Over the last year, predictions of serious struggles for Russian President Vladimir Putin – or even his political demise – have been increasingly frequent. A recent article in The Economist, “An awful week for Vladimir Putin,” is just one example. But it is Putin biographer and New York Times correspondent Steven Lee Myers whose assessment rings most true: “Putin,” Myers has repeatedly said to me, “always wins.”

Maybe “always” isn’t quite true. Russia’s economy is expected to grow by only 1% this year, owing to lagging export diversification, large-scale capital flight, and low levels of foreign direct investment linked to Western sanctions imposed after the country’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. As a result, Putin’s approval rating has declined somewhat from its annexation-fueled high of 83% in July 2014.

But 61% of Russians still rate Putin’s performance positively. Most democratic leaders can only dream of such favor with the public. Fewer than 43% of Americans approve of President Donald Trump, for example. In fact, the same incoherent and combative US policies toward Europe, China, Turkey, and others that have contributed to Trump’s unpopularity have fueled Putin’s popularity, by handing him a series of tactical victories.

For example, a lack of effective US engagement in Syria has pushed Turkey into Russia’s arms. In particular, in October 2015, the United States withdrew its Patriot missiles from southeastern Turkey, which had been deployed after the country appealed to its NATO allies to guard against missile threats from neighboring Syria. In 2017, the US offered to sell Turkey Patriot missiles, but without the underlying technology.

So Turkey reached a multibillion-dollar arms deal with Russia instead, despite the outrage of its NATO partners. (Beyond Putin’s approval ratings, America’s self-proclaimed master deal-maker Trump should envy his Russian counterpart’s negotiating skills.) In retaliation for Turkey’s decision to acquire Russian S-400 missile systems, the US has threatened sanctions and blocked Turkey from obtaining F-35 stealth fighters, suspending the country’s participation in a program to build them.

But Turkey knows that it is Russia, not the US, that is shaping the Syria conflict, and will play a leading role in the country’s potentially lucrative reconstruction effort, making it a much more desirable partner there. Strengthening the bilateral relationship further, Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan are about to inaugurate the TurkStream gas pipeline connecting their two countries.

Russia has also launched a massive new gas pipeline project with China, worth $400 billion over 30 years, and is negotiating another. Here, too, the Trump administration’s actions – in particular, its bitter (and self-defeating) trade war against China, which may well continue, despite the two countries’ recent “phase one” agreement – created a lucrative opening that Putin was quick to seize.

The pipeline project, according to Putin, takes bilateral “strategic cooperation in energy to a qualitative new level” and supports progress toward the goal, set with Chinese President Xi Jinping, “of taking bilateral trade to $200 billion by 2024” – the year Putin’s “final” presidential term ends. Perhaps he hopes that the fruits of such engagement will strengthen his position enough to enable him to remain in power, whether as president or in another position, such as security chief, endowed with greater powers.

Putin has picked up another gas-related win with regard to Ukraine, whose national oil and gas company Naftogaz just received a $2.9 billion payment from Russia’s Gazprom to settle a 2017 Stockholm arbitration ruling. The financial settlement was part of a larger deal between the two companies: a five-year plan, starting January 1, to ship Russian gas to Europe through Ukrainian pipelines. Naftogaz also agreed to drop another lawsuit against Gazprom.

Although fears of being under Putin’s thumb fueled the protests that ousted Ukraine’s pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych, in 2014 – leading directly to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and Russia-backed separatists’ takeover of eastern Ukraine – the fear of confronting Russia alone is even greater. And, with Ukraine at the center of Trump’s just-concluded impeachment by the US House of Representatives and upcoming trial in the Senate, the US cannot be considered a reliable partner.

This doesn’t mean Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is going to roll over for Russia. He agreed with the Kremlin on an exchange of 200 prisoners in the ongoing war in eastern Ukraine – the second prisoner exchange this year. The recent pipeline deal can also be considered a win for Ukraine: Gazprom had previously insisted on a one-year deal, because it already has the Nord Stream-1 pipeline, which crosses the Baltic Sea to Germany, and will soon complete Nord Stream-2.

