

**What's next after new  
Energean gas discovery in  
Israel's Karish North Field?  
Expert underlines need for  
Lebanon to lay groundwork for  
maritime boundary deals with  
Cyprus and Syria**



DOHA/BEIRUT – By Myriam Balaa: Israel’s latest undersea gas find further demonstrates that Lebanon should be doing everything it can to pave the way for its own offshore oil and gas industry, specifically by settling its maritime boundaries with Cyprus and Syria, one of the region’s foremost authorities on energy development says.

In an interview following Greek/Israeli-owned Energean’s announcement of a second discovery in the Karish North Field adjacent to Lebanese waters, energy consultant Roudi Baroudi said the news was actually good for Lebanon.

“It’s no surprise that they found more. It just underscores

what we've known for several years: we haven't located all the resources tucked away beneath the seabed of the East Med, including deposits awaiting discovery off Lebanon's coast," said Baroudi, who has more than four decades of experience in the energy business. "The problem is that Lebanon's ongoing political quagmire has caused significant delays in the development of the country's nascent offshore hydrocarbon sector."

Baroudi, who currently serves as CEO of Energy and Environment Holding, an independent consultancy based in Doha, Qatar, confirmed that the new find seemed to be located very close to the maritime boundary line (MBL) agreed to by Lebanon and Israel in October 2022. That agreement, reached after years-long mediation by the United States, was a "necessary step", he explained, but "it alone has not been sufficient to fully activate Lebanon's oil and gas industry."


Asked how Beirut should proceed at this juncture, he stressed the importance of moving ahead with efforts to finalize Lebanon's MBLs with Cyprus and Syria, "which would achieve full international recognition of Lebanon's Exclusive Economic Zone, thereby reducing the risk for the big energy companies whose assistance we need in order to fully explore and exploit our offshore resources."

"We've already negotiated the different equidistance points for a completed MBL agreement with Cyprus, we just haven't ratified it," Baroudi explained. "That means we just have to adjust a few coordinates in order to set a trijunction point where the Lebanese, Cypriot, and Israeli MBLs intersect at sea. And setting that trijunction in the south will automatically simplify the process of setting another in the north for Lebanon-Cyprus-Syria".

## CYPRUS - LEBANON MBL

Cyprus vs. Lebanon \*Strict Equidistance Maritime Boundary Line (MBL)

100% \*Full Effect Line (red dashed line), using all relevant Cyprus coastlines and offshore Islands (see close-up inset example), plus also all relevant Lebanese mainland coastlines and all offshore Islands (see closeup inset example). This MBL begins at the northern computed Cyprus-Syria-Lebanon Trijunction point (TRJ ~ green star) and terminates at the southern modified computed Cyprus-Lebanon-Israel Trijunction point (TRJ ~ green star). See the report for specific details on the Trijunction Points and MBL Line Latitude and Longitude geographic coordinates, along with methodology on how the Trijunction Points and this MBL was produced.



He also played down claims in some circles that a significant gap exists between the Lebanon-Cyprus line and the Cyprus-Israel line, making it more difficult to set a trijunction.

“There is a gap, of course, but it’s really quite small,” Baroudi told the reporters “The proof of this is in the delineation of the offshore blocks issued by both Lebanon and Cyprus about a decade ago. On all the international blocks maps of the area, even including the ones issued by the oil and gas companies, which focus on accurate portrayals of acreage, there is no overlap. In fact, virtually all of the line between Lebanese and Cypriot blocks precisely tracks almost a MBL line agreed which Nicosia and Beirut agreed to in the unratified agreement. The difference at the southern end of the trijunction point is very, very small.”

The smaller the gap, he explained, the easier it should be to finish defining Lebanon's EEZ.


"Since the lines are so close, setting a trijunction – the point where the Lebanese, Cypriot, and Israeli boundaries intersect – should be relatively easy," he said. "In addition, agreeing that trijunction in the south would automatically simplify the process of setting one in the north for Lebanon-Cyprus-Syria. And keep in mind: Lebanon has strong & friendly relations with both Cyprus and Syria, so these negotiations will be a lot friendlier than the ones with Israel, which had to be pursued indirectly via American mediation."

When asked about how any new diplomatic efforts might be affected by the long-running political paralysis in Beirut, where the presidency has been vacant since late 2022 because rival parties in Parliament can't agree on a successor to former President Michel Aoun, Baroudi said the quagmire only accentuated the need for action.

## CYPRUS-SYRIA MARITIME BOUNDARY LINE

### Cyprus vs. Syria Strict Equidistance MBL\*

\*100% Full Effect Line (red dashed line), using all relevant Cypriot coastlines and offshore islands (see close-up inset example), plus all relevant Syrian mainland coastlines and offshore islands (see close-up inset example). This MBL begins at the northern computed Cyprus-Türkiye-Syria Trijunction Point (upper green star) and terminates at the southern computed Cyprus-Syria-Lebanon Trijunction Point (lower green star). See the report for specific details on the geographic (longitude and latitude) coordinates of the MBL and Trijunctions, along with an explanation of the methodology used to produce the MBL and Trijunctions.



“Right now, Lebanon can’t officially ratify into a new MBL agreement with either Cyprus or Syria because it requires a presidential signature, but that doesn’t stop us from carrying out the necessary talks,” he said. “In fact, we should be rushing to get all of this settled now so that when we finally fill the vacancy at Baabda Palace, we’ll have everything ready for the new president’s signature.”


In addition to settling its maritime boundaries, Baroudi said Lebanon also had another reason to re-engage with neighboring countries.

“It’s been almost ten years since Cyprus proposed a

unitization agreement (joint development agreement) with Lebanon for joint production from any deposits that straddle their shared MBL,” he recalled, “and the Lebanese paralysis has kept it from happening. We need to revive this process and get a deal in place. That way, again, once we have a president in office, we’ll be ready to hit the ground running, with no further delays, and start collecting the badly needed gas revenues”.

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## **Regional Energy Expert Roudi Baroudi Earns Award from Washington Think Tank**



## **Transatlantic Leadership Network Recognizes Author for Contributions to Peaceful Development in Eastern Mediterranean**

WASHINGTON, DC November 9, 2023: Doha-based Lebanese author Roudi Baroudi was one of two people presented with the 2023 Transatlantic Leadership Award at a ceremony in Washington this week.

Although circumstances relating to the conflict in the Gaza Strip prevented Baroudi from attending the event, both he and Joshua Volz – the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Europe, Eurasia, Africa, and the Middle East and the Office of International Affairs at the US Department of Energy – were recognized by the Transatlantic Leadership Network (TLN). Each was cited at a gala dinner on Monday for his “valuable contribution in building a peaceful and prosperous Eastern Mediterranean” as part of the TLN’s 2nd Annual Conference on Freedom of the Media.

“I was deeply honored to be named a recipient of this prestigious award, and I will always be grateful for the many ways in which the TLN has supported my work for several years now,” Baroudi said. “I also look forward to working together in the future so that one day, our descendants can know the benefits of peace and coexistence. It is precisely in difficult and trying times that cooler heads must be able and willing to look at the reasons for current bloodshed and recrimination, then envision pathways to a better future.”

Baroudi, who serves as CEO of independent consultancy Energy and Environment Holding in Doha, is a long-time champion of dialogue, cooperation, and practical solutions to both the global climate crisis and recurrent tensions in the East Med. A regular speaker at regional energy and policy conferences, Baroudi’s insights are also avidly sought by local and international media, as well as governments, major energy companies, and investors.



Having advised both public and private sector actors on a wide variety of energy issues, Baroudi is widely credited with bringing unique perspective to all manner of policy discussions. He is the author of several books, including “Maritime Disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean: The Way Forward” (2021), and “Climate and Energy in the Mediterranean: What the Blue Economy Means for a Greener Future” (2022). Together with Notre-Dame University – Louaize, Baroudi has also published a study of the US-brokered October 2022 Maritime Boundary Agreement between Lebanon and Israel, and is currently preparing another volume on Lebanon’s prospects for similar deals with Cyprus and Syria.


The TLN describes itself as “a nonpartisan, independent, international network of practitioners, private sector leaders and policy analysts dedicated to strengthening and reorienting transatlantic relations to the rapidly changing dynamics of a globalizing world.”

Monday’s ceremony was attended by a broad cross-section of high-profile figures, including senior officials from the Departments of Energy and State, numerous members of Washington’s extensive diplomatic corps, and representatives of both international organizations and various media outlets.

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**بارودي مٌصرٌ على التفاوض  
وينشر الخارطة: اكتشاف الغاز لا**

# يكون دائماً من خلال حفر البئر الاول



بارودي مٌصرّ على التفاؤل وينشر الخارطة: اكتشاف الغاز لا يكون دائماً من خلال حفر البئر الاول

الدراسات والأبحاث تؤكد ان احتمالات اكتشاف الغاز في المياه اللبنانية مرتفعة جداً

”خاص“ اخبار اليوم

أكد الخبير في شؤون الطاقة رودي بارودي أن القصة لم تنته مع عدم اكتشاف الغاز في البئر الاول إذ أنه من المهم جداً معرفة أن كل بلوك بحري يجب تقسيمه إلى عدد من الآبار ومن الطبيعي جداً أن تقوم شركات الاستكشاف بحفر آبار عدة قبل اكتشاف البئر الرئيسي الذي يحتوي على مخزون تجاري من الغاز .

و في حديث الى وكالة "أخبار اليوم"، اوضح بارودي إنه لم ييأس من عدم اكتشاف الغاز في البئر الأول، ذلك أن أكبر حقل للغاز في البحر المتوسط الذي هو حقل "ظُهر" والذي يقع في منطقة بلوك شروق في مصر، ويمتد على الحدود بين مصر وقبرص. كانت حقوق استغلال هذا الحقل تعود لشركة شل لمدة 15 عاماً ، وخلال هذه الفترة قامت الشركة بحفر العديد من الآبار ولكنها لم تنجح في العثور على أي كميات من الغاز حتى قامت ببيع حقوق الاستكشاف لشركة إيني الإيطالية في عام 2015، التي بدورها حفرت بئراً واحداً على عمق 5100 متر لتجد أكبر مخزون من الغاز في شرق المتوسط والمقدر بـ 850 مليار متر مكعب.

ورأى بارودي أن هذا الأمر يشير إلى أن اكتشاف الغاز لا يكون دائماً من خلال حفر البئر الاول. وقد تكرر هذا الأمر مع حقول الغاز في قبرص إذ إنه لم تكتشف أي كمية من الغاز التجاري في البئر الاول، علماً أن حقل أفروديت في قبرص والقريب من لبنان احتاجت شركة نوبل لحفر بئر على عمق 5800 متر لكي تجد الغاز، والخريطة المرفقة تبين الاعماق في البحر في كل من قبرص واسرائيل ومصر للحقول المستكشفه ومنها: كاريش (٤٨٨٠ متر) ، تمار (٥٠٠٠ متر) ، لفثيان (٥١٧٠ متر) ، افروديت (٥٨٠٠ متر) ، كرونوس (٢٢٨٧ متر)، ظُهر (٤١٣١ متر)، (كاليبسو (٢٠٧٤) متر).

من هنا من غير الجائز علمياً القول بأنه لا يوجد كميات من الغاز التجاري في البلوك 9 اذ ان عملية الاستكشاف لم تشمل لغاية تاريخه إلا بئراً واحداً وعلى عمق فقط 3500 متر.

أما عن وجود مؤامرة تقوم بها شركات التنقيب، فقال بارودي: من المؤسف أن بعض المحللين وخبراء النفط يتحدثون عن مؤامرة يقوم بها الكونسورتيوم المكون من شركات عالمية وهي إيني، توتال، وقطر للطاقة وهي من الشركات العملاقة في مجال الطاقة والتي لا تدخل في البازار السياسي ولديها مصالح في كل بلاد العالم.

واضاف: علينا أن نستفيد من وجودها في لبنان بدل اتهامها ورمي الشائعات عليها. ولكن من الممكن أن يؤثر الوضع العام الحالي، وخصوصاً أن الحرب دائرة على حدودنا أن تقوم الشركات بتعليق أنشطتها مؤقتاً ريثما تنجلي الصورة.


وتابع: الاتفاق المبرم بين الدولة اللبنانية والكونسورتيوم المكلف بالاستكشاف ينص على أن تقوم الشركات بحفر اثنين من آبار الاستكشاف قبل أن يتخذ قرار بشأن وجود الغاز أو عدمه. من هنا، فأن بث

الأجواء السلبية وفكرة المؤامرة لا تفيد لبنان بشيء، بل على العكس علينا المثابرة بالعمل للحفاظ على حقوقنا.

وختم: كما من واجب الحكومة والمجلس النيابي المباشرة فوراً بالإصلاحات المالية والاقتصادية المطلوبة من لبنان لكي نستطيع أن نواكب عمليات الاستكشاف، فلا تذهب الثروة النفطية الموعودة في نهر الفساد الجارف الذي نعاني منه.

# لبنان أمام فرصة تاريخية... شرط أن يُحسن استغلالها بارودي: احتمال وجود كميات تجارية في البلوكات 8 و 9 و 10 مرتفعة جداً

## LEBANON – ISRAEL MARITIME BORDER REGION EXPLORATION RIG LOCATION & ITS VICINITY TO KARISH FIELD



**المركزية-** تتقدّم عمليات الحفر واستكشاف النفط والغاز التي تجريها المنصّة العائمة في الـ"بلوك 9" في المياه الإقليمية اللبنانية بقيادة "توتال إنرجي"، بوتيرة سريعة جداً من دون أي صعوبات أو عراقيل، بحسب المعلومات المتداولة في الساعات الأخيرة والتي رجّحت أن تصدر النتائج الأوّلية لعملية الحفر قبل 15 يوماً من الموعد المحدّد.

هذه المعطيات حملتها "المركزية" إلى خبير الطاقة الدولي رودى بارودى لاستشراف أي معطى جديد في الأمد القريب، وعمّا يتوقّعه من فى TRANSOCEAN BARENTS المرحلة الاستكشافية مع بدء عمل الباخرة البلوك 9، فيجيب بارودى: لقد قام الكونسورتيوم الذي تترأسه شركة "توتال" والذي يضمّ شركات "توتال" و"إيني" و"قطر للطاقة" بما وعد به والتزم باستئجار هذه المنصّة الاستكشافية الرئيسية. لكن للأسف، لم تقم الحكومة اللبنانية بدورها بعد، فلبنان يحتاج أولاً وقبل كل شيء إلى انتخاب رئيس للجمهورية وهو أمر مهم جداً للبلاد. كما على السلطات اللبنانية القيام بالكثير من الإصلاحات العاجلة، والأكثر إلحاحاً هو إحياء و/أو تعيين هيئة جديدة لإدارة قطاع البترول اللبنانية، علماً أنه تم تشكيل الهيئة فى العام 2012، وقام أعضاؤها بأعمال كثيرة ومهمّة دوا الطريق أمام عملية الاستكشاف، إنما انتهت مدة ولاية الهيئة فى العام 2018، ومنذ ذلك الحين غادر العديد من أعضائها لبنان أو استقال.

ويُضيف: الإصلاح الثانى الأكثر أهمية هو الإصلاح القضائى على المستويات كافة من أجل حماية مصالح لبنان وشركات النفط والغاز الكبرى. ومن المعروف أن القضاء المستقل يجذب الاستثمارات المهمة، من هنا فإن استعادة الثقة بالقضاء وعلى كل الأصعدة، واجبٌ. إضافة إلى ذلك، من الضرورى تطبيق الإصلاحات المطلوبة من المجتمع الدولى ولا سيما الإصلاحات المالية التي تعطي الثقة مجدداً بالقطاع المصرفى، وبالطبع يجب إقرار قانون صندوق سيادى يوافق بين الحاجات اللبنانية والمبادئ العالمية، خصوصاً لناحية الشفافية. لذلك ينبغي القيام بدراسة معمّقة لقانون الصندوق السيادى ليكون صندوقاً شفافاً يمكنه أن يؤدى واجباته على أكمل وجه، خصوصاً أن الثروة النفطية هي ملك الشعب اللبنانى ويفترض عدم التفريط بها.

ولم يغفل بارودى الإشارة فى هذا المجال، إلى أنه "فى حال وجد لبنان النفط فى مياهه الإقليمية، فإن الاستثمار الأجنبى المباشر الذى سيحتاجه الكونسورتيوم الذى تترأسه "توتال"، سيتراوح (FDI) بالتأكيد ما بين 1 و3 مليارات دولار، وذلك حسب البنية التحتية

اللازمة. علماً أن الاستثمار الأجنبي المباشر يحتاج دائماً إلى "سيادة القانون والشفافية المطلقة والاستقرار السياسي".

## "موجودات الـ"بلوك 9"

وعن رأيه في احتمالية موجودات الـ"بلوك 9" وعمّا إذا كان هناك من أمل، يقول بارودي "إذا نظرنا إلى هذه الخريطة الحصريّة سنرى من BARENT Ocean Rig لـ"المركزية" والتي تُظهر موقع باخرة موقعها أنها بالكاد تبعد 3 أميال فقط عن خطوط الحدود البحرية الجديدة بين لبنان وإسرائيل. وإذا نظرنا أيضاً إلى الجنوب الغربي، فهي بعيدة حوالي 8.3 أميال، هذه هي المسافة التي تفصلها عن حقل غاز "كاريش". إضافة إلى ذلك، فإن سفينة الحفر لا تبعد أكثر من 25-30 ميلاً عن الخطوط البحرية اللبنانية القبرصيّة حيث تم اكتشاف كميات تجاريّة. من هنا، فإن احتمال وجود كميات تجاريّة في البلوكات اللبنانية 8 و9 و10 وفقاً لعلماء الجيولوجيا الأميركيين، مرتفعة جداً.

ويُلفت في هذا السياق، إلى أن "مساحة الـ"بلوك 9" تبلغ حوالي  $\pm 1700$  كيلومتر مربع، ومساحة الـ"بلوك 8" من  $\pm 1400$  كيلومتر مربع، ومساحة الـ"بلوك 10"  $\pm 1380$  كيلومتراً مربعاً على بُعد أميال قليلة جنوباً، حيث تقع حقول الغاز مثل "تمار" و"كاريش" و"ليفياثان"، ويُضيف: يتمتّع لبنان وحوض "ليفياثان" بشكل عام، بإمكانات عالية جداً ليس فقط في البحر إنما أيضاً في البر. هذا ما أكّده دراسات عديدة موثوقة منذ العام 1992.

ويختم بارودي: بالتالي، هناك إمكانات كبيرة لاستكشافات تجاريّة واعدة، ما يحتاج إليه لبنان هو الاستعداد لتلقي الموارد النفطية والغازية بطريقة آمنة لضخ هذه الثروة في الاقتصاد والتنمية الاجتماعية والرعاية الصحية، وإطفاء الديون المالية... كل ذلك، شرط إجراء إصلاحات حقيقيّة وعلى كل الأصعدة المالية والاقتصادية، وإبعاد المناكفات السياسية عن هذا الملف الحساس.

# تنبيه... كي لا تذهب الثروة النفطية إلى المجهول



يقرب لبنان من ساعة الصفر في مجال الاستكشافات النفطية البحرية، التي تعاقدت معها شركة Transocean Barents خصوصا أن سفينة الحفر لإتمام عمليات الاستكشاف في البلوك رقم 9 -Energies Total والموجودة حاليا في النروج، ستنتقل إلى لبنان في تموز الجاري للبدء بعمليات الحفر.

هذا ما يؤكد خبر الطاقة الدولي رودي بارودي في حديث لـ"المركزية"، ويشير إلى أن "هذا التطور الهام يعني أن شركة "توتال" تقوم بواجباتها التعاقدية إن لناحية استكمال التجهيزات التقنية واللوجستية، أو لناحية البدء الفعلي بعمليات الحفر والاستكشاف في هذا الحقل". ويقول إن "عملية ترسيم الحدود البحرية مع إسرائيل كانت ضرورية للبدء بهذا العمل المهم، خصوصا لجهة طمأنة تحالف الشركات الدولية... كما أن هذا الترسيم سيسمح بفرز مكامن النفط والغاز ضمن المناطق المتداخلة مع إسرائيل فورا، موضحا أن "قانون البحار"، Total-Energies وذلك من خلال اتفاقية هو آلية أساسية لتسوية جميع المشاكل سلميا، إذ أن الدول تستطيع اللجوء إليه ساعة نشاء لترسيم حدودها البحرية المتنازع عليها وهو المرجع الصالح لأحكام وقرارات المحاكم الدولية والتحكيم والمعاهدات الثنائية، ما يؤمن استقرارا مطلوباً لجذب الشركات العالمية من أجل تطوير بلوكات النفط والغاز".

وفي هذا السياق، يلفت إلى أن هناك "أربعة بلوكات إسرائيلية وهي 74 و 27 و 36 و 70 التي ستُطرح للمزايدة، تتجاوز جنوباً المنطقة E4 - الاقتصادية المصرية الخالصة وتقتطع من البلوك المصري رقم مساحة ١٤٠ كيلومتراً مربعاً، أي ما يوازي خمس مرات مساحة حقل "زهر"، وعلى الرغم من أن مصر وإسرائيل ليس لديهما توقيع رسمي فمن خلال المفاوضات واستناداً إلى القانون، MBL للحدود البحرية الدولي، يمكن تقاسم العائدات في المناطق المختلطة، من هنا فإن هذا التعدي أو التداخل لم يمنع الجانبان المصري والإسرائيلي من تعيين موعد للمناقصات في 16 تموز 2023 أي بعد حوالي الأسبوعين... أما لبنان كما أسلفنا ذكره، فيمكنه تحصيل عائدات المناطق المتداخلة من خلال اتفاقية "توتال إنريجي" الموقعة مع إسرائيل.

### الإصلاحات أولوية وإلا..

ويشدد بارودي على أن "الإصلاحات الاقتصادية والمالية والقانونية المطلوبة من المجتمع الدولي والهيئات الاقتصادية اللبنانية، تبقى أولوية من أجل الاستفادة من الثروات النفطية التي يمكن أن تتكشف في المياه اللبنانية، إذ أن الحوكمة الصحيحة هي التي تؤمن الاستعمال الصحيح للثروة النفطية... فمن هنا ضرورة أن تقوم الحكومة فوراً بإصلاحات جذرية تبدأ بالاعتماد على خارطة الطريق المقترحة من قبل صندوق النقد الدولي، وضرورة إقرار قانون لصندوق سيادي مستقل شفاف على مثال البلدان التي سبقتنا في هذا المجال وإلا فإن مصير الثروة النفطية سيكون مشابهاً لغيرها من الثروات التي هدرت نتيجة "فساد مستشري".


وليس بعيداً، يوضح أن "غياب الإصلاحات وسيادة القانون سيمنعان شركات النفط الدولية الكبرى من القدوم والاستثمار في بلد يحتاج إلى مداخل مالية جديدة وشفافة، ولعلّ التمديد الجديد لمهلة تقديم طلبات الاشتراك في دورة التراخيص الثانية في مياه البحرية اللبنانية التي انتهت في 30 حزيران حتى الثاني من تشرين الأول 2023، أكبر دليل على أن غياب الإصلاحات وتردّي الأوضاع السياسية والمالية وعدم تحسّن سمعة لبنان في مكافحة الفساد، ستمنع من تحقيق تقدّم فاعل في عمليات الاستكشاف، كما يضاف إلى هذه المشكلة التباطؤ في استكمال عملية ترسيم الحدود البحرية مع قبرص، والتأخر في إطلاق ترسيم الحدود البحرية مع سوريا.


لبنان يتمتع بمزايا كثيرة" يختم بارودي، منها "ديناميكية شعبه"... وشمسه وبحره وجباله بالإضافة الى حسن الضيافة، وقريباً جداً قد يتمتع باستكشافات غازية ونفطية واعدة تمكنه في حال استغلالها



بطريقة مستدامة وشفافة، من وضع لبنان على الطريق الصحيح في عملية النهوض الاقتصادي والمالي التي يحتاج إليها.

# الحدود البحرية لشرق البحر الأبيض المتوسط: حاجة لبنان إلى إكمال ترسيم الحدود البحرية من خلال إبرام إتفاقيات مع قبرص وسوريا - خبير طاقة متخصص





أثينا، اليونان - 25 حزيران 2023: صرّح خبير طاقة إقليمي في مؤتمر عالمي للطاقة في أثينا يوم الأربعاء أنه على لبنان استكمال اتفاقية ترسيم الحدود البحرية مع إسرائيل الموقعة العام الماضي من خلال السعي لاتفاقات مماثلة مع قبرص وسوريا.

Energy and Environment Holding، الرئيس التنفيذي لشركة وهي شركة استشارية مستقلة مقرها الدوحة، قطر: "يجب أن يتابع لبنان مفاوضات مفتوحة وموضوعية مع هذين الجارين، على لبنان محاورة الