بارودي في مؤتمر أثينا: يمكن لأوروبا أن تخفف من أزمتها عبر الطاقة النظيفة في البحر الأبيض المتوسط

المركزية- حاضر الخبير الدولي في شؤون الطاقة رودي بارودي عن صناعة الطاقة العالمية خلال مؤتمر أثينا الذي انعقد الأسبوع الفائت تحت عنوان “حوارات الطاقة 2022″، حيث لفت إلى أنه “يمكن لأوروبا أن تخفف من أزمتها في مجال الطاقة من خلال الدعم والاستثمار في طفرة الطاقة النظيفة في منطقة البحر الأبيض المتوسط”.

وجاء في مداخلته: “خلال السنوات الأخيرة، دارت كل المناقشات العلمية في صناعة الطاقة العالمية حول موضوعين: تغيّر المناخ وتقلبات أسعار السوق.

هناك، بالطبع، ضغوطات متزايدة لاستبدال الوقود الأحفوري بموارد الطاقة المتجددة مثل الرياح والطاقة الشمسية. والهدف من ذلك هو الجمع بين موارد طاقة جديدة مستدامة بيئيًا وقابلة للاستمرار اقتصاديًا، كذلك الدمج بين زيادة الوعي وتحسين التكنولوجيا يجعلنا أقرب إلى تحقيق كلا الهدفين.

لطالما كانت إحدى المشاكل الرئيسية تكمن في أن هذا التغيير لا يمكن أن يتم بين ليلة وضحاها. إن إنتاج وأداء وحجم الاتكال على المصادر النظيفة والصديقة للبيئة ليس كافيا بعد لتلبية الطلب بالكامل، وسيتطلب الوصول إلى تلك المرحلة سنوات طويلة من التخطيط والاستثمار والبناء. إذا أخذنا التقنيات المتوفرة في وضعها الحالي قبل أن يتم استبدالها بالتقنيات الحديثة، فإن النقص الناتج سيؤدي إلى ارتفاع الأسعار، مما سيزيد من تكاليف المعيشة والتسبب في انهيار الاقتصادات بأكملها. من ناحية أخرى، إذا انتظرنا وقتًا طويلاً قبل التخلي عن موارد الطاقة العالمية المنتجة لانبعاثات الكربون، فإن التغيرات المناخية تهدد بإلحاق أضرار أكبر من سابقها.

من البديهي القول إنه كانت هناك دائمًا عملية موازنة دقيقة في هذا المنحى، فقد أجبرت تقلبات الأسواق صانعي السياسات مراراً على إعادة النظر في خططهم وإعادة التفكير فيها وإعادة ضبطها. ثم جاءت جائحة كورونا (كوفيد – 19) التي تسببت بضغط غير مسبوق على الإنتاج والاستهلاك على حد سواء. وقد نجحت مجموعة حلول من الفئات العامة والخاصة في التغلب على أسوأ ما في تلك العاصفة بشكل مثير للدهشة. لكن التعافي العالمي لا يزال هشاَ وغير متوازن لا سيما في ضوء الانتشار الواسع للتضخم وانهيار خطوط الإمداد.

أما الآن تلوح أمامنا أزمة جديدة تهدد موارد الطاقة وتتسبب بصدمات قوية قد تؤدي الى انهيار معاييرنا الجديدة والتسبب بأسوأ موجة كساد في التاريخ الحديث. أشير بالطبع إلى الحرب في أوكرانيا والتي لم تكشف فقط عن اعتماد أوروبا المفرط والخطير على الغاز الطبيعي وواردات الطاقة الأخرى من روسيا، ولكنها كشفت أيضا إلى اي مدى يمكن أن يسبب اختلال هذه العلاقة من فوضى في العالم أجمع. منذ أن شنت موسكو غزوها للأراضي الأوكرانية في أواخر شباط / فبراير، كان الاتحاد الأوروبي مترددًا في فرض عقوبات على قطاع صناعة الطاقة الروسية لأنه يفتقر إلى بدائل أخرى بسبب عدم امتلاكه لمصادر متنوعة من الطاقة ومورديها بشكل كاف.

تجري في العديد من البلدان بعض التحركات التي طال انتظارها لزيادة قدرتها على التكيف، لكن التوقيت يزيد من التحديات بطرق عدة. فعلى سبيل المثال تم رفض أو تأخير المقترحات المختلفة لمد خطوط أنابيب الغاز من شمال إفريقيا وآسيا الوسطى، والتي قد تمر بالأراضي الروسية. بالإضافة إلى ذلك، قررت بعض الحكومات الأوروبية في السنوات الأخيرة، إغلاق محطات الطاقة لديها التي تعمل على الفحم و / أو الطاقة النووية، ما جعلها تفتقد إلى المرونة والقابلية في التعويض عن الغاز الطبيعي الروسي واستبداله بموارد وأنواع أخرى من الوقود. كما تعاني القارة أيضًا من عجز في القدرة على إعادة معالجة الغاز ليكون قابلا للاستهلاك، ما يعني أنها لا تستطيع الاستغناء كليا عن الغاز المستورد عبر الأنابيب الروسية، واستبدالها بشحنات الغاز الطبيعي المسال المنقولة بحراً من دول أخرى.

هناك حلول لكل هذه المشاكل، وبعضها قيد التنفيذ بالفعل:

• تقوم ألمانيا حالياً ببناء محطتين جديدتين لاستقبال الغاز الطبيعي المسال، وتقوم هولندا بتوسيع طاقتها الاستيعابية الحالية، كذلك أكدت اليونان مؤخراً أن لديها خططاً في نفس الاتجاه.

• تمتلك إسبانيا خطوط انابيب غاز داخلية وكذلك تمتلك القدرة الاحتياطية لإعادة تحويل الغاز المسال إلى غاز قابل للاستهلاك، لكنها تفتقد إلى القدرة على زيادة الإنتاج والضخ إلى باقي الدول الأوروبية. لذلك فإنه من المنطقي القول إن الوقت قد حان لربط شبكة الأنابيب الإسبانية بفرنسا، ما يتيح للغاز أن يتدفق إلى الشبكة الأوروبية.

• من المنطقي أيضًا الإسراع في وضع الخطط لإنشاء خط أنابيب جديد آخر و / أو زيادة القدرة على نقل الغاز من أذربيجان ومناطق أخرى في آسيا الوسطى إلى تركيا، ما يُتيح لإمدادات الغاز هذه أن تدخل الأسواق الأوروبية.

• يمكن أيضاً لأوروبا أن تعزز أمنها في الطاقة من خلال المساعدة على تطوير حقول الغاز ألغنية بشكل متزايد في شرق البحر الأبيض المتوسط ​​، والتي يمكن بعد ذلك ربط إنتاجها عن طريق خط أنابيب تحت البحر و / أو فوق الأرض إلى البر الرئيسي الأوروبي.

• سيتم أيضًا تعزيز الفائدة من هذه الخطوات وغيرها بشكل كبير من خلال بناء مرافق تخزين جديدة لكل من الغاز الطبيعي المسال والغاز التقليدي، مما سيجعل أوروبا أكثر صلابة أمام انقطاع إمدادات الغاز في المستقبل.

• نظرًا لقرار الاتحاد الأوروبي الجاد في فك قيود سياسته الخارجية والتوقف عن اعتماده على الغاز الروسي، فمن الممكن أيضًا تأجيل إغلاق محطات الإنتاج التي تعمل على الفحم والطاقة النووية والإسراع بتنفيذ مشاريع الطاقة النظيفة، حقول الطاقة الشمسية، ومزارع الرياح على وجه الخصوص.

• بالإضافة إلى الغاز الذي يجري ضخه عبر الأنابيب، تتلقى إسبانيا الكهرباء المولدة من مزارع الطاقة الشمسية في شمال إفريقيا، كما أن هنالك مجال كبير جدا لإنشاء شبكات مشتركة مماثلة عبر المنطقة الأورو- متوسطية.

• لعل الحل الأفضل على المدى الطويل هو أن تغتنم أوروبا الفرصة من خلال استثمارها في مجالات انتاج الطاقة ذات الإمكانيات الكبيرة بواسطة الرياح البحرية في منطقة المتوسط.

تجدر الإشارة هنا إلى أنني نشرت منذ مدة وجيزة كتابًا جديدًا بعنوان “المناخ والطاقة في منطقة البحر الأبيض المتوسط: ماذا يعني الاقتصاد الأزرق لمستقبل أكثر خضرة؟”. لقد أكملت كتابته قبل اندلاع الحرب في أوكرانيا، وكان هدفي من وراء كتابته التركيز على خفض انبعاثات الكربون أكثر من التقليل على الاعتماد على الغاز الروسي. لكن الأزمة الحالية تجعل موضوع الكتاب أكثر أهمية من أي وقت مضى. وتذهب التوصية الأساسية للكتاب إلى أنه يمكن لأوروبا أن تستفيد بشكل كبير من برنامج لتوليد الطاقة عبر تطوير مرافق استفادة من الرياح البحرية في حوض المتوسط. كما يتضمن الكتاب تقديرات لإمكانيات استفادة كل دولة أورو- متوسطية من الرياح البحرية، والارقام في تزايد.

أساساُ، فإن الاستفادة الكاملة من هذه الإمكانات – في المياه الساحلية وحدها – يمكن أن توليد ما لا يقل عن 500 مليون ميغاواط من الكهرباء. بمعنى آخر ما يعادل مجموع إنتاج مولدات الطاقة النووية في العالم أجمع! ويجدر الإشارة أن هذه التقديرات واقعية، وقد تم التوصل إليها من خلال دراسات شاملة وحثيثة للغاية تستند إلى التكنولوجيا القياسية المستخدمة في أيامنا هذه.

يعيدنا هذا إلى موضوعنا الأساسي، فنظريا، كل ما سبق ذكره من محطات الغاز الطبيعي المسال، وخطوط الأنابيب الجديدة، وأعمال التطوير لزيادة عمر محطات توليد الطاقة التي تعمل على الفحم وتلك التي تعمل على الطاقة النووية، وتسخير الإمكانات الهائلة للبحر الأبيض المتوسط ​​- كل هذا سيتطلب أموالا طائلة. ستكون السنوات الثلاث إلى الخمس المقبلة حاسمة، ليس فقط من أجل تقليل الاعتماد على الغاز الروسي، وبالتالي استعادة استقلالية السياسة الخارجية للاتحاد الأوروبي، ولكن أيضًا لتكثيف مصادر الطاقة المتجددة التي ستساعد في الحفاظ على تغيرات المناخ ضمن حدود يمكن التحكم فيه.

يمكن لمنطقة البحر الأبيض المتوسط ​​- بما في ذلك الدول المطلة عليها من مكونات الاتحاد الأوروبي وتلك غير التابعة له – أن تكون جزءًا كبيرًا من هذا المسعى لتحقيق قابلية مزدوجة لمواجهة التحديات الاقتصادية والبيئية على حدٍ سواء. تعتبر الاستثمارات الأوروبية في إنتاج الطاقة في بلدان الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا منطقية لعدة أسباب ومنها، انخفاض قيمة اليد العاملة وتكاليف البناء الأخرى، فضلاً عن إمدادات طاقة أكثر تنوعًا والتي يمكن الاعتماد عليها بشكل أكبر. ناهيك عن المزايا المساعدة على تطوير اقتصادات أقوى واستقرار سياسي أكبر على أطراف أوروبا. ستساعد هاتان النتيجتان على تحسين الفقر واليأس، وتحد من تدفق المهاجرين غير الشرعيين، الذين لقي الآلاف منهم حتفهم أثناء محاولتهم عبور البحر المتوسط ​​في القوارب المتهالكة والمثقلة بالأعباء التي زودهم بها مهربو البشر عديمو الضمير.

سيداتي وسادتي، أعتقد أنه يمكننا أن نتفق جميعًا على أن هذه ليست أولويات ثانوية. على العكس من ذلك، فهي أولويات استثنائية تتطلب اتخاذ تدابير استثنائية، وقد تكون الآثار المترتبة على عدم التصرف كارثية في السنوات القادمة. وبالتالي، فإن المطلوب ليس فقط أن تتعاون الدول الأعضاء في الاتحاد الأوروبي لتحقيق هذه الأهداف، كما يفعل البعض منها حالياُ، ولكن المطلوب من جميع الهيئات ذات الصلة أن تتقدم وتتدخل وتشارك كما لم تفعل من قبل.

حول هذا الموضوع بالذات، تلقينا بعض الأخبار الجيدة جدًا مؤخرًا. فقبل حوالي أسبوع، حددت المفوضية الأوروبية خطة جديدة لإنهاء اعتماد أوروبا على الغاز الروسي، خطة تتطلب إنفاق أكثر من 200 مليار يورو على مدى السنوات الخمس المقبلة. هذا رقم كبير، لكن الخطة تحتاج الآن إلى التمويل.

ستتطلب المشاريع المعنية دعما هائلا، سواء المباشر منها أو غير المباشر، وذلك إذا أريد لها أن تبدأ في العمل بسرعة، وإذا كانت ستفعل ذلك دون أن تخضع لفرض ضرائب غير مستدامة و / أو دون أن تتأتى منها أعباء ديون على الاقتصادات الفردية. هذا يعني أنه ليس فقط على الاتحاد الأوروبي نفسه أن يبدأ بالتمويل، ولكن على كل من بنك الاستثمار الأوروبي والبنك الدولي وصندوق النقد الدولي – أن يبدأوا بالتمويل كذلك. كما يجب على القطاع الخاص إن يشارك في هذا الإجراء أيضا.

ستكون هناك فوائد كبيرة إذا اعتمدنا على مثل هذا البرنامج، وبالمقابل ستكون هناك أزمات أكبر إذا لم نفعل ذلك. لذلك لا يمكن اعتبار الحلول المذكورة انفاقاً منتظماً، بل هي بدلا من ذلك ترقى لتكون استثمارات ضرورية وتاريخية في مستقبل أفضل للقارة بأكملها ولجيرانها في الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا، وبإمكاني أن أقول وكذلك الأمر بالنسبة للعالم أجمع.

لسوء الحظ، لقد فات الأوان لمنع الحرب في أوكرانيا. لكن كلما تحركت أوروبا بشكل أسرع وفعال لإنهاء اعتمادها على الغاز الروسي، وتبنت شراكة أوثق مع جيرانها في البحر الأبيض المتوسط، والتي ستحقق الاستقلالية الكاملة لسياستها الخارجية، كلما تمكنت من المساعدة في استعادة السلام – ومنع حدوث كوارث مماثلة في المستقبل”.




Dismantling the fossil-fuel economy at Stockholm+50

Our planet is facing a triple crisis of climate, nature, and pollution, with one common cause: the fossil-fuel economy. Oil, gas, and coal are at the root of runaway climate disruption, widespread biodiversity loss, and pervasive plastic pollution. The conclusion is clear and must be paramount when political leaders gather in Stockholm this week to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the first United Nations Conference on the Human Environment. Any effort to address these existential threats to human and ecological health will mean little as long as the fossil-fuel economy remains intact.
As UN Secretary-General António Guterres recently noted, fossil fuels are choking our planet. In the last decade, their combustion accounted for 86% of global carbon dioxide emissions, for which just a few actors bear overwhelming responsibility. In fact, nearly two-thirds of all CO2 emitted since the Industrial Revolution can be traced to just 90 polluters, mostly the largest fossil-fuel producers.
Yet, rather than reining in the polluters, the world’s governments are currently planning to allow more than twice as much fossil-fuel production in 2030 than would be consistent with the goal – agreed under the 2015 Paris climate agreement – of limiting global warming to 1.5C above pre-industrial levels. And when it comes to the damage wrought by fossil fuels, higher global temperatures and intensifying extreme weather events are only the beginning.
Last year, the UN Special Rapporteur on Toxics and Human Rights, Marcos A Orellana, affirmed what frontline communities have long known: fossil-fuel production generates toxic compounds and pollutes air, water, and soil. Air pollution from burning fossil fuels was responsible for about one in five deaths worldwide in 2018. Moreover, oil and gas are the building blocks of the toxic chemicals, pesticides, and synthetic fertilisers that are pushing ecosystems and species to extinction. These fossil-fuel-based products perpetuate an economic and agro-industrial model that drives deforestation, destroys biodiversity, and threatens human health.
Fossil fuels are also behind the proliferation of plastics, which are accumulating in even the most remote areas of the planet, from the top of Mount Everest to the bottom of the Mariana Trench. Ninety-nine percent of all plastics are made from chemicals derived from fossil fuels, predominantly oil and gas. The production of petrochemical feedstocks for plastics and the use of fossil fuels throughout the plastics value chain are boosting demand for oil and gas and exposing millions of people to toxic pollution.
As if that were not enough, fossil fuels foment and fund violent conflict around the world. The fossil-fuel economy is enabling Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine and the humanitarian crisis it has created. In the seven years after Russia illegally annexed Crimea, eight of the world’s biggest fossil-fuel companies enriched Russia’s government by an estimated $95.4bn. Russia’s revenues from energy exports have soared since the invasion of Ukraine in February, which drove up prices. And big Western oil companies, cashing in on the conflict, have raked in record profits.
Instead of facing accountability, the oil and gas industry and its allies are exploiting the Ukraine crisis to push for even more drilling, fracking, and exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) all around the world. But new fossil-fuel infrastructure, which will take years to bring online, will do nothing to address the current energy crisis. Instead, it will only deepen the world’s dependence on fossil fuels, enhance producers’ ability to wreak havoc on people and the planet, and push a climate-safe future further out of reach.
As world leaders gather for Stockholm+50, breaking our addiction to fossil fuels should be the top priority. Yet fossil fuels are conspicuously absent from the official concept note and agenda, and they are barely mentioned in the background papers of the three Leadership Dialogues that are supposed to inform the summit’s outcome.
This omission is no accident. The fossil-fuel lobby has decades of experience sowing doubt about the damage the industry is causing and obscuring the link between fossil fuels and the toxic chemicals used in industrial agriculture and plastic products. When outright denial has not worked, the industry has touted false solutions, including speculative technological fixes, market mechanisms with gigantic loopholes, and misleading “net-zero” pledges. The goal is to divert political attention from the urgent action needed to end reliance on fossil fuels and scale-up proven approaches, like renewable energy, agroecology, and plastic reduction and reuse.
Such transformative action is precisely what Stockholm+50 must deliver. Participating governments and decision-makers must acknowledge that fossil fuels are the main driver of the triple crisis we face, and they must set a bold agenda for halting fossil-fuel expansion, ensuring a rapid and equitable decline of oil, gas, and coal, and accelerating a just transition to a fossil-free future.
One possible feature of such an agenda would be a Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty – an initiative that has attracted wide support, including from thousands of civil-society organisations, hundreds of scientists and parliamentarians, more than 100 Nobel laureates, and dozens of municipal governments. To spur progress, a broad range of stakeholders – including representatives of indigenous communities, governments, international institutions, and academia – will gather the day before Stockholm+50 for the Pre-Summit on the Global Just Transition from Fossil Fuels.
In parallel with the Stockholm meeting, an intergovernmental negotiating committee, convened by the UN Environment Programme, is gathering in Dakar to develop a legally binding global plastics treaty. Crucially, the treaty will have to take a comprehensive approach that addresses the full plastic life cycle, beginning with fossil-fuel extraction.
If we have learned one thing in the 50 years since the first Stockholm conference, it is that a future tied to fossil fuels is no future at all. To tackle the converging crises of climate change, biodiversity loss, and petrochemical and plastic pollution, Stockholm+50 has no alternative but to confront oil, gas, and coal head-on. — Project Syndicate

 Nikki Reisch is Director of the Climate and Energy Program at the Center for International Environmental Law.
 Lili Fuhr is Deputy Director of the Climate and Energy Program at the Center for International Environmental Law.




Sun-starved Sweden turns to solar to fill power void

Bloomberg

Sweden, known for its long dark winters with barely any daylight, is seeing a solar power boom.
Harnessing whatever sunshine the country gets is emerging as the quickest solution to fill part of the void left by two closed nuclear reactors in southern Sweden, where the biggest cities and industries are located. With shortages piling up in the region and consumers keen to secure green energy at stable prices, solar is quickly catching up with wind as developers put panels on rooftops and underutilised land in populated areas.
While the lack of sunlight is a hindrance, every bit of new electricity capacity will lower imports from Europe where prices are more than three times higher than in the rest of Sweden. Projects are also getting built quickly because developers are directly getting into power sales deals with consumers and aren’t dependent on government support, said Harald Overholm, CEO of Alight AB, which started Sweden’s biggest solar plant this month.
Companies are targeting a quick ramp-up, pushing total capacity in the country to 2 gigawatt this year. That’s more than the two nuclear reactors in Ringhals that were halted in 2020, and will close the gap with Denmark, an early mover in the industry in the region.
“We are very good at creating contracts directly with commercial partners that use power, and that is what drives our development,” said Harald Overholm, CEO of Alight.
The past winter has demonstrated the hole left behind by the two atomic reactors, with the government facing the task of resolving a divergent market. While vast hydro and wind projects have kept the cost of electricity in the sparsely populated north in check, a lack of generating capacity and congested grids have forced the south at times to import power.




Berlusconi’s bad break-up with Putin reveals Italy-Russia ties

Rome (AFP) – After a tycoon bromance, Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi is struggling to break up with Russia’s Vladimir Putin over the Ukraine war — like many in his country, where ties with Moscow run deep.

The billionaire former premier’s unwillingness to speak ill of Putin is echoed by other leading Italian politicians, while in the media, there are concerns that pro-Russian sentiment has warped into propaganda.

Prime Minister Mario Draghi is committed to NATO and the EU, strongly backing sanctions against Moscow, and at his urging a majority of Italy’s MPs approved sending weapons to help Ukraine defend itself.

But much of Draghi’s coalition government — Berlusconi’s Forza Italia, Matteo Salvini’s League and the once anti-establishment Five Star Movement (M5S) — has long pursued a “special relationship” with Moscow.

Italy used to have the largest Communist party in the West, and many businesses invested in the Soviet Union in the 1960s, while Russians in turn sought opportunities here.

Barely a month before the February 24 invasion, Putin spent two hours addressing top Italian executives at a virtual meeting.

Beds, hats, parties

Berlusconi, 85, has been out of office for more than a decade but remains influential both in politics and through his media interests, as founder of the Mediaset empire.

He was an ardent admirer of the Russian leader, and a close chum — they stayed in each other’s holiday homes, skied together and were snapped sporting giant fur hats.

“They were two autocrats who mutually reinforced their image: power, physical prowess, bravado, glitz,” historian and Berlusconi author Antonio Gibelli told AFP.

Putin gave Berlusconi a four-poster bed, in which the Italian had sex with an escort in 2008, according to her tell-all book. He in turn gave Putin, 69, a duvet cover featuring a life-sized image of the two men.

In the months before the Ukraine war, Berlusconi continued to promote his close ties, including a “long and friendly” New Year’s Eve phone call.

It was not until April, two months after Russia’s invasion, that he publicly criticised the conflict, saying he was “disappointed and saddened” by Putin.

He has struggled to stay on message since then.

Speaking off the cuff in Naples last week, he said he thought “Europe should… try to persuade Ukraine to accept Putin’s demands”, before backtracking and issuing a statement in Kyiv’s support.

“Breaking the twinning with Putin costs Berlusconi dearly: he has to give up a part of his image,” Gibelli said.

Meanwhile, the leader of the anti-immigration League, Salvini, who has proudly posed in Putin T-shirts in the past, has argued against sending weapons to aid Ukraine.

The League did condemn Russia’s military aggression, “no ifs and no buts”, on February 24 when Russia invaded.

But an investigation by the L’Espresso magazine earlier this week found that, in the over 600 messages posted by Salvini on social media since Russia invaded, he had not once mentioned Putin by name.

He did so for the first time on Thursday, saying “dialogue” with Putin was good, and encouraging a diplomatic end to the war.

‘Biased media’

Many pro-Russian figures are given significant airtime in the media, which itself is highly politicised.

“Italy is a G7 country with an incredibly biased media landscape,” Francesco Galietti, founder of risk consultancy Policy Sonar, told AFP.

TV talk shows are hugely popular in Italy, and “one of the main formats of information” for much of the public, notes Roberta Carlini, a researcher at the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom at the European University Institute.

But she warns they often “obscure facts”.

Italy’s state broadcaster RAI is being investigated by a parliamentary security committee for alleged “disinformation”, amid complaints over the frequent presence of Russian guests on talks shows.

Commercial giant Mediaset is also in hot water after airing an interview with Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in which highly polemical claims went unchallenged.

It defended the interview, saying good journalism meant listening to “even the most controversial and divisive” opinions.

“RAI is a reflection of the political landscape, with its many pro-Russian parties. And Mediaset… well, Berlusconi is an old pal of Putin’s, so what do you expect?” Galietti said.

He also points to a decades-long culture in Italy of allowing conspiracy theories — particularly on the interference of US spies in Italian politics — to circulate in the media unchallenged.

“You end up with a situation where Russia Today (RT) is considered as authoritative as the BBC,” he said.




R. Baroudi (CEO Energy & Environment Holding): “Key” to Europe’s energy independence, Eastern Mediterranean deposits of hydrocarbons and offshore wind farms

Αθήνα, 27.05.2022 – “Climate change and market instability are the two main parameters in recent years for the global energy market,” highlighted Mr. Roudi Baroudi, CEO of Energy & Environment Holding at his speech on the second day of the 10th Athens Energy Dialogues conference on May 26-27.

According to Mr. Baroudi the goal is a new energy mix that is both environmentally sustainable and economically viable.
Another crucial point is that reliability of cleaner and greener sources are not yet sufficient to fully meet demand, and getting there will require years of planning, investment, and construction. If we take existing technologies offline before newer ones can replace them, the resulting shortages will cause prices to spike, driving up the cost of living and causing whole economies to collapse. On the other hand, if we wait too long to decarbonize the global economy, climate change threatens to inflict even greater damage.

The Russian invasion to Ukraine has changed the geopolitical status quo, according to Mr. Baroudi.

The war in Ukraine, has exposed not only Europe’s dangerous over-reliance on natural gas and other energy imports from Russia, but also the extent to which disrupting that relationship could wreak havoc around the world. Ever since Moscow launched its invasion in late February, the European Union has been hesitant to impose sanctions on Russia’s energy industry because it lacks other alternatives, and it lacks those alternatives because of a years-long hesitance to maintain a sufficiently diverse basket of sources and suppliers.

The continent also suffers from inadequate regasification capacity, which means it cannot fully replace piped gas from Russia with seaborne loads of LNG from other countries.
Mr. Baroudi highlighted that there are solutions for all of these problems, and some are already under way.

“Europe could also bolster its energy security by helping to develop the increasingly promising gas fields of the Eastern Mediterranean, the output of which could then be linked by undersea and/or overland pipeline to the European mainland. The utility of these and other moves would also be significantly enhanced by building new storage facilities for both LNG and conventional gas, which would make Europe a lot more resistant to future supply disruptions,” said Mr. Baroudi.

But most importantly in the long term, Europe needs to seize the opportunity presented by the great potential for offshore wind energy in the Mediterranean, since making full use of this potential – just in the coastal waters – could generate at least some 500 MILLION megawatts of electricity: in other words, the same as the entire global nuclear industry.

The Mediterranean region – including both its EU and non-EU components – can and should be a huge part of this drive for a dual resiliency against economic and environmental challenges alike. European investments in MENA countries’ energy output makes sense for several reasons, including lower labor and other construction costs, as well as more diversified – and therefore more reliable – energy supplies.
About a week ago, the European Commission outlined a new plan to end Europe’s dependence on Russian gas, one that envisions spending of more than 200 billion Euros over the next five years. That is a significant number, but now the plan needs to be funded.

This means that not just the EU itself but also the European Investment Bank, the World Bank, and the IMF – all need to open up their vaults. Needless to say, the private sector would do well to get in on the action as well.

Unfortunately, it is too late to prevent war in Ukraine. But the faster Europe moves effectively to end its reliance on Russian gas, embraces closer partnership with its Mediterranean neighbors, and achieves the full independence of its foreign policy, the sooner it can help to restore the peace – and prevent similar calamities in the future.

#athensenergydialogues #energy #climate #climatechange #renewableenergy #sustainability #climateaction #energyindustry #tsomokos
###
For any additional information, please contact Ms. Elias Gerafenti, Tsomokos SA, tel. 210 728 9000 & 6970808764, e.gerafenti@tsomokos.gr




R. Baroudi: «Απόλυτα εφικτό η Ελλάδα να αποτελέσει στρατηγικό ενεργειακό κόμβο για την Ευρώπη»

Ένα από τα σημαίνοντα στελέχη της παγκόσμιας ενεργειακής αγοράς εξηγεί πώς προέκυψε η τέλεια ενεργειακή καταιγίδα – Τι λέει για τις άστοχες πολιτικές της Ευρώπης

O Roudi Baroudi έχει 40 χρόνια διεθνή εμπειρία στους τομείς του πετρελαίου και του φυσικού αερίου, των ανανεώσιμων και πράσινων πηγών και των ενεργειακών υποδομών. Η καριέρα του ξεκίνησε από τις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες το 1978, πέρασε από την Παγκόσμια Τράπεζα, το ΔΝΤ και την Ε. Επιτροπή και τον έφερε στην περιοχή της Ανατολικής Μεσογείου, περιοχή που έχει μελετήσει βαθιά και για την οποία έχει γράψει το βιβλίο με τίτλο «Maritime Disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean: The Way Forward».

Διευθύνων σύμβουλος, πλέον, της Energy & Environment Holding του Κατάρ μετέχει στο 10ο «Athens Energy Dialogues» και μιλώντας στο newmoney επιμένει ότι μία συνεργασία Ελλάδας και Τουρκίας στον χώρο της ενέργειας είναι και δυνατή και αμοιβαία επωφελής, αν και όχι απολύτως ανώδυνη. Επίσης, προκαλεί αισιοδοξία η πεποίθησή του ότι έχει ξεκινήσει η διαδικασία αποκλιμάκωσης του κόστους της ενέργειας στην Ευρώπη.

-Ποια είναι η εκτίμησή σας για την ενεργειακή κρίση; Πόσο θα κρατήσει; Υπάρχει διέξοδος από αυτή χωρίς τη Ρωσία;

«Προφανώς είναι ένα πολύ σοβαρό πρόβλημα, όχι μόνο για την Ευρώπη, αλλά και για ολόκληρο τον κόσμο, καθώς επηρεάζει τόσες πολλές πτυχές της καθημερινότητας, από την τιμή του ηλεκτρικού ρεύματος έως τη βενζίνη, τις μεταφορές γενικότερα, την τροφική αλυσίδα κ.λπ. Είναι πολύ δύσκολο να προβλέψουμε πόσο θα διαρκέσει, καθώς ο πόλεμος μόλις ξεκίνησε. Η πρόβλεψη μιας ημερομηνίας λήξης είναι δύσκολο εγχείρημα, καθώς τόσο τα προβλήματα όσο και οι λύσεις έχουν πολλά κινούμενα μέρη.

Καταρχάς, το πρόβλημα είναι προϊόν πολλών παραγόντων, όπως:

  • οι παλαιότερες αποφάσεις για σταδιακή κατάργηση της χρήσης άνθρακα και πυρηνικών σε ορισμένες ευρωπαϊκές χώρες
  • η αποτυχία αποτελεσματικής διαφοροποίησης του συνολικού ενεργειακού καλαθιού της Ευρώπης (που οδηγεί άμεσα στην υπερβολική εξάρτηση από τις ρωσικές προμήθειες, ιδίως από το φυσικό αέριο που μεταφέρεται με αγωγούς)
  • οι επακόλουθες επιπτώσεις της πανδημικής κατάρρευσης των τιμών του πετρελαίου και του φυσικού αερίου, που ανάγκασε πολλούς παραγωγούς σε όλο τον κόσμο να κλείσουν, οδηγώντας με τη σειρά του σε ανοδικές πιέσεις στις διεθνείς τιμές όταν η ζήτηση ανέκαμψε.

Ο συνδυασμένος αντίκτυπος όλων αυτών έγινε ακόμη πιο βαρύς από τη συγκυρία: η κρίση έρχεται ακριβώς τη στιγμή που αγωνιζόμαστε να πετύχουμε με τους στόχους απαλλαγής από τις εκπομπές άνθρακα, καταργώντας τα ορυκτά καύσιμα. Έτσι οι ευρωπαϊκές αγορές ενέργειας έμειναν εξαιρετικά ευάλωτες σε διακοπές εφοδιασμού – ή ακόμα και στην πιθανότητα διακοπής.

Το να ξεσπάσει ο πόλεμος στην Ουκρανία, όταν αυτό έγινε, ήταν από πολλές απόψεις το χειρότερο σενάριο, και αυτό είναι που έχουμε να αντιμετωπίσουμε.

Δεύτερον, η αποτελεσματικότητα των λύσεων θα καθοριστεί από πολλαπλές μεταβλητές που εξαρτώνται από τη σωστή λήψη και εφαρμογή των αποφάσεων, την επαρκή χρηματοδότηση τόσο από τις κυβερνήσεις όσο και από διάφορους χρηματοπιστωτικούς οργανισμούς και τη συνεργασία μεταξύ των χωρών της ΕΕ και με τους γείτονές τους στη Βόρεια Αφρική και την Ανατολική Μεσόγειο.

Η Ευρώπη έχει πολλά κουμπιά που μπορεί να πατήσει και όσο περισσότερα πατήσει, τόσο καλύτερα θα είναι τα αποτελέσματα. Μερικά από αυτά θα ήταν:

  • η καθυστέρηση της σταδιακής κατάργησης του άνθρακα/πυρηνικής ενέργειας
  • η ριζική αύξηση των επενδύσεων σε ανανεώσιμες πηγές ενέργειας όπως η αιολική και η ηλιακή ενέργεια
  • η επέκταση των δυνατοτήτων της Ευρώπης να δέχεται και να επεξεργάζεται μεταφορά μέσω πλοίων υγροποιημένου φυσικού αερίου
  • η καλύτερη αξιοποίηση τέτοιων λύσεων στην Ισπανία, με σύνδεση μέσω αγωγών με τη Γαλλία και επομένως με την υπόλοιπη Ευρώπη
  • εγκατάσταση κοινών δικτύων ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας με γειτονικές περιοχές
  • η στήριξη στην αξιοποίηση υποθαλάσσιων κοιτασμάτων φυσικού αερίου στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο και
  • η κατασκευή νέων αγωγών που συνδέουν τις αγορές της ΕΕ με τους παραγωγούς φυσικού αερίου στην Κεντρική Ασία.

Όσο περισσότερα από αυτά τα πράγματα κάνουμε –και κάνουμε καλά– τόσο πιο γρήγορα θα υποχωρήσει η κρίση. Όσο επιτρέπουμε να καθυστερεί η εφαρμογή τέτοιων μέτρων, τόσο περισσότερο θα διατηρηθεί η κρίση –και η ευπάθεια της Ευρώπης σε παρόμοια προβλήματα στο μέλλον.

Σε τελική ανάλυση, λοιπόν, ναι, μπορούμε να βγούμε από την κρίση, αλλά δεν υπάρχει ένα μόνο μονοπάτι που θα οδηγήσει εκεί. Και ναι, μπορούμε να το κάνουμε με ή χωρίς τη συμμετοχή των Ρώσων, αλλά φυσικά η διαδικασία θα ήταν πολύ πιο εύκολη αν με κάποιο τρόπο συμμετείχαν σε αυτή».

-Πιστεύετε ότι οι τιμές της ενέργειας είναι δυνατό να επιστρέψουν ξανά στα επίπεδα του 2020; Θα πρέπει οι Ευρωπαίοι να προσαρμοστούν στο να ζουν με ακριβό ηλεκτρικό ρεύμα και καύσιμα; Τι θα σήμαινε αυτό για την ευρωπαϊκή οικονομία;

«Μεσομακροπρόθεσμα, με την προϋπόθεση ότι θα λάβουμε όλα ή τα περισσότερα από τα μέτρα που ανέφερα προηγουμένως, οι τιμές της ενέργειας σίγουρα θα επιστρέψουν μια μέρα στα επίπεδα του 2020, αλλά όχι στις αρνητικές τιμές που παρατηρήθηκαν για σύντομο χρονικό διάστημα, όταν ο COVID-19 κατακρήμνισε τη ζήτηση.

Όπως είμαι βέβαιος ότι γνωρίζετε, οι τιμές πετρελαίου και φυσικού αερίου συνδέονται όχι μόνο με τις αντίστοιχες καταστάσεις προσφοράς και ζήτησης, αλλά και μεταξύ τους. Οι συνθήκες που προκάλεσαν αρνητικές τιμές ήταν εξαιρετικά ασυνήθιστες, και ακόμη κι αν προσεγγίζαμε ξανά αυτά τα επίπεδα, από τη φύση τους δεν θα μπορούσαν να διαρκέσουν πολύ.

Ωστόσο, οι τιμές μπορούν να μειωθούν και η διαδικασία βρίσκεται ήδη σε εξέλιξη.

Ήδη σήμερα, πολλές υπεύθυνες χώρες αυξάνουν την παραγωγή πετρελαίου και φυσικού αερίου για να βοηθήσουν στην ηρεμία των αγορών στην Ευρώπη και αλλού. Ωστόσο ορισμένες άλλες χώρες αρνούνται να το κάνουν, ενώ κάποιες άλλες βρίσκονται υπό κυρώσεις, που τις εμποδίζουν να φέρουν στην αγορά αρκετά εκατομμύρια βαρέλια που είναι απαραίτητα για να πέσουν οι τιμές.

Προς το παρόν, οι Ευρωπαίοι δυσκολεύονται πολύ να αντιμετωπίσουν το κόστος ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας και καυσίμων, ειδικά εδώ στην Ελλάδα, όπου οι τιμές της ενέργειας είναι απίστευτα υψηλές. Η Γερμανία είναι ένα άλλο παράδειγμα.

Δεδομένης της κατάστασης, και επειδή είναι η ταχύτερη διαθέσιμη μέθοδος, ορισμένες ευρωπαϊκές χώρες πρέπει να αναστείλουν ή να ανακαλέσουν τις αποφάσεις τους να κλείσουν τους πυρηνικούς σταθμούς και τους σταθμούς ηλεκτροπαραγωγής με άνθρακα. Πρέπει να καθυστερήσουν το κλείσιμο για άλλα πέντε έως επτά χρόνια και ίσως να κατασκευάσουν επίσης ένα ή δύο νέα εργοστάσια άνθρακα, για να αντιμετωπίσουν την αυξανόμενη ζήτηση και να περιορίσουν την ανοδική πίεση στις τιμές μέχρι να προστεθούν στο δίκτυο άλλες πηγές ενέργειας.

Παρά την πιθανότητα οι τιμές να υποχωρήσουν τελικά, βραχυπρόθεσμα έως μεσοπρόθεσμα, οι Ευρωπαίοι πρέπει οπωσδήποτε να προσαρμοστούν. Μελέτες έχουν δείξει ότι οι αυξημένες τιμές της ενέργειας θα σημαίνουν μειωμένη οικονομική ανάπτυξη, ειδικά στη Γερμανία.

Αυτό σημαίνει ότι περισσότεροι άνθρωποι θα έχουν λιγότερα μέσα για να αντεπεξέλθουν στις υψηλότερες τιμές ενέργειας και αυτό καθιστά καθήκον των ηγετών της ΕΕ και των εθνικών κυβερνήσεων να αναπτύξουν πολιτικές και μηχανισμούς για να αμβλύνουν το πλήγμα, ειδικά για τις οικογένειες με χαμηλότερο εισόδημα».

-Η ελληνική κυβέρνηση ζητά από την ΕΕ «στοχευμένη και προσωρινή παρέμβαση» στη χονδρική αγορά φυσικού αερίου για τη μείωση των τιμών. Πιστεύετε ότι μια τέτοια παρέμβαση είναι εφικτή, και αν ναι, τι αντίκτυπο θα μπορούσε να έχει;

«Είναι σίγουρα εφικτή. Υπάρχουν περιστάσεις όπου η ΕΕ θα πρέπει να βοηθήσει τα κράτη-μέλη, όπως σε περιόδους πολέμου, και η τρέχουσα κατάσταση είναι εξαιρετική, πρωτοφανής μετά τον Β’ Παγκόσμιο Πόλεμο. Με αυτήν την εξαιρετική κατάσταση πραγμάτων, η ελληνική κυβέρνηση –όπως κάθε άλλο κράτος μέλος– μπορεί και πρέπει να προτείνει βιώσιμους δρόμους προς τα εμπρός, π.χ. ανώτατα όρια στο αυξανόμενο κόστος ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας, πετρελαίου ή/και άλλων ενεργειακών δαπανών. Με τη βοήθεια της ΕΕ, η κυβέρνηση θα πρέπει να μπορεί να επιδοτεί ορισμένους καταναλωτές χαμηλού επιπέδου, για παράδειγμα νοικοκυριά των οποίων η κατανάλωση είναι μικρότερη από 100 KWh την ημέρα».

-Έχετε γράψει ένα βιβλίο με τίτλος «Ναυτιλιακές διαφορές στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο: Ο δρόμος προς τα εμπρός». Πιστεύετε ότι υπάρχει περιθώριο για ειρηνική συνεργασία Ελλάδας, Κύπρου και Τουρκίας στον ενεργειακό τομέα και εάν ναι, ποια θα ήταν τα μέσα για να επιτευχθεί;

«Ναι, πιστεύω ακράδαντα ότι η Ελλάδα, η Κύπρος και η Τουρκία θα μπορούσαν και θα έπρεπε να βρουν τρόπους συνεργασίας στον ενεργειακό τομέα, και υπάρχουν αρκετοί τρόποι με τους οποίους η συνεργασία θα προσφέρει πολλά πλεονεκτήματα.

Το ένα είναι η εξερεύνηση και η εκμετάλλευση κοιτασμάτων πετρελαίου ή/και φυσικού αερίου κάτω από τον βυθό της Ανατολικής Μεσογείου, όπου τα μέρη θα μπορούσαν να μοιραστούν το κόστος, να μοιραστούν δεδομένα, να μειώσουν τις επικαλύψεις, να επενδύσουν το ένα στα κοιτάσματα του άλλου κ.λπ.

Το ίδιο θα μπορούσε να ισχύει και για τα υπεράκτια αιολικά πάρκα.

Ένας άλλος τρόπος είναι η κατασκευή ενός ή περισσότερων αγωγών που θα μετέφεραν αέριο από τη νοτιοανατολική Μεσόγειο στην Ευρώπη χωρίς να χρειάζεται όλη η διαδρομή να γίνεται κάτω από το νερό: ο αγωγός θα μπορούσε να φτάσει έως την τουρκική ακτή και ο υπόλοιπος να συνέχιζε από την στεριά.

Δυνητικά, οι τρεις χώρες θα μπορούσαν επίσης να συνεργαστούν για να κατασκευάσουν μια μονάδα LNG, μια τεράστια επένδυση που γίνεται πιο ελκυστική αν διαμοιραστεί το ρίσκο. Σίγουρα πάντα υπάρχει χώρος για ειρήνη και πάντα υπάρχει χώρος για διπλωματία. Ο δρόμος προς τα εμπρός είναι η Ελλάδα και η Τουρκία να συνεχίσουν τις συζητήσεις τους με βάση τις αρχές της Σύμβασης του ΟΗΕ για το Δίκαιο της Θάλασσας (UNCLOS) που είναι ο Άτλαντας του Παγκόσμιου Ωκεανού. Σε αντίθεση με την Κύπρο, ούτε η Ελλάδα ούτε η Τουρκία έχουν υπογράψει την UNCLOS, αλλά οι κατευθυντήριες γραμμές και τα δεδικασμένα της ισχύουν – και μπορούν να εφαρμοστούν – από όλες τις χώρες. Η UNCLOS παρέχει μια νομική και τεχνική υποδομή με την οποία η Ελλάδα και η Τουρκία, ως κύρια μέρη, θα μπορούσαν να καθίσουν και, με αναφορά σε έρευνες που χρησιμοποιούν την τελευταία λέξη της επιστήμης και τεχνολογίας, να καταλήξουν σε μια δίκαιη και ισότιμη θαλάσσια λύση.

Τόσο ο Πρωθυπουργός Μητσοκάκης όσο και ο Πρόεδρος Ερντογάν έχουν εκφράσει την προθυμία τους να επιλύσουν αυτή τη σύγκρουση και πιστεύω ότι αυτή τη στιγμή είναι η κατάλληλη για να γίνει.

Στο βιβλίο μου, έχω επισημάνει μελέτες που δείχνουν ότι και οι δύο χώρες θα έχαναν ορισμένες θαλάσσιες περιοχές, αλλά και οι δύο χώρες θα κέρδιζαν πολύ περισσότερα: την ομορφιά ενός αποτελέσματος win-win, στο οποίο και οι δύο γείτονες θα μπορούσαν να επωφεληθούν από τον πλούτο του πετρελαίου και του φυσικού αερίου της περιοχής, ενώ και οι δύο λαοί θα μπορούσαν να απολαμβάνουν ειρήνη και ευημερία.