But Russian negotiators eased their position, perhaps partly in the hope of easing resistance to the Nord Stream project. That resistance includes sanctions, included in the 2020 US defense budget, on companies working on Nord Stream-2, which the US argues would give Russia too much leverage over America’s European allies, as well as those working on TurkStream.

It is not just Russia that wants Nord Stream to work. Germany, the main recipient of the Russian gas, argues that its energy policy should be decided in Europe, not the US. When a Swiss contractor obediently (if reluctantly) suspended its work in response to the sanctions, the Germans immediately suggested that they would find another way to complete the work as soon as possible.

Russian officials echoed this sentiment, noting that Gazprom has already lined up other companies prepared to take over. There is “nothing to worry about,” claims Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, especially given the gas-transit arrangement with Ukraine. As in the Middle East and China, Putin knows that a moment when Europe’s relationship with the US is severely strained is the ideal time to strengthen its position vis-à-vis its neighbor.

Putin may not have a winning long-term strategy to save Russia’s economy, but his pipeline politics have led to a series of impressive foreign-policy victories. This approach may give him enough prestige to continue his long winning streak.

BERLIN — Germany on Thursday warned Washington to mind its own business after US lawmakers gave initial approval to a bill that would sanction contractors working on a Russian pipeline to Germany.

“European energy policy is decided in Europe, not in the US,” Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said on Twitter.

“We reject external interference,” he said.

The 9.5 billion euro ($10.6 billion) Nord Stream 2 pipeline will run under the Baltic Sea and is set to double shipments of Russian natural gas to Germany.

The German-Russian Chamber of Commerce (AHK) said the pipeline was important for the energy security of Europe as a whole and called for retaliatory sanctions against the United States if the bill passes.

“Europe should respond to sanctions that damage Europe with counter-sanctions,” said AHK chief Matthias Schepp.

Supporters of the 1,230-kilometer (760-mile) line say it will be a reliable source of cheap energy but critics warn it could end up vastly increasing Russia’s political influence in Europe.

The EU joined in criticizing proposed US action.

EU Trade Commissioner Phil Hogan said Brussels “opposes the imposition of sanctions against any EU companies conducting legitimate business”.

“The (European) Commission objective has always been to ensure that Nord Stream operates in a very transparent and in a non-discriminatory way with the appropriate degree of oversight,” he said.

Germany’s Schepp said the sanctions would end up affecting European companies more than Russia.

Half of the project is financed by Russian gas giant Gazprom, with the rest covered by its European partners: Germany’s Wintershall and Uniper, Anglo-Dutch Shell, France’s Engie and Austria’s OMV.

Despite its own diplomatic tensions with Russia, including over the murder of a former Chechen rebel in Berlin earlier this year, Germany has repeatedly defended the long-running project.

The German economy ministry said it was awaiting the result of a US Senate vote expected next week on the bill — part of much wider US defense legislation.

US President Donald Trump has already said he would sign off on the measures if they are approved.

The bill requires the US State Department to report back within 60 days with the names of companies and individuals involved in pipe-laying for Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream, another pipeline from Russia to Turkey.

The sanctions envisioned by the bill include asset freezes and revocation of US visas for the contractors.

One major contractor that could be hit by the sanctions is Swiss-based pipeline laying company Allseas, which has been hired by Gazprom to build the offshore section.

The power of Gazprom and therefore the Russian state is at the center of concerns about the pipeline in the United States and in eastern and central Europe.

Europe is Russia’s main customer for natural gas and critics fear the pipeline, which has an annual capacity of 55 billion cubic meters, will increase its reliance.

Countries like Ukraine, a major transit country for Russian gas, also fear they could lose influence.

Russia had hoped to launch the pipeline in late 2019 but the completion has been delayed by difficulties in obtaining permits from Denmark.

In October, Copenhagen gave Russia a permit to build a section of the pipeline on the Danish continental shelf in the Baltic Sea.

