد طرح تعديلات على "خط هوف" الا ان الرئيس بري ابلغه . بأن هذا الطرح مرفوض وغير قابل للدرس .

ورفض المصدر الكشف عن طبيعة الطرح الأميركي الجديد، واكتفى بالتأكيد ان ساترفيلد تبلغ الموقف نفسه من الرئيس الحريري . والوزير باسيل .

اما مصادر الخارجية فقد اشارت لـ"اللواء" إلى ان ساترفيلد الذي يتوقع ان يتوجه إلى إسرائيل في الساعات المقبلة لاستكمال وساطته بين الطرفين، نقل أجواء إيجابية عن زيارة تيلرسون إلى بيروت . بمحطاتها الثلاث، وتحديداً مع الرئيس ميشال عون .

وأضافت ان اللقاء جاء تكملة لاجتماع باسيل مع تيلرسون والذي تركز حول المبادرة الأميركية لحل مشكلة الحدود وترسيمها والنقاط الخلافية مع اسرائيل، وان ساترفيلد قدم مقترحات سوف يدرسها باسيل على ان لا تتناقض مع ثوابت المواقف اللبنانية التي اتخذت سابقاً ، وان باسيل أصر على ان يكون القرار اللبناني متخذاً تحت مظلة الوحدة الوطنية والإجماع الوطني بعيداً من التفرد .

وكانت مصادر اطلعت على محادثات تيلرسون مع المسؤولين اللبنانيين أوضحت ان المسؤول الأميركي ابلاغهم بأن الاقتراح الذي أشار إليه مساعده ساترفيلد يعطي مكاسب للبنان قد لا تكون مضمونة في حالات "أخرى، الا انه لم يسم "خط هوف" .

وقالت ان تيلرسون أكد على ضرورة معالجة الخط الأزرق مع الخط الأبيض لكي يكون ذلك مدخلاً لحلحلة الوضع في الجنوب، مشيراً إلى ان ما قدم من مقترحات في هذا المجال مناسب لحلحلة الوضع، لافتاً إلى ان مصلحة لبنان يمكن ان تتأمن بمثل هذا الحل، مع انفتاح على اقتراحات يمكن ان تكون مشجعة على تسوية يتم التوصل إليها .

GECF Doha meet seeks to further strengthen gas market

The 18th ministerial meeting of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) in Doha tomorrow will further explore ways to strengthen the global gas market, which faces numerous challenges including lower prices.

The Doha-headquartered GECF currently accounts for 42% of the global gas output, 67% of the world's proven natural gas reserves, 40% of pipe gas transmission, and 85% of global LNG trade.

The GECF seeks to increase the level of coordination and strengthen the collaboration among member countries, and to build a mechanism for a more meaningful dialogue between gas producers and consumers to ensure stability and security of supply and demand in global natural gas markets.

It also aims to support its members over their natural gas resources and their abilities to develop, preserve and use such resources for the benefit of their peoples, through the exchange of experience, views, information and coordination in gas-related matters.

Saudi Arabian Energy Minister Khalid al-Falih is expected to travel to the Qatari capital, Doha, this week for meetings with oil-producing countries on the sidelines of an energy forum, three sources familiar with the matter said, according to a Reuters dispatch. Al-Falih is expected to meet other energy ministers from Opec and possibly Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak on Friday, the sources said, speaking on condition of anonymity.

It was not immediately clear whether al-Falih would meet Iranian Oil Minister Bijan Zanganeh, the sources said, as

there was no confirmation from Tehran yet on whether Zanganeh would attend the gas forum.

Qatar and Russia are members of the GECF, while Saudi Arabia is not.

The natural gas market is very dynamic and requires liquidity, flexibility and transparency for it to function effectively, GECF noted. It, therefore, needs multiple supply sources, users and comprehensive infrastructure for transmission and distribution. The natural gas market is highly developed in the US Europe and Asia.

التنقيب عن النفط برّاً : احتمالات واعدة بكلفة أقل



بحر لبنان وبرّه بانتظار الإفراج عنها.. مع ذلك يحضر الملف النفطي بصمت أحياناً وبصخب أحياناً أخرى، وفي كلتا الحالتين يبقى عالقا في الدهاليز السياسية

قبل إعلان رئيس مجلس الوزراء سعد الحريري استقالته، كانت الحكومة على أبواب إقرار أول عقد تلزيم في البلوكين 4 و 9 وذلك بعد إقفال دورة التراخيص الأولى في 12 تشرين الأول على عرضين مقدمين من ائتلاف يضم ثلاث شركات إيني ونوفاتك وتوتال(. وكان من المفترض أن يبت مجلس الوزراء هذا الملف ويعطي وزارة الطاقة موافقته لتتمكن من

التفاوض مع الشركات. علماً أن المفاوضات مع تحالف الشركات المشاركة في دورة التراخيص الأولى للتنقيب عن النفط في المياه الإقليمية اللبنانية، تبدأ من بعد غد الإثنين.

غير أن وزير الطاقة لم ينتظر تكليف الحكومة فوقّ دعوة الشركات المشاركة في دورة التراخيص الأولى معلناً ذلك بخطورة التبعات لتي تنجم من عدم المضيّ قدماً في مسار الآلية المقرّرة لاستكشاف الثروة النفطية. رغم خطوة الوزير، التي يراها كثيرون خطوة متسرّعة، يبدو أن تحقيق حلم لبنان النفطي قد أرجئ في الوقت الراهن. صحيح أن الحريري قد تريّث في ما خص الاستقالة، إلا أن الأوضاع لا تنبئ بانعقاد جلسة لمجلس الوزراء قريباً لحسم الملفات الكبيرة وعقد الاتفاقات المصيرية.

في ظلّ هذا الوضع هل يُعاد إلى الواجهة التنقيب عن النفط برّاً؟! أبدى لبنان جاهزية تامّة لبتّ موضوع استخراج النفط في البرّ، وذلك من خال المسح الذي جرى على امتداد 6000 كيلومتر مربع منذ أكثر من ثلاثة أعوام. المعلومات الجيولوجية التي أصدرتها شركة «نيوس» تسمح بتقييم مخزون النفط والغاز في البرّ اللبناني بشكل مفصّل. وقد أتاح المسح الثلاثي الأبعاد الحصول على مجموعة بيانات جيوفيزيائية لباطن الأرض التي يمكن للشركات لعالمية أن تحلّلها بغية تحديد أماكن وجود النفط والغاز وتطويرهما واستخراجهما. ومع ذلك لم تبتعد المناكفات السياسية من هذا لملف، فيما يستمرّ تخوف الخبراء من تكرار تجربة المماثلة المتمادية التي رافقت إقرار المرسومين المتعلقين باستخراج النفط في البحر وما رتبّه ذلك من ضمور في هذا الملف وانكفاء لعدد كبير من الشركات الدولية التي لم تعد مهتمة بالغوص في الأعماق اللبنانية، وما تبعه من تسرع لناحية إجراء دورة تراخيص واحدة (فيما أجرت قبرص ثلاث دورات تراخيص ولم تحسم هذا الموضوع الدقيق اقتصادياً وسياسياً).

التنقيب البرّي أقل كلفة

بحسب الخبير النفطي والاقتصادي رودي بارودي، «فإنّ تحاليل البيانات قد أظهرت تكاملاً في النظام البترولي من الناحية الجيولوجية فلماذا لا يباشر لبنان بإجراءات التنقيب البرّي؟ عمليات حفر الآبار النفطية التي حصلت في أربعينيات القرن الماضي ثبتت وجود مكامن نفطية، إضافة إلى الاستكشافات التي تمت في سوريا وفلسطين والتي يشكل لبنان استمراراً لها، كلها دلائل تؤكّد وجود مكامن نفطية. إلى ذلك، كلفة التنقيب والتطوير في البرّ، أقلّ من خمس (5/1) الكلفة بحراً، ما يشكل عنصر جذب لشركات متوسطة الحجم.

من هنا لا بدّ من عدم المماثلة في هذا الملف الحيوي لتجنب تكرار تجربة البحر. فالاهتمام بالبرّي يؤدي إلى زيادة التنافس بين الشركات، ما يُعطي الدولة قدرة تفاوضية أعلى تؤدي إلى تعظيم المنفعة، فضلاً عن سهولة مشاركتها في الأنشطة البترولية برّاً بسبب «الكلفة المتدنية مقارنة مع البحر».