Φυσικά, αυτού του είδους η συνεργασία εξαρτάται από τη φιλική δέσμευση, και αυτή τη στιγμή αυτό ακούγεται δύσκολο, αλλά, όπως εξηγεί το βιβλίο, υπάρχουν τρόποι να επιλυθούν ορισμένες από τις διαφορές μεταξύ των τριών χωρών, ειδικά των διαφορών που σχετίζονται με τα θαλάσσια σύνορα.

Το επόμενο βιβλίο μου, «Κλίμα και ενέργεια στη Μεσόγειο», προχωρά ακόμη περισσότερο προτείνοντας συνεργασία σε όλη την ευρωμεσογειακή περιοχή. Ένα από τα παραδείγματα που μπορούμε να δούμε είναι η Κασπία, όπου πέντε χώρες – Αζερμπαϊτζάν, Ιράν, Καζακστάν, Ρωσία και Τουρκμενιστάν – βρήκαν μια πολύ δημιουργική λύση. Βασικά, συμφώνησαν να εφαρμόσουν ένα σύνολο κανόνων για τον βυθό της θάλασσας και ένα άλλο για το νερό και τους πόρους του. Αυτή η συμφωνία δεν είναι τέλεια, και ορισμένες πτυχές πρέπει ακόμη να αποτελέσουν αντικείμενο διμερών διαπραγματεύσεων, αλλά η συμφωνία επέτρεψε σε κάθε χώρα να πάρει τουλάχιστον μερικά από αυτά που ήθελε και να συνεχίσουν με την εκμετάλλευση των αντίστοιχων μεριδίων τους».

-Η Ελλάδα φιλοδοξεί να γίνει στρατηγικός ενεργειακός κόμβος για την Ευρώπη. Είναι αυτό εφικτό και αν ναι τι οφέλη θα αποφέρει στη χώρα;

«Είναι απολύτως εφικτό. Ανάλογα με τις ποσότητες που διαθέτουν, κάθε χώρα της Ανατολικής Μεσογείου που καταλήγει να παράγει πετρέλαιο και φυσικό αέριο μπορεί να γίνει τουλάχιστον σε κάποιο βαθμό ενεργειακός κόμβος. Κοιτάζοντας πίσω, πριν από 10 χρόνια, η Κύπρος είχε την ευκαιρία να γίνει ένας ωραίος περιφερειακός κόμβος αγωγών και τερματικού σταθμού LNG, και εάν η ανάπτυξη συνεχίσει να αυξάνεται, έχει ακόμα μια καλή ευκαιρία να πραγματοποιήσει αυτές τις προβλέψεις. Η Ελλάδα θα μπορούσε επίσης να γίνει σημαντικό ενεργειακό κέντρο την επόμενη δεκαετία, εάν επιβεβαιωθούν κοιτάσματα ανάλογα με αυτά που βρέθηκαν σε άλλες χώρες της Ανατολικής Μεσογείου, όπως η Αίγυπτος και το Ισραήλ. Πράγματι, πολλές εταιρείες του ιδιωτικού τομέα ενδιαφέρονται, αλλά αυτό πιθανότατα θα διαρκέσει 5-10 χρόνια αφού η εξερεύνηση επιβεβαιώσει επαρκείς ποσότητες υδρογονανθράκων. Τα οφέλη του κόμβου θα ήταν σημαντικά: περισσότερες καλοπληρωμένες θέσεις εργασίας για τους Έλληνες πολίτες, περισσότερα κέρδη για τις ελληνικές εταιρείες, περισσότερα έσοδα για την ελληνική κυβέρνηση, περισσότερα διαθέσιμα κεφάλαια για δρόμους, σχολεία και νοσοκομεία, μεγαλύτερη επιρροή στην ευρωπαϊκή και παγκόσμια σκηνή, και τα λοιπά».




European Energy Crisis: R. Baroudi: “It is entirely possible for Greece to be a strategic energy hub for Europe”

Roudi Baroudi
CEO, Energy & Environment Holding, Qatar
Interview with Newmoney.gr by Symela Touchtidou

Questions:

  1. What is your assessment on the current energy crisis? How long will it last? Is there a way out of it? Is there a way out of it without Russia included?

Obviously it’s a very serious problem, not only for Europe, but also for the whole world as this is affecting so many aspects, from electricity crises to petrol prices for vehicles, transportation in general, food chain, etc.

It’s very difficult to predict how long it will last as the war has just begun, but four months in, it has already caused so much damage. Predicting an end-date is a difficult ask because both the problems and the solutions have so many moving parts. First, the problem is a product of several contributing factors, including: earlier decisions to phase out coal and nuclear plants in some European countries; a failure to sufficiently diversify Europe’s overall energy basket (leading directly to over-reliance on Russian supplies, especially pipelined natural gas); and the after-effects of the early-pandemic collapse of oil and gas prices, which forced many producers around the world to shut down, leading in turn to upward pressure on international prices when demand recovered. The combined impact of all this was made even heavier by the timing: the crisis comes just as we are struggling to keep up with decarbonization goals by transitioning away from fossil fuels and toward cleaner and greener energy, leaving European energy markets extremely vulnerable to supply interruptions – or even the possibility thereof. To have had the Ukraine war break out when it did was in many ways worst-case scenario, and that’s what we’re dealing with.

 

Second, the effectiveness and timeliness of solutions will be determined by multiple variables that depend on sound decision-making and dedicated follow-up, adequate financing from both governments and multilateral financial institutions, and cooperation among EU countries and with their neighbors in North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean. Europe has several buttons it can push, and the more of them it pushes, the better the results will be. Some of these would be to delay the coal/nuclear phaseouts; radically increase investments in renewables like wind and solar; expand Europe’s capacity to receive and process shipments of liquefied natural gas; make better use of such capacity in Spain by linking it to France, and therefore the rest of Europe, by pipeline; install shared power grids with neighboring regions; help develop undersea gas resources in the Eastern Mediterranean; and build new pipelines linking EU markets to gas producers in Central Asia. The more of these things we do – and do well – the sooner the crisis will recede. The more we allow implementation of such steps to be delayed, the longer the crisis – and Europe’s vulnerability to similar problems in the future – will persist.

So in the final analysis, yes, we can get out of this crisis, but there is no single path that will get use there. And yes, we can do so with or without the participation of the Russians, but of course the process would be much easier with them somehow included.

 

  1. Do you see energy prices ever going back to the 2020 levels? Will Europeans have to adjust to living with expensive electricity and fuels? What would that mean for the overall European economy?

In the medium/long terms, provided we take all or most of the steps I listed earlier, energy prices will definitely go back one day to the levels for 2020 as a whole, but not to the negative prices seen briefly when COVID-19 caused demand to fall off a cliff before production had been dialed back, causing a sudden glut. As I’m sure you know, commodity prices for oil and gas are connected not only to their respective supply and demand situations, but also to each other. The conditions that caused negative prices were highly unusual, and even if we approached those levels again, by their nature they could not last long.

Nonetheless, prices can be brought down, and the process is already under way. As of today, many responsible countries are increasing their production of oil and gas to help calm markets in Europe and elsewhere, but some countries are refusing to, while several others are under sanctions, preventing them from bringing to the market several million barrels needed to cool off the price hikes. For the time being, Europeans are having a very hard time to cope with electricity and fuel costs, especially here in Greece, where energy prices are unbelievably high.
Germany is another example.

Given the situation, and because it’s probably the fastest method available, some European countries need to suspend or reverse their decisions to close their nuclear and coal power plants. Instead, they need to delay closures for another five-to-seven years, and maybe build one or two new coal plants, too, to cope with rising demand and restrain upward pressure on prices until other sources of energy can come online.

Despite the likelihood that prices will eventually retreat, in the short to medium term, Europeans definitely need to adapt. Studies have indicated that elevated energy prices will mean reduced economic growth, especially in Germany, whose importance to the rest of Europe cannot be overstated. That means more people will have less means to cope with higher energy prices, and that makes it incumbent on EU and national leaders to develop policies and mechanisms to cushion the blow, especially for lower-income families.

 

  1. The Greek government asks from the EU “a targeted and temporary intervention” in the natural gas wholesale market to bring prices down. Do you believe such an intervention is possible, and if so, what impact could be?

It is definitely possible. There will be circumstances when the EU has to assist EU members, such as during times of war, and the current situation is an extraordinary one, unseen since World War II. With this extraordinary state of affairs, the Greek government – like any other member state – can and should propose viable paths forward, e.g. caps on rising electricity, petroleum and/or other energy costs. At the very least, with the help of the EU, the government should be able to subsidize certain low-level consumers, for instance households whose consumption is less than 100 KWh per day.