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Kozak told reporters last month that he expected the pipeline to become operational in mid-2020. — AFP

Gazprom PJSC and Ukraine reached an agreement that will allow Russian gas to flow to Europe via its neighbour through the end of 2024 and settle all of the related legal disputes.
Ukraine’s gas company, Naftogaz PJSC, will organise the transit of Russian gas through the country, with a booked pipeline capacity of 65bn cubic meters for 2020 shipments, Gazprom chief executive officer Alexey Miller said in a statement yesterday.
In 2021-2024, the booked capacities will reach 40bn cubic meters a year, he said. The companies also agreed to mull the possibility of gas transit through 2034, according to a protocol, signed late Friday evening in Minsk. An extension for the following 10 years may be on the same terms as the five-year deal, according to Ukraine’s Energy Ministry.
“The transit via Ukraine will continue and the strategic nature of the transit was understood by everyone and I believe it would help us open a new chapter in this relationship,” EU Commission Vice President Maros Sefcovic told Bloomberg yesterday.
The bilateral agreement paves the way for the continuation of Russian gas flows to Europe via Ukraine, which has been the key transit route for Gazprom even amid the legal spats and political tensions between the two nations.
It also supports Europe’s energy security as Russia has been the European Union’s dominant and often cheapest energy supplier, providing some 37% of the fuel to the region last year. The current 10-year transit deal between Russia and Ukraine expires January 1. “There are very precise deadlines until when everything should happen,” Sefcovic said. “I have no doubt that everything will go smoothly as of January 1 because there was full understanding of what needs to be done.”
Russia and Ukraine reached the deal as the US administration imposed sanctions on Russia’s future subsea gas-export pipeline, Nord Stream 2. The $11bn pipeline is just weeks away from completion, but it has faced criticism from the US, and it wasn’t immediately clear if the pipeline work can be completed without the input of AllSeas Group SA, which said it would halt operations.
Talks to find a deal between Russia and Ukraine intensified in recent days as the deadline loomed. “To be honest we have done almost the impossible in three months,” Ukraine’s Energy Minister Oleksiy Orzhel told reporters in Kiev yesterday.
Under the deal, Gazprom and Ukraine have agreed not to start any new gas lawsuits against each other and to cancel all their current legal claims that haven’t been subject to court rulings, according to Miller. The Russian gas giant will also pay to Naftogaz $2.9bn awarded by the Stockholm arbitration in 2018.
The sum includes a $2.6bn debt and fines accumulated thereafter, a spokesman for Gazprom said in a separate statement. “It is very important that these $3bn in line with Stockholm arbitration will be paid in cash if we implement all the package of proposals before year-end,” Orzhel said. At the same time Ukraine will withdraw its legal claims against the Russian company.
Last month, Naftogaz filed a lawsuit against Gazprom with a court of arbitration in Stockholm, asking to revise transit fees totalling more than $12bn.
Gazprom and the Ukrainian government are also set to sign an “amicable agreement” on cancelling an antitrust claim that has reached about $7.4bn, including fines. All the legal issues should be resolved by December 29, according to the protocol.

من هنا، يتخذ موضوع الغاز اللبناني – بكل ما يحمله من تفاصيل تقنية – منحى استراتيجياً بامتياز، علماً ان أبعاده السياسية في شقّيها الداخلي والخارجي مرتبطة بشكل عضوي. فخارجياً يتّخذ النفط اللبناني أهمية مضاعفة نظراً “للكميات الهائلة” التي بات من شبه المؤكد انه يختزنها براً وبحراً. وان كانت هذه الكميات نظرياً لا تغيّر الميزان الاستراتيجي المتعلق بانتاج الطاقة في الشرق الاوسط والمطلوبة بغالبيتها للانتاج الصناعي، إلا أنّ الحقول اللبنانية متّصلة جغرافياً بالحقول المصرية والاسرائيلية والسوريّة والأهم القبرصية. ذلك يعني انه وعدا عن الدور المباشر الذي يحظى به “غاز لبنان” فهو قد يبرز أيضاً لدى طرح إشكالية أساسية هي المتعلقة بأماكن انشاء محطات تسييل وتكرير الغاز بالاضافة الى المنشآت والبنى التحتية الضرورية لتسييله مع آليات نقله وتسويقه. وعليه، لا يمكن التنبؤ بهويّة الدولة التي ستتحكّم بما قد يستجدّ من تحالفات إقليمية ودولية؛ هذا الامر سيحتم حداً أدنى من التعاون بين الدول المعنيّة، وهنا يكمن بيت القصيد، بما أن هذه البلدان في حالة عداوة أو في حالة تصادم ما بين المحاور السائدة في الاقليم والمرشّح للتفاقم بسبب التنافس الشرس على الثروة الجديدة في شرق المتوسط.