تاريخ التنقيب البرّي

ليس التنقيب عن البرّ في لبنان أمراً مستجداً. بل إنّ التوقعات عن احتمال وجوده تعود إلى منتصف الأربعينيات، وقد بدت حينها محاولات حفر بئر تجريبية في المنحدر الغربي في جبل تربل شمال مدينة طرابلس. آنذاك اكتشفت الشركة المنقبية موادّ بترولية ثم طمرت البئر من دون أن تُعرف الأسباب. بين الأعوام 1948 و 1966 تم حفر سبع آبار غالبيتها في منطقة البقاع قبل أن يقفل هذا الملف بسبب الأوضاع السياسية من جهة، وعدم توفر إمكانيات لإجراء الدراسات اللازمة. ولكن، رغم الاكتشافات، والإثباتات لا يزال لبنان غائباً عن الساحة النفطية، فيما يُفترض أن يكون معنياً بكل ما يحصل من حوله.

عن الإطار القانوني، تقول المحامية والمتخصصة في قطاع النفط والغاز كرسينا أبي حيدر: «هنالك مشروع قانون للتنقيب البري وهو موجود لدى اللجان المختصة لكن إن لم يُقرّ في وقت قريب فلماذا لا تُعتمد القوانين المرعية الإجراء التي، بالرغم من قدمها، من الممكن أن تسد الفراغ إن أجريت التعديلات اللازمة. القانون الجديد ينبغي أن يحتوي على نقاط قانونية هامة إذا ما أردنا مواكبة التطور الاقتصادي والاجتماعي لا سيما في ما يتعلق بتنظيم عمل الشركات، ومسألة الإشغال الموقت للعقارات أثناء عملية الاستكشاف البرّي، من ثم الاستملاك إذا تم اكتشاف حقل نفطي. كل هذه الأمور تحتاج إلى مقاربة استباقية وسريعة. فالملكية الفردية مصنونة في الدستور اللبناني فإمكان نزعها إلا بموجب مرسوم منفعة عامة ولقاء تعويض عادل. إلى ذلك، قد تظهر عقبات إضافية هي المحافظة على الآثار وعلى المواقع الطبيعية والمياه الجوفية والثروات الطبيعية الأخرى، كل هذه التحديات قد تعوق عمليات التنقيب أو تدمّر التراث الوطني لذا يجب سنّ قوانين وقائية وردعية». وتتابع أبي حيدر «من غير الممكن الحديث عن النفط البرّي دون ذكر دور البلديات كسلطة محلية منتخبة وعلى تماسّ مباشر مع المشاكل اليومية، لذلك من المفترض إيجاد منظومة تشريعية ترعاها لكونها المعنى مباشرة بإدارة الثروات الطبيعية. ومن الضروري أن توضع

القوانين الواضحة قبل البدء بأيّ عملية تنقيب، مع دراسة التجارب السلبية والإيجابية في الدول الأخرى لنعرف كيف نستفيد منها ولن أخذ مثلاً الأثر البيئي الذي تؤدي في تطبيقه البلديات دوراً أساسياً . للأسف، حتى الساعة لم يُفتح النقاش في لبنان على نحو واسع وعميق حول دور البلديات، سواء على صعيد الآثار البيئية أو الاقتصادية أو الاجتماعية أو حتى إيجاد فرص عمل جديدة، و إيجاد مدخول جديد « . للبلديات ولاتحادات البلديات

وتضيف « أنّ التجارب العالمية تشجع الشركات الصغرى والمتوسطة في عملية التنقيب البرّي، ومن المفترض أن يحذو لبنان حذو الدول الأخرى التي تمتاز بخبرات عالية في إدارة مجال النفط والغاز البرّي، و ألا يسمح للشركات الكبرى بأن تنفرد بهذا القطاع وتبتلعه، ولا يمكن لذلك أن يتم إلا من خلال مراقبة علمية ودقيقة لعمل الشركات المنقّبة». منذ أكثر من أربعة أعوام يزعم المسؤولون عن هذا القطاع أنّ عملية التنقيب عن النفط البرّي يمكن أن تبدأ في وقت قريب، بما أنّ العوائق التي تؤخر العمل بحراً غير موجودة. لكن يبدو أنّ هذا الوقت القريب لن يحين حتى من أجل وضع منهجية واضحة لطريقة العمل. فهل كلّ العراقيل المفتعلة « أحيانا الظروف المستجدة أحيانا» أخرى إشارة إلى أفضلية أن تبقى هذه الثروة مدفونة لئلا تتسبب في إغراقنا في المزيد من الفساد والمحاصصة؟

بارودي: الجدول الزمني للإمتيازات البرية أقل من البحري



قدّم الكثير لتطوّر القطاع وتقريب الدول " DE Margerie" بارودي: الجدول الزمني للإمتيازات البرية أقل من البحري

المركزية- أعرب الخبير الإقتصادي في شؤون الطاقة رودي بارودي عن أسفه الشديد لغياب رئيس مجلس إدارة شركة "توتال" العالمية الرجل الذي قدّم الكثير لتطوّر هذا " Christophe de Margerie القطاع وحاول التقريب في ما بين الدول"، مثمّننا "رحيله وهو يقوم بمهامه كرئيس "توتال" إذ كان يحاول تذليل المزيد من الصعوبات التي يواجهها القطاع عموماً و"توتال" خصوصاً، وتحقيق إنجازات جديدة لشركته

من جهة أخرى، شرح بارودي لـ"المركزية"، بعض النقاط المتعلقة بآلية التنقيب البري والبحري عن النفط والغاز في لبنان، وشدد في هذا السياق على أبرز المحاور التي تشكل أولوية في هذه العملية، وهي:

أولاً: على الحكومة فصل القانون البري وآلياته عن عملية التنقيب - البحري.

ثانياً: إعداد خارطة طريق واضحة وشفافة للإمتيازات البرية -

وأضاف: يظهر أن مع نهاية العام الجاري، ستتوفر لدى غرفة البيانات حول D في وزارة الطاقة والمياه، كامل صور ودراسات 3 (Data Room) Transitional Zone (الشاطئ) E & P باطن سطح الأرض لشركات الـ وذلك من أجل شراء البيانات وفحصها قبل البدء بالإلتزامات البرية. الحالية فسيتم دمجها في مشروع المسح D أما الخطوط الزلزالية 2 "الجوي، عبر قياسات متعددة

وقال رداً على سؤال: إن الجدول الزمني للإمتيازات البرية سيستغرق فترة زمنية أقل بكثير مما تتطلبه الإمتيازات البحرية، إذ في

الإمكان البدء بالحفر (الإستكشاف) وتنفيذه في وقت أسرع مما هو عليه في الآبار البحرية.

وأكد أن "الإلتزام البري للشركات يُفترض أن يُحدّد لمدة ثلاث سنوات، ويمكن أن تشمل الإمتيازات في هذا المجال، بين ثلاثة وخمسة آبار على الأقل وبميزانية أقل من تلك المخصصة للآبار البحرية"، وأعطى مثالاً على ذلك، "خمسة ملايين دولار للآبار البرية، في مقابل 125 مليوناً للآبار البحرية البعيدة من الشاطئ، أما المدة فتتراوح بين شهرين وأربعة أشهر للأولى، في مقابل ستة أشهر وسنة للثانية.

وفي المقلب الآخر، شدد بارودي على "ضرورة تقسيم المياه البحرية الخاضعة للولاية القضائية اللبنانية، إلى مناطق بشكل رُقع، على أن يتم الانتهاء من نموذج "اتفاقية الإستكشاف والإنتاج" في أسرع وقت، بالتزامن مع مرسوم دفتر الشروط والإفادة من التراخيص البحرية.

وقال: يبقى الأهم التوافق السياسي على هذا المشروع المستقبلي الضخم، والإفادة من دعوات رئيس المجلس المتكررة إلى الحوار والحفاظ على الأمن والإقتصاد على السواء.

وأخيراً، أثنى بارودي على "الدور الرائد الذي تقوم به" هيئة إدارة قطاع البترول في لبنان" وتنظيمها للمؤتمر المنعقد في بيروت، والذي سيطلق آفاقاً جديدة في عملية التنقيب عن النفط

**Energy and Environmental
Economist, Roudi Baroudi
joins Power House Energy
Advisory Panel**



PowerHouse Energy Group Plc (AIM: PHE), the company focused on ultra high temperature gasification waste to energy systems, and the creation of Distributed Modular Gasification© (“DMG”), are delighted to announce the appointment of Roudi Baroudi to its recently established Advisory Panel.

Roudi is a global energy expert with over 37 years experience of international public and private companies across oil & gas, petrochemicals, power, energy-sector reform, energy security, carbon trading mechanisms and infrastructure. In addition, he is currently a member of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe’s Group of Experts of Gas – this is a body established to facilitate dialogue on promoting safe, clean and sustainable solutions for natural gas production.

With a wealth of international experience he has worked on project and program development with the World Bank, the IMF, the European Commission USAID and the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development. Mr Baroudi is a regular lecturer on global energy affairs and is also the author and co-author of a number of books, article studies and research reports on political, economic and climate change as well as other energy associated matters.

It should be noted that none of the Advisory Panelists are Directors of the Company, and while management, and the Board, will seek their counsel on particular matters pertaining to their individual expertise, the governance and decision making authority for the Company rests solely with the Board of Directors.