 

  1. Are you aware of the ‘Six-Point Plan’ of the Greek government? What is your assessment on it? (available here https://primeminister.gr/en/2022/03/09/28836 )

Yes, I am aware of the Six-Point Plan that Prime Minister Mitsotakis has proposed. It’s a very positive move forward in order to cushion some of the pain from disastrous price increases, which are driving inflation across the Greek economy. Here, Greece is contributing to the European Union’s overall policy formulation, which seeks to provide protection against the major consequences emanating from the Russia-Ukraine war, and the Greek plan is definitely doable. There are other measures, too, that could be taken to shield the country from the continuous negative repercussions of the war in Ukraine. Of course gas supplies could be increased by expanding the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP) to boost imports from Azerbaijan gas, for instance, but keeping coal power plants would also help contain pressure on electricity prices, as would adding a nuclear plant of 4,000-6,000 MW. Moving quickly to promote energy conservation, too, would also help alleviate spiking costs and give Greek households and business sustainable access to more affordable electricity.

 

  1. Greece is the only European country where electricity prices are directly linked to natural gas international stock prices. Do you believe there is a way out of this? What measures could be taken to bring electricity prices in the Greek market down?

Yes, there is definitely a way out. This is the responsibility of the Regulatory Authority for Energy, which controls and regulates energy prices in Greece. Given the circumstances, the RAE certainly has a powerful incentive to propose a different mechanism, one that would follow other European countries in order to help keep energy prices at affordable costs for all.

 

  1. You have written a book on “Maritime Disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean: The Way Forward”. Do you believe there is room for peaceful cooperation between Greece, Cyprus and Turkey in the energy field and if so, what would be the means to achieve it?

Yes, I believe very strongly that Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey could and should find ways to cooperate in the energy field, and there several ways in which working together would offer many advantages. One is exploration and development of oil and/or gas deposits beneath the seabed of the Eastern Mediterranean, in which the parties could share costs, share data, reduce duplication, invest in one another’s fields, etc. The same could go for offshore wind farms.

Another is the construction of one or more pipelines that could transport East Med gas to the European mainland without having to have the entire route under water: just get it to Turkish coast and run the rest of it overland. Potentially, the three countries also could team up to build an LNG plant, an enormous investment and therefore one for which spreading the risk would be very attractive.

Definitely there is always room for peace and there is always room for diplomacy. The way forward is for Greece and Turkey to continue their discussions based on the principles of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which is the Atlas of the World Ocean. Unlike Cyprus, neither Greece nor Turkey is a signatory to UNCLOS, but its guidelines and precedents are applicable to – and actionable by – all countries. UNCLOS provides a legal and technical infrastructure with which Greece and Turkey, as the main parties, could sit down and, with reference to surveys using the latest science and technology, arrive at a fair and equitable maritime solution. Both Prime Minister Mitsokakis and President Erdogan have expressed their willingness to solve this conflict, and I believe that right now, the time is right to get it done. In my book, I have highlighted studies indicating that both countries would lose some maritime areas, but both countries would gain far more: the beauty of a win-win outcome, one in which both neighbors would be able to benefit from the region’s oil and gas wealth, and both peoples would be able to enjoy peace and prosperity.

 

  1. Greece aspires to become a strategic energy hub for Europe. Is this possible and if so what benefits will it bring to the country?

Absolutely it is possible. Depending on what quantities they have, every East Med country that ends up producing oil and gas can become an energy hub to some extent at least. Looking back, 10 years ago, Cyprus was slotted to become a nice regional hub for pipelines and an LNG terminal, and if development keeps on growing, it still has a good chance to make those predictions come true. Greece could also become a major energy center in the next decade if their exploration efforts confirm the same kinds of deposits found offshore other East Med countries like Egypt and Israel. Indeed a lot of private sector firms are interested, but this will probably take 5-10 years after exploration confirms sufficient quantities of hydrocarbons.

The benefits of hub status would be significant: more good-paying jobs for Greek citizens, more profits for Greek companies, more revenues for the Greek government, more funds available for roads, schools, and hospitals, more influence on the European and global stages, etc.




EUROPE ENERGY CRISIS – Qatar and Germany sign energy strategic partnership

News – Oil and GasBerlin, May 2022

Qatar’s Emir, His Highness Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz signed a strategic energy partnership on May 20 as Germany scrambles to reduce its dependence on imports of coal and pipelined natural gas from Russia, mainly to punish the latter for its invasion of Ukraine.

Al Jazeera turned to regional energy expert Roudi Baroudi to provide context and analysis for the summit, which could have historic implications. Baroudi confirmed that the German plan centers on a rapid switchover to seaborne shipments of liquefied natural gas, so the government is building two LNG plants, at Brunsbüttel and Wilhelmshaven, along with the possibility of adding three offshore floating storage and regasification units (FCRUs).

Baroudi estimated that these facilities, including the FSRUs, could account for 20-30% of German’s annual gas needs of approximately 85 billion cubic meters.

He also explained that Qatar, which has the world’s second largest gas reserves and has led the industry in LNG exports for most of the past two decades, would be a natural secure and reliable fit to supply even more gas to European terminals that it already does. The Gulf state has recently invested in even more LNG capacity, via an expansion of its North Field operations, which will see its output once again surpass those of the United States and Australia as the world’s largest producer




Sea border talks between Israel and Lebanon on verge of imminent collapse

Why did Biden’s energy envoy issue a poison pill that is sure not only to kill the deal but give Hezbollah a new reason to fight?

When President Biden appointed his personal friend and former Obama administration energy coordinator Amos Hochstein as his own energy envoy last summer, it seemed that the decades-old deadlock between Lebanon and Israel over their sea boundary, and potentially tens of billions of dollars in energy resources, might finally be resolved.

Hochstein was assumed to be trusted by the Israelis (he was born in Israel and served in the IDF in the early 1990s). He was perceived positively by some of the main Lebanese actors as a foe of a former U.S. envoy, Ambassador Frederic Hof, who had tabled a deal ten years before known as the “Hof Line” boundary that was widely seen in Lebanon as exceptionally unfair. And he came with a deep background in the complexities of the energy sector.

Perhaps most importantly, however, the Biden administration seemed hungry to claim a success in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although a mutually agreed-upon sea boundary between Lebanon and Israel would fall far short of any Abraham Accord-type arrangement, such a deal would represent a UN-recognized boundary between a democratically elected Arab government and Israel. Given the extensive power of the armed Lebanese political party Hezbollah, which Israel considers its most formidable non-state enemy, the removal of a large offshore area from the regular military exchanges between the two sides onshore would also help to structurally diminish the prospects of another devastating war in the Middle East, something the Biden administration very much wants to avoid.

Unfortunately, eight months on, according to several senior Lebanese officials directly involved in the negotiations, the deal that Hochstein unveiled a few weeks ago in Beirut, one which apparently has Israel’s blessing, falls far short of Lebanon’s minimum acceptable position. As a result, the talks are in imminent danger of collapsing, perhaps in the coming weeks. Asked about this prospect, the State Department and U.S. Embassy in Beirut both declined to comment.

Hochstein, it seems, badly misunderstood the Lebanese side. First, in proposing that Israel and Lebanon share a potentially rich hydrocarbon field between them (known as the Qana Prospect after a town in South Lebanon), he has ensured that any deal is dead on arrival. No Lebanese political actor can muster the votes to essentially go into business with a state that is officially an enemy and regularly in military conflict with the most powerful political and military actor in the country, Hezbollah. Hochstein surely should know this (a similar offer he made at the end of the Obama administration was rejected by Lebanon), which is why it is especially confounding that after all of his discussions with different Lebanese parties, he still ended up proposing a “unitization agreement.”

Was he lulled into thinking that Hezbollah’s uncharacteristic quiet on the maritime issue over many years offered a rare opportunity for initiating material cooperation between Lebanon and Israel? If this was his assumption, he burned a golden opportunity consecrated when Hezbollah delegated the indirect negotiations to its two allies, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and President Michel Aoun.

Indeed, instead of using Hezbollah’s self-removal to box it into accepting a deal seen as reasonable by the vast majority of Lebanese on legal, commercial and nationalistic grounds, rather than on imperatives related to an enduring struggle against Israel, Hochstein’s field-sharing proposal played right into Hezbollah’s hands. In fact, Hezbollah MP Mohammad Raad felt confident enough a few weeks ago, despite the country’s mounting economic problems, to deliver the party’s first fiery “redline” speech on the issue: “They tell us…it may turn out that you will need to share the gas field with the Israelis…We’d rather leave the gas buried underwater until the day comes when we can prevent the Israelis from touching a single drop of our waters.”

Hochstein’s “poison pill” deal, as some Lebanese are now calling it, also squandered a second opening the Lebanese side has offered since the fall of 2020 when the Trump administration resumed Washington’s mediation efforts.

Although it is the source of much political intrigue and enmity in Beirut, for whatever internal reasons Lebanon opened the indirect talks on the basis of a new, extended boundary claim known as “Line 29” but without officializing it as countries are legally entitled to do given relevant changes in international legal rulings. As a result, and probably for the first time in modern maritime negotiations, the Lebanese team came to the table with a well-grounded “maximalist” position (Line 29) but without having actually deposited it de jure at the United Nations.

This goodwill concession over an additional 1,430 square kilometers of sea unofficially claimed by Lebanon prevented the likely early breakdown of talks by allowing Israel and private companies like Greece’s Energen and America’s Halliburton to legally move forward with exploitation activities over the last year and a half in the energy-rich Karish field, as well as its northern environs (including the southern part of the Qana Prospect). All of the former and some of the latter are outside of Lebanon’s current “minimalist” legal claim known as “Line 23.”

 

Of course, Lebanon’s restraint in not officializing its new “maximalist” Line 29 also gave Lebanese politicians a convenient way to accept a deal far less than what their own experts and lawyers have been saying for years should be granted to Beirut. After all, anything roughly comparable to Lebanon’s current “minimalist” Line 23 could technically be spun as a victory.

Hochstein’s proposal, however, that Israel and Lebanon go into business together by sharing the Qana Prospect, decisively quashed any such maneuverability.

Should talks break down in the coming period, as now seems likely, at least two negative outcomes are almost certain. First, with the talks dead and the country sinking ever deeper into a “Deliberate Depression,” Lebanese leaders will have little to lose from officializing the “maximalist” boundary claim they are legally entitled to assert and then taking punitive action in multiple fora. This will put significant pressure on private companies operating in the (soon to be) “disputed” Karish field as well as the Qana Prospect.

Second, and perhaps most important, by offering an unworkable deal that leads to a negotiation breakdown, the U.S. and Israel will be handing Hezbollah a powerful new raison d’être as a resistance group by creating a “Maritime Shebaa,” in reference to the strategic strip of land between Lebanon, Syria and Israel that is occupied by Israel. Lebanon claims this land and considers military operations there, including by Hezbollah, as both legal and necessary in order to liberate it. The United Nations considers Shebaa to be part of Israeli-occupied Syrian land, but Syria itself supports Lebanon’s claim.

In short, a “Maritime Shebaa” will be far more evocative and unifying for more Lebanese — to Hezbollah’s distinct political benefit — than the issue of “Land Shebaa” since Lebanon’s case is much stronger in the water, just as the loss of potentially tens of billions of much-needed dollars to Israel will be daily more evident to everyone. This will likely lead to periodic military engagements in the area that negatively impact drilling and perhaps lead to deaths. At worst, this part of the Eastern Mediterranean sea could become the spark for a devastating new regional war.

Finally, at a time when Europe’s current and future gas needs have suddenly been destabilized following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, any further disruption of international supplies will only create more negative fallout. Just a few weeks ago, Israel and Energen announced that Karish had been hooked up to the national grid, with gas expected to flow in the coming months. Crucially, this extra capacity is now being seriously considered for export to the European Union via Egypt as early as September, according to Israeli and Egyptian officials. A combination of Lebanese legal actions and Hezbollah threats could substantially disrupt this schedule, however, not to mention harm Lebanon’s own hoped-for exploitation of its own blocks.

Given these dangerous consequences, the Biden administration should urgently consider whether proposing a different deal might better serve U.S., Israeli and Lebanese interests as well as regional stability. As it currently stands, there is a narrowing window for creating a stable sea boundary between Israel and Lebanon, one that must avoid, first and foremost, the “poison pill” of a shared field by trading Israel’s imminent exploitation of all of the Karish field for Lebanon’s exploitation of the Qana Prospect (which, it should be recognized, is less certain of producing hydrocarbons).

Such an arrangement would likely have to go beyond Lebanon’s current de jure Line 23 claim with a “zig-zag” around the Qana Prospect in order to be politically viable in Lebanon. This will undoubtedly be difficult for Israel to swallow since successive governments have long hoped Washington could extract for them a large chunk of the sea behind Lebanon’s current claim (as the “Hof Line” proposed a decade ago) and part of the Qana Prospect. But this compromise will also be difficult for Lebanon to accept. Beirut severely undercut its own position by officially sticking with a poorly grounded, “minimalist” boundary claim that failed to take advantage of international legal rulings over the last decade. Generations of Lebanese will have to bear some measure of loss for this.

For both sides, however, and for the U.S., all of these perceived losses should pale in comparison to the immediate and long-term benefits of finally having a stable maritime boundary between Israel and Lebanon, with the stable exploitation of valuable natural resources and the immediate strategic benefit of de-escalating — rather than inflaming — one conflict in a part of the world that simply can’t bear another.

Written by
Nicholas Noe




Sanctioning a nuclear foe is a studied endeavour

By Ana Palacio/ Madrid

Western governments must be clear about what sanctions can and cannot achieve – and how much sacrifice is acceptable

The grim scenes left behind after Russia’s withdrawal from Bucha, where Ukraine accuses Russian troops of torturing and slaughtering civilians, have intensified pressure on the West to provide more offensive weapons to Ukraine and for Europe to ban Russian energy imports. But beyond the legitimate question of Europe’s willingness to pay such a high price on Ukraine’s behalf lies the stark reality that sanctions are hardly a silver bullet.
Calls for sanctions began well before the invasion. When Russia was massing troops near Ukraine’s border, the Ukrainian government – and some American lawmakers – urged the United States and Europe to impose preemptive sanctions and offer Ukraine stronger security guarantees. But Western leaders demurred, arguing that sanctions would impede their ability to reach a diplomatic solution.
Of course, in geopolitics, as in life, hindsight is 20/20: we now know that those diplomatic efforts were in vain. What we do not know is whether preemptive sanctions would have motivated Russian President Vladimir Putin to rethink his plans, especially given that preemptive sanctions most likely would not have been as severe as the package of measures imposed after the Kremlin launched the invasion.
That package, after all, is the most comprehensive and co-ordinated punitive action taken against a major power since World War II. Overcoming initial reservations, the European Union joined the US in cutting off Russian banks from the arteries of global finance in a matter of days. The West also froze much of the Russian central bank’s foreign-exchange reserves – an unprecedented step that surely triggered a red alert in China, with its $3.25tn in official reserves.
At first, the sanctions seemed to be having the intended effect. Within a week, the rouble had fallen by a third against the US dollar. Tumbling share prices forced the authorities to suspend trading on the Moscow stock exchange for nearly a month. Russia’s GDP is expected to contract by 10-15% this year.
But, even as the sanctions vise continues to tighten, Russian markets appear to be stabilising. Thanks to robust intervention by the authorities, the rouble is now trading close to its pre-war levels, and the stock market has recovered some losses. With the violence showing no sign of abating, Western governments must be clear about what sanctions can and cannot achieve – and how much sacrifice is acceptable.
Sanctions, first used in the Peloponnesian wars, have been an instrument of foreign policy for some 2,500 years. While their sophistication and complexity have increased over time, the basic mechanism has remained the same: inflict enough economic pain to force the target to change its behaviour.
But the most comprehensive analysis of sanctions use, conducted by researchers at Drexel University, found that the goals of sanctions were completely met in only 35% of cases. Where sanctions have had an impact, such as in South Africa during apartheid, they have been combined with other measures to advance a specific foreign-policy objective.
Moreover, even well-targeted sanctions and asset freezes have limited efficacy against autocracies. From North Korea to Iran, regimes shield themselves from economic pain through convoluted schemes to evade sanctions. Putin’s regime – including his cronies – has proved adept at ensuring that sanctions do not affect them.
Instead, it is ordinary Russians who will pay the price for today’s sanctions. And, contrary to the hopes of some in the West, this is unlikely to lead to Putin’s fall from power. Dictators are not particularly vulnerable to shifts in public opinion. And a revolution does not seem forthcoming, not least because of the work of the Kremlin’s increasing repression and powerful propaganda machine.
By “cancelling” Russian culture and mounting “unprovoked” attacks on the country’s economy, the Kremlin narrative goes, the West is trying to destroy Russia – just as Putin had long warned. Anyone in Russia who opposes the “special military operation” in Ukraine is a “traitor” or a “gnat,” ready to “sell their souls.”
With no independent media left to refute these narratives, Russians seem to be largely convinced. A recent poll by the Levada Center indicates that 83% of Russians approve of Putin’s actions in Ukraine, compared to 69% in January – a relevant statistic, notwithstanding the complex realities in Russia.
While Putin’s regime insulated itself from the pain of sanctions, Europe is facing high costs of its own. In today’s economically interdependent world, sanctions often imply hefty costs for both sides. Though Western economies are not particularly dependent on Russia overall, Europe relies on it for a large share of its energy. So, while the US Congress votes to ban all Russian energy imports, EU leaders have targeted only Russian coal, not oil or gas.
A comprehensive ban on Russian energy imports to Europe would undoubtedly increase the pressure on the Kremlin. But such a decision must be approached with care. As German Chancellor Olaf Scholz recently warned, the economic and social costs of a sudden embargo would be massive. It will take time to wean Europe off Russian natural gas while also maintaining European social and economic stability.
Equally important, sanctions are an integral part of a broader negotiating strategy. Once the West has launched all its biggest economic weapons, it will have no remaining leverage. There must be room to escalate in response to Putin’s actions, particularly the deployment of chemical or tactical nuclear weapons.
The West’s arsenal in Ukraine is clearly limited. Sanctions are an important and powerful weapon, and they are putting some pressure on the Kremlin. But given their limitations – and the costs that must be borne by both the West and ordinary Russians – they must be used judiciously. Otherwise, Putin, who appears to believe his paranoid propaganda and oversees the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, may conclude that he has nothing to lose. — Project Syndicate

• Ana Palacio, a former foreign minister of Spain and former senior vice president and general counsel of the World Bank Group, is a visiting lecturer at Georgetown University.