اما البعد الثالث الذي يكتسبه غاز لبنان فـ”ماليّ” بحت والمقصود هنا ليس مالية الدولة بل الميل الى الالتفاف حول القانون لاستفادة الفريق السياسي المهيمن، وذلك من خلال السمسرات وعقود الخدمة للشركات والانشاءات المرتبطة بهذا القطاع فضلاً عن القدرة على توظيف “الازلام” تماماً كما جرى ولا يزال في شركتي الاتصالات وكازينو لبنان والكسارات والسدود وغيرها من المجالس التي قد تكون اكثر إغراء، خصوصاً اذا استغلّت المراسيم كمنفذ مقونن للهيمنة على ما تبقّى من موارد في البلاد، لا سيّما وأن التعويل على العائدات النفطية “اليوم”، أي في ظلّ عدم وجود قانون واضح ينظّم وجهة استخدام هذه الاموال من خلال الصندوق السيادي، يعني حُكماً أننا تخلينا عن ثروتنا هذه لخدمة الدين وتحويلها من أموال استثمارية الى أموال “منهوبة”.

من هذا المنطلق، لا يجوز الإفراط في التعويل على الثروة النفطية لانتشال لبنان من مأزقه النقدي، فالجدوى الاقتصادية، بحسب الخبراء، للنفط والغاز في المنطقة ككلّ لم تُثبّت بعد لا سيما وأن كلفة استخراج هذه المواد من قعر البحر تفوق بكثير الكلفة التي تتكبدها روسيا لاستخراج غازها. وبرأي الخبراء، فإنّ امكان تصدير هذا الغاز الى أوروبا على سبيل المثال قد يكون صعباً بما أن الاسعار ستكون عاجزة عن منافسة الغاز الروسي من جهة، ومن جهة ثانية بسبب العوامل الجيو – سياسية في منطقة شرقي المتوسط. أما كلّ ما أُثير عن احتمال إنشاء أنابيب لربط هذه الآبار بأوروبا مروراً باليونان فقد سقط عملياً بعد دخول اسرائيل الى طاولة المباحثات اضافة الى صعوبة تأمين الاموال الاستثمارية اللازمة له.

لا تعني كلّ هذه الفرضيات أن دولة من دول العالم الثالث كلبنان “عاجزة عن الاستفادة من ثرواتها النفطية بل يمكن استغلالها، وإن لم يكن للتصدير، فذلك في إصلاح الكهرباء وتحويل الانتاج ليرتكز على الغاز، وهكذا يتم تخفيض العجز وتالياً تقليص الخضوع لهيمنة صندوق النقد الدولي كلما وجدنا أنفسنا مضطرين الى الاقتراض بنسب وشروط تعجيزيّة”، بحسب الخبراء.

الطروحات الاميركية

من جهة ثانية، تُضاف معضلة ترسيم الحدود التي لا تزال تتخذ حيّزاً من المفاوضات والتي يوليها الجانب الاميركي أهمّية كبيرة خصوصاً في ظلّ التواجد الصيني والروسي في المنطقة. ولا شكّ أن مساعد وزير الخارجية الأميركي للشؤون السياسية ديفيد هيل سيتطرّق الى هذا الملف خلال زيارته إلى بيروت في الايام القليلة المقبلة.