Keith Allaun, Executive Chairman of PowerHouse, said: "I believe it is a very strong validation of PowerHouse's potential that we are able to attract someone of the calibre of Roudi to assist the Company.

"The tremendous advantages afforded the Company by such an experienced Advisory Panel cannot be overstated and we are very pleased to welcome Roudi to the team. The members of this panel, investing their time and commitment to our success, will help the Company achieve its commercial goals in segments of the market, and geographies, in which we are well suited to operate.

"I am honoured that each of these industry luminaries has agreed to serve our objective of ubiquitous DMG. With their assistance, we believe PowerHouse and DMG have a very bright future."

Further information on Roudi Baroudi

Roudi Baroudi has more than 37 years of international public- and private-sector experience in the fields of oil and gas, petrochemicals, power, energy-sector reform, energy security, environment, carbon-trading mechanisms, privatization and infrastructure.

Mr. Baroudi's transactional practice began when he joined an energy firm in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, U.S.A., in 1978. His practice relates principally to the energy, high technology, renewable and green electricity, and life sciences sectors of the economy, and involves contract and legal negotiations and

investment vehicles, business combinations, divestitures and operations, as well as various forms of corporate and government finance.

His international experience includes project and program development with the World Bank, the IMF, the European Commission, state-to-state protocols, USAID, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, and Italian Bilateral Protocols, as well as multilateral agency financing in the United States, the Middle East, Central Asia, Japan and Europe, many of which have involved negotiations between and among private and publicly owned concerns and national governments or state enterprises.

Mr. Baroudi has helped to formulate energy and environment policies in the Euro Mediterranean and North Africa region and for the Middle East area. He participated in the preparations of the Euro-Med Energy Free Trade Zone, and in the Euro-Med Regional and Euro-Med Government negotiations. He also has had a role in energy and transportation policies, advising both the European Commission and its Mediterranean partners between the Barcelona and Trieste Declarations of 1995-1996 and 2004. In addition, Mr. Baroudi was a founding member of the Rome Euro-Mediterranean Energy Platform (REMEP).

In particular, his work and research on integration have focused on energy and transportation networks and related projects, including natural gas and electricity rings affecting both EU and non-EU member states bordering the Mediterranean. His expertise is regularly sought by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), which invites him to participate in the expert working party on topics such as gas savings, underground gas storage, and sustainable energy development.

Mr. Baroudi has done extensive work in energy, security and

economic development, industrial programs which have help bring about energy and economic advances related to private sector power development, electricity market unbundling, gas market reform, political reform and deregulation. He also has done extensive work on international oil and gas ventures, including petroleum development and exploration, as well as government legislation.

Mr. Baroudi has held a variety of influential positions. In 1999, he was elected secretary general of the World Energy Council – Lebanon Member Committee, a position he held until January 2013. He is also a member of the Association Française des Techniciens et Professionnels du Pétrole (French Association of Petroleum Professionals and Technical Experts). Mr. Baroudi is a former senior adviser to the Arab Electricity Regulatory Forum (AREF), a member of the Energy Institute, (UK), and a member of the International Association for Energy Economics (IAEE) in the U.S.A. Mr. Baroudi also serves on several boards of directors of different companies and international joint ventures.

Mr. Baroudi is the author or co-author of numerous books, articles studies, and research reports on political, economic, climate change and other matters associated with energy. His insights on these and related issues are frequently sought by local and international companies, governments, media and television outlets. He is also a regular lecturer on global energy and transportation affairs.

In addition to the foregoing, Mr. Baroudi is currently a member of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe's Group of Experts of Gas, a body established to facilitate multi-stakeholder dialogue on promoting safe, clean, and sustainable solutions for the production, distribution and consumption of natural gas in the world's single-largest energy market.

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
PowerHouse is the holding company of the G3-UHt Ultra High Temperature Gasification Waste-to-Energy system, and the creator of Distributed Modular Gasification© (“DMG”)

The Company is focused on technologies to enable energy recovery from municipal waste streams that would otherwise be directed to landfills and incinerators; or from renewable and alternative fuels such as biomass, tyres, and plastics to create syngas for power generation, high-quality hydrogen, or potentially reformed into liquid fuels for transportation. DMG allows for easy, economical, deployment and scaling of an environmentally sound solution to the growing challenges of waste elimination, electricity demand, and distributed hydrogen production.

PowerHouse is quoted on the London Stock Exchange’s AIM Market. The Company is incorporated in the United Kingdom.

For more information see www.powerhouseenergy.net

Così Cipro unita aiuterebbe tutto il Mediterraneo





il Giornale.it mondo

Uno dei fattori chiave che hanno permesso a Donald Trump di vincere a novembre è stata l'enorme voglia di cambiare la politica interna.

Eppure la sua presidenza può offrire enormi opportunità anche per quanto riguarda la politica estera e Cipro, insieme al resto dei Paesi dell'Est Mediterraneo, potrebbero così essere tra i primi beneficiari della politica estera di Trump.

L'isola è divisa dal 1974, nonostante i vari tentativi di riunificazione. Trump non è il primo presidente a seminare speranze per Cipro unita, ma questa volta, dopo molti anni, ci sono seri motivi di credere che un accordo totale ed equo è possibile.

Prima di tutto la figura di Trump. È la prima volta che nella storia americana sale alla Casa Bianca qualcuno di così fondamentalmente diverso rispetto ai suoi predecessori. Molti studiosi si sono focalizzati sulle ripercussioni negative che la politica di Trump porterebbe, ma allo stesso modo sono in vista cambiamenti positivi.

Inoltre, a pesare in senso positivo, c'è la nomina del segretario di Stato. Benché Rex Tillerson abbia una scarsa esperienza nel governo, ha lavorato per dieci anni alla ExxonMobil, una compagnia con 75mila dipendenti, che opera in duecento Paesi. Prima ancora ha personalmente seguito e guidato il processo attraverso cui ExxonMobil ha raggiunto la sua invidiabile posizione in Russia, il più grande produttore di energia del mondo. Insomma, un curriculum che la dice lunga sulle sue capacità.

E non da ultimo c'è la tempistica. Cipro sta costruendo molto rapidamente il suo polo energetico regionale per l'est Mediterraneo. Dalle recenti attività di esplorazioni è stata confermata la presenza di depositi di gas naturale.

Questo sviluppo energetico di Cipro potrebbe essere un perno di vitale importanza, primo per la sua posizione geografica, insieme alla sua posizione geostrategica, e per il fatto di essere membro dell'Unione Europea e, non da ultimo, per lo sviluppo industriale della regione.

Molti protagonisti si sono già messi in gioco, incluso la ExxonMobil che, insieme al Qatar Petroleum, il più grande produttore di gas naturale, si è assicurata i diritti di esplorazione del Blocco 10 del Cyprus Exclusive Economic Zone. In campo c'è anche Rosneft, una delle compagnie di energia più importanti della Russia, e Soyuzneftegaz, un'altra compagnia russa.

In questo delicato momento storico, Cipro trarrebbe ovviamente grandi vantaggi da una riunificazione. Prima di tutto,

evidentemente, attrarrebbe più investitori. Se il riavvicinamento tra il presidente russo, Vladimir Putin, e il turco, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, continua così come sostengono molti osservatori, sarà più facile portare avanti una negoziazione positiva. E questo ci fa tornare alla nuova amministrazione americana. Sia l'Unione Europea che l'Onu si sono impegnate a cercare un'intesa su Cipro ma per superare l'ostacolo «dell'ultimo miglio» potrebbe venir richiesto un impegno americano più intenso.

Cipro unificata, che diventa un polo regionale dell'energia sarebbe così un vantaggio non solo per se stessa ma ridurrebbe le tensioni tra Ankara e Atene, e tutti i Paesi vicini del Mediterraneo avrebbero vantaggi dalla stabilità ritrovata, incluso più turismo e più investimenti.

Un discorso non certo facile da realizzare: il processo di unificazione non è facile da raggiungere. Ecco perché una volontà solida dei protagonisti è così fondamentale; le potenziali ricadute positive derivanti dal settore energetico di Cipro potrebbero essere così più forti delle rimanenti obiezioni. È quindi tempo di dare un'opportunità costruttiva e dare un regalo di pace prima a Cipro poi ai paesi del Mediterraneo.

Roudi Baroudi

Ceo della Energy & Environment Holding, basata in Qatar

Qatar's Energy Acumen Spells Prosperity at Home and Stable

Prices Around the World



by Roudi Baroudi

Qatar's growing stature on the international stage did not come about by accident, but rather as the product of a concerted effort to acquire a larger and more constructive role in the region and around the world. This greater capacity to exert positive influences has been made possible by the country's enormous gas reserves, but even these would not have sufficed without both effective management of those resources and many years of astute diplomacy.

There were never any guarantees that the story would have a happy ending. The first oil well, "Dukhan 1," was drilled in 1939, but Qatar did not gain full independence from Britain until 1971, and its flagship oil company, Qatar Petroleum (QP), was not formed until 1974. Like many resource-rich countries emerging from the era of colonialism, Qatar lacked many of the institutions and mechanisms required for effective governance, so for many years it did not derive maximum benefit from the production and export of crude.

Near the end of the 20th century, however, the country and its territorial waters were found to be sitting atop huge deposits of natural gas in what would become known as the North Field. The colossal North Field covers an area of some 6,000 square kilometres, making it the single largest non-associated gas reservoir on the planet. Coupled with a new leadership that had the vision to make far-seeing investments, this gas has

offered Qatar an opportunity to more than make up for lost time. As of 2014, the country's gas reserves were estimated at more than 25 trillion cubic metres, surpassed only by Russia and Iran and equivalent to a whopping 14 percent of the world total.

It was foresight, though, not just raw reserves, that made Qatar what it is today. Not content with the country being "just" another major producer of fossil fuels, the ruling family threw its weight behind financial investments and technological choices that would make Qatar a global leader in several facets of the gas business. Accordingly, billions of dollars were spent to expand production, acquire the world's most advanced liquefied natural gas (LNG) trains, and build a fleet of ultra-modern LNG carriers to serve customers around the globe. As a result, Qatar now leads all nations in exports of LNG. In addition, the country has been the foremost partner in the pioneering of research, development and commercialisation of gas-to-liquids (GTL) technologies, including a jet-fuel blend that reduces both emissions and operating costs.

Even more than natural resources, then, it is sound judgement that has transformed Qatar into the world's wealthiest nation-state on a per capita basis, winning it a choice seat at the table when major powers discuss the most pressing matter of the day. It has used this influence to promote both economic and political stability, striving to forge bilateral and multilateral relationships with which to address shared concerns like war/occupation, poverty, and the environment.

This level of economic and diplomatic ambition requires across-the-board engagement and, when appropriate, strong leadership. Therefore, in addition to having joined the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries just a year after OPEC's founding in 1960, Qatar also plays a central role in the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) set up in 2001, having hosted the GECF's Executive Office and Secretariat

since 2009.

GTL capital of the world

The GECF was established to promote the interests of the world's leading gas producers by holding regular meetings to find common ground and develop solutions for shared challenges, but its selection of Doha to serve as headquarters reflected a different priority, that of improving ties and coordination with consumer nations. As a country that maintains warm relations with governments on both sides of several diplomatic divides, Qatar and its robust finances have been instrumental in initiating and sustaining useful discussions of issues affecting the international gas market, providing a platform of stability that has allowed the development of a healthy and prosperous energy market that benefits all stakeholders.

Despite the volatility of the hydrocarbon markets and their relationship to international politics, Doha, in particular with its energy policy, has been a focal point of cooperation among producers and consumers with a view toward adopting new standards, regularizing markets and prices, and ensuring both stability and sustainability of supply so that demand is met in a mutually beneficial manner. The resulting safe and sustainable energy flows, with fewer interruptions due to wars or other forms of instability, yields a variety of certainties that serve the interests of all countries. So it was that in less than a decade, a tiny country of just 2 million inhabitants became the most important force for maintaining global security and price stability for all forms of natural gas. Given the ever-increasing importance of natural gas in the global energy mix, this also means that Qatar contributes mightily to economic growth and flourishing energy initiatives in virtually all corners of the world.

In addition, Qatar has employed skilful political leadership in urging its fellow gas producers to think long and hard about the difference between oil and gas prices. Oil remains the benchmark, as all other energy prices usually rise and

fall under its influence. Qatar continues to study the causes that have led to gaps in the price relationship between oil and gas, and how collective action can both restore the link and achieve parity between the two. Given the many environmental and other advantages that gas offers over traditional energy sources – including being non-toxic, near-perfect combustion, no soil contamination, and an enviable safety record – greater parity would seem to be in the interests of all concerned, including the planet itself.

The GTL venture is a prime example of innovation designed to ensure that more and more applications can use cheaper, cleaner-burning natural gas. Qatar is carving out yet another niche for itself, this time as “GTL capital of the world.” Only two other countries – South Africa and Malaysia – possess similar facilities, and Qatar’s access to affordable feedstock will give it significant advantages for years to come. By 2016, national production of GTL will amount to 174,000 barrels a day, radically increasing supplies available to help airlines, local public transport and utilities to reduce their carbon footprints.

The natural gas industry is growing and globalizing as demand expands and new technologies like GTL enable and inspire creative new ways to customize compatible products and services. Simultaneously, Qatar’s backing of a positive global energy dialogue,

reliable production and massive investment in today’s fuel of choice are bringing more stability and security of supply to regional and global markets because in the gas industry, volumes and prices are defined primarily by long-term contracts, consumers and supplies. In 2006, Qatar and two of its neighbors, Oman and the UAE, completed the first cross-border regional gas pipeline, linking the North Field to customers in Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Oman. This tri-nation sub-sea gas pipeline project was an unprecedented achievement and so set a fitting example of strategic inter-energy connecting grids.

The impacts go far beyond the energy business. For example, Qatar has worked very successfully to foster better environments for strategic partnerships, and to achieve greater energy security while improving climate protection in the discovery, development and production of cleaner and more efficient fuels. This combination imparts enormous value to society by inspiring confidence in the strength and durability of the national economy and the policies pursued by the government, both at home and abroad. Better fuels mean higher standards of living, greater social stability, and a cleaner environment. The revenues and cost savings can be a game-changer in reducing poverty, and the Qatari government has worked to ensure that the gas industry operates with due regard for social, moral and environmental impacts. On this last score, achieving a truly open global market for gas is perhaps the single greatest step government and industry can take to achieve genuinely significant levels of de-carbonization in the coming years.

Even as I write, the world is rapidly moving toward commercialization of energy technologies independent of carbon, such as photovoltaics and fuel cells. These will take time to mature, particularly in terms of applications requiring large mobile energy supplies, so gas will be the natural bridge that joins the carbon and post-carbon eras.

For now, the oil and gas industry continues to decide the future of our world economy, and energy and capital complement one another. Therefore, the emerging primacy of gas will only solidify Qatar's position as a global energy titan, and continue to fuel its diversification as an emerging business and logistics hub in today's highly competitive world. And if recent history is any guide, the same resources will help fund investments that make the country a player in tomorrow's world as well.

قدّم إلى سليمان دراسته الأخيرة حول "الطاقة في المنطقة" بارودي: "إعلان بعدا اقتصادي" يجذب الإنهيار



المركزية - تسلّم الرئيس العماد ميشال سليمان من الخبير الدولي في قطاع الطاقة رودي بارودي دراسته الأخيرة لهذا العام حول "وضع الطاقة في المنطقة" بعد الدراسة السابقة التي أعدّها في هذا الشأن عام 2008، وذلك خلال زيارة قام بها بارودي للرئيس سليمان في منزله في اليرزة قبل ظهر اليوم.

وتركز البحث في خلال اللقاء، على أهمية الإستكشاف والتنقيب عن الغاز والنفط في لبنان وخصوصاً البدء بالمشح البري بعد مدة زمنية فاقت الـ60 عاماً منذ آخر عملية استكشاف، وضرورة عدم تضييع الفرص في هذا المجال للإفادة من هذه الثروة إلى أقصى حدّ.

وكانت مناسبة شكر فيها بارودي للرئيس سليمان محافظته على الثروة النفطية اللبنانية طوال عهده في سدة الرئاسة، ومتابعته الحثيثة لتطورات هذا الملف عبر مواكبة الإتصالات الجارية مع الدول المعنية بالتنقيب في المياه الإقليمية، سعياً إلى حفظ حقوق لبنان في حصته النفطية.

وشدد بارودي في خلال اللقاء، على "أهمية تعزيز العلاقات بين لبنان وقبرص في ملف النفط والغاز، وتنمية أواصر التعاون خصوصاً في مجال الغاز السائل والتصدير إلى أسواق أوروبا الأقرب على الإطلاق لتسويق الغاز"، مشيداً بـ"النشاطات الجبارة التي تقوم بها هيئة إدارة قطاع البترول في لبنان".

وأكد أنه "لا بد" من إحياء ما طالبنا به منذ نحو سنتين، بضرورة صوغ "إعلان بعبدا اقتصادي" يجمع كل الأفرقاء ليشبكوا الأيدي وينكبوا على إبعاد شبح الإنهيار الإقتصادي عن لبنان وجبه كل التحديات والمشكلات التي تعوق نموّه وازدهاره، وبالتالي الإفادة من كل الفرص المتاحة على أكثر من صعيد ولا سيما التنقيب عن النفط والغاز في البرّ وفي مياها الإقليمية".