“طروحات ثلاثة، هي ما قدّمه الطرف الاميركي في ما خصّ مسألة ترسيم الحدود مع الكيان الإسرائيلي في المنطقة المتنازع عليها: الاول هو تقسيم رضائي بنسبة ثلث للكيان وثلثين للبنان. الثاني هو تصنيفها كمنطقة عدم أنشطة وبالتالي اعتبارها محظورة للطرفين؛ أما الطرح الثالث فيتمثّل باعتبارها منطقة أنشطة مشتركة، وهو ما يرفضه الجانب اللبناني حتى الساعة متسلّحاً بالقوانين التي ترعى حقوقه في المياه الاقليمية إضافة الى الطلب الذي كان تقدّم به الى الامم المتحدة لحلّ النزاع في هذه القضيّة” يقول الخبير في قوانين وسياسات الطاقة المحامي علي برّو.

ويضيف برّو في اتصال مع “نداء الوطن” أنّ “قبرص تتحمّل مسؤولية مخالفة أحكام الاتفاقية مع لبنان سنداً لاتفاقية 2007 حيث لم يكن ينبغي عليها ترسيم الحدود مع الكيان الاسرائيلي من دون موافقة الدولة اللبنانية. من جهتها، أودعت الدولة اللبنانية الامم المتحدة احداثيات منطقتها الاقتصادية الخالصة، إلا أنها قصرت في مطالبتها قبرص لخرقها احكام الاتفاقية معه. من الناحية القانونية، لبنان جاهز لعمليّة إعادة الترسيم وفقاً للوسائل العلمية التابعة لقانون البحار. ومن خلال لجوئنا الى القانون الدولي، سنتمكن من استعادة حقوقنا السيادية في المياه البحرية”.

في الاطار عينه، يوضح الخبير النفطي رودي بارودي أنه “من المتوقع أن يأتي ديفيد هيل وفي جعبته ملف ترسيم الحدود البحرية. هذا الموضوع بحاجة الى حلّ جذريّ لا سيّما مع بدء لبنان بحفر أول بئر استكشافي مطلع العام المقبل. وبحسب قانون الامم المتحدة للبحار (UNCLOS) لا شكّ أن لبنان سيحظى بالحصة الاكبر من المنطقة الاقتصادية الخالصة المُتنازع عليها، فصحيح أن الكيان الاسرائيلي ليس طرفاً في المعاهدة مع الامم المتحدة، الا أنه طبّق قواعدها من خلال تقيّده ببنود الاتفاقية بينه وبين قبرص. بالتالي أصبح من الممكن اللجوء الى إتفاقية تنمية مشتركة تماماً كما هي الحال بين الكويت والسعودية في ما يُعرف بالمنطقة المحايدة. بهذه الطريقة، تقوم شركة محايدة بعمليات الاستخراج وتوزّع لكلّ دولة حصّتها وفق المعايير الدولية”.

كثيرة تصبح التأويلات عندما يتعلّق الأمر بغاز لبنان وليس هناك من حقيقة مطلقة عندما تكون المسألة جيو – سياسية. وحدها الايام المقبلة ستُظهر نوايا الولايات المتحدة تجاه لبنان إلا أنّ معيار ترسيم الحدود البحرية يجب أن يبقى القانون الدولي منفرداً. ولعلّه من الافضل لهذه الثروة أن تبقى نائمة في قعر البحر لحين ايجاد حلول آنية تُعيد خلق اقتصاد منتج بدلاً من اقتصاد ريعيّ وترك هذا الملف يأخذ مساره الطبيعي لئلا تصبح عوائده…”أموالاً منهوبة”.

German energy group E.ON plans a £500mn ($642mn) break-up of the struggling British Npower division it inherited from Innogy, which a union said could put up to 4,500 jobs at risk.
The revamp, the latest among established British retail power providers, effectively removes one of the market’s so-called ‘Big Six’ players, which have lost customers to nimbler recent entrants and been hit by a regulatory price cap.
E.ON’s plan includes managing Npower’s residential and small and medium-size business customers on the same platform as its own, while putting Npower’s industrial and commercial customers into a separate business.
The rest of Npower will be closed.
E.ON chief executive Johannes Teyssen said the group would examine options for Npower’s industrial and commercial business, the division’s only profitable part, suggesting it might be sold at some point.
The shake-up will result in up to 4,500 job losses at Npower, British union UNISON said, nearly 80% of the division’s total staff.
“The UK market has been very challenging for several years,” Teyssen said. “Churn (customer switching) rates are high, margins slim, and the price caps introduced this year have exacerbated the situation.
No company operating there has been spared these difficulties.”
Teyssen said talks with British unions about the plans had started. Shares in E.ON were up 1.6% at 0951 GMT.
“We see this initial update as encouraging, given likely low market expectations around the outlook for Npower,” Jefferies analysts wrote, keeping a “buy” rating on E.ON stock.
Npower has been suffering more than its large rivals, including E.ON itself, Centrica’s, SSE, EDF and Iberdrola, partly because of internal billing problems.
E.ON said it expected its combined British business to achieve at least 100mn pounds of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) and positive free cash flow from 2022 onwards. E.ON took over Npower as part of a far-reaching asset swap with RWE that included the break up of Innogy.
The deal, first announced in March 2018, has turned E.ON into a pure energy retail and networks group.
As a result of the transaction, E.ON’s net debt nearly doubled to €39.6bn ($43.7bn) at the end of September.
E.ON also said yesterday the deal had led it to raise its 2019 adjusted EBIT forecast to €3.1-3.3bn from 2.9-3.1bn.
In the first nine months of the year, adjusted EBIT fell 6% at €2.2bn.

Nordic Monitor has obtained a copy of a recent maritime agreement between Turkey and Libya that determines the Turkish-Libyan continental shelf and exclusive economic zone coordinates.

The agreement, officially titled “Memorandum of Understanding Between Turkey and Libya on Delimitation of the Maritime Jurisdiction Areas in the Mediterranean,” has been the subject of criticism, especially by countries such as Egypt, Greece and Cyprus in the Mediterranean region.

The agreement states that both Turkey and Libya have determined a precise and equitable delimitation of their respective maritime areas in the Mediterranean in which the parties exercise sovereignty and sovereign rights and/or jurisdiction in accordance with the applicable rules of international law, taking into account all relevant circumstances.

It refers to achieving equitable and mutually acceptable solutions to the above-mentioned issues through constructive negotiations and in the spirit of good and friendly relations and says that the memorandum of understanding will contribute to the strengthening of relations and encourage further cooperation between the parties in the interest of the two brotherly countries.

The agreement, which was signed in Istanbul on November 27, 2019, includes the following provisions:

According to Article 1, the parties have agreed on these boundaries:

“The boundaries of the Continental Shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone in the Mediterranean between the Republic of Turkey and the Government of National Accord-State of Libya begins at “Point A” (34° 16′ 13.720″N -026° 19′ 11.640″E) and ends at the Point B (34° 09′ 07.9″N -026° 39′ 06.3″E).

“The boundaries of the Continental Shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone determined in ARTICLE I, paragraph 1 of this Memorandum of Understanding are shown on the Maritime Chart INT 308 (Data Source: BA Chart Edition 1992), scale 1: 1 102 000 (Annex 1 ). The coordinates are shown in the chart at Annex 1 in its coordinate system. The geographical coordinates referred to in ARTICLE I of this Memorandum of Understanding are expressed in terms of the World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS’84).

“Base points coordinates that are used to determine the equidistance line are shown in Annex.”

libya_MOU

A Turkish diplomat has revealed a map which delineates waters in the Mediterranean claimed by Turkey, amid an ongoing months-long standoff with Cyprus and Greece over Turkish oil and gas exploration and drilling inside Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

“After signing deals with its own puppet state in occupied northern Cyprus and with the pseudo-government in Libya’s Tripoli, Turkey declares that it owns half of the eastern Mediterranean,” Aron Lund, an analyst at The Century Foundation, observes of the newly published map.
New map outlining Turkey’s claimed continental shelf and the borders of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), via Hurriyet Daily.

Meanwhile the entire eastern side of Cyprus is claimed by the internationally disputed “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.”

And Turkey’s Hurriyet Daily explains: “With the chart, Ça?atay Erciyes showed the outer boundaries of Turkey’s continental shelf and EEZ, designated in a 2011 agreement between Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), the median line between Egypt and Turkey’s mainlands and a recent memorandum with Libya.”

Over the past year Turkey has sent both oil and gas exploration ships, as well as military transport vessels, into Cypriot waters in the East Mediterranean related to expanded claims based on the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus (since 1974), earning the condemnation of both Nicosia and top EU officials, who have defended EU-Cyprus’ interpretation of the conflict.
Turkey claims western waters off Cyprus, with the so-called TRNC eastern waters; and now Erdogan is cutting deals with Libya to expand from the southern Mediterranean.

In nearby Libya, as Turkish military advisers continue to play a key role in support of the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) against an offensive led by Gen. Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA), Turkey is also busy expanding maritime defensive operations off North Africa.

“On Nov. 27, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdo?an held a closed meeting in Istanbul that lasted over two hours with Fayez al-Sarraj, chairman of the Presidential Council of Libya,” Hurriyet Daily reports further.

In that meeting the two leaders reportedly struck a deal which is seen as key to expanding Turkey’s maritime claims:

Lenders in the UK loan market are gripped by uncertainty as the failure to move ahead on Brexit this week leaves them with little visibility on how long they’ll be able to keep their preferential access to the European market. Banks and loan managers say the lack of clarity on “passporting rights” that allow them to seamlessly market products and services across the European Union is making planning diff icult, compelling some of them to insert clauses in their documents to minimise disruption. The passage of the Withdrawal Agreement Bill would have set the end of 2020 as the deadline for a transition but now the focus is on the length of any EU exten- sion beyond October 31. Nicholas Voisey, managing director of the Loan Market Association, said the market is trying to make their deals as “Brexit-proof” as possible, including by adding terms that would permit the transfer of loan commitments to other booking off ices. If Brexit were to happen in the immediate future “Much of the decision-making and discussions will still need to be ironed out — particularly relating to financial services,” he said. A prolonged ambivalence on the Brexit front could force more participants in the €400bn ($445bn) per year loan market to build safeguards, which could increase their cost of doing business. Some UK lenders, including global banks’ London off ices, have already shifted assets to other EU nations to help prepare for the loss of passporting rights. Nicola Wherity, London-based partner at law firm Cliff ord Chance LLP, said steps taken by lenders to overcome Brexit-related hurdles include setting up new EU hubs, seeking local licences and on-going process of shifting loans to these new branches. The financial markets rely on nine dif- ferent passports for carrying out core banking activity and non-EU firms face significant regulatory barriers to provid- ing cross-border services to EU clients without these rights, lobby group UK Finance says in its website.

SOCHI, Russia—Russian President Vladimir Putin on Thursday promised support to Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte in fighting terrorism.

“Mr. President [Duterte], we are ready to continue to develop our partnership and to share our experience and achievements in the field of counterterrorism,” he said during their bilateral meeting in the resort city of Sochi.

The Philippine government under the Duterte administration, Putin said, was able to reduce terror threats and enhance the capabilities of its security forces.

The Russian government also expressed interest to further expand its cooperation with the Philippines.

“Russian companies are willing to increase the export of energy, aircraft, motor transport and special vehicles to the Philippines. We are interested in promoting industrial cooperation and joint projects in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, space exploration and digital technology,” Putin said.

On his part, Duterte reaffirmed Philippines’ commitment to build a comprehensive partnership with Russia.

“In the past 2 years we have seen a dramatic increase in bilateral activities across many areas of cooperation at various levels of government. We have also made historic firsts in the key strategic areas, from economic defense, security and military technical cooperation,” he said.

Meanwhile, in the Valdai Discussion Club where Duterte delivered a speech, he stressed the need to explore new partnerships with non-traditional allies, such as Russia.

He also used the forum to lash out against countries critical of his administration’s campaign against illegal drugs.

“We want unimpeded freedom guaranteed by our constitution to exercise the right to govern ourselves as a people and as we saw it fit,” he said.

He added, “I want our friends and partners to respect our independence to make sovereign decisions just as we respect theirs.”

With 3 years left before his term ends, Duterte said he would sought engagement in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East.

“I want the Filipino people to broaden their worldwide view, to be enriched by the cultures and intellectual traditions of the old civilizations of the Americas, Africa, Central Asia, and the Middle East,” he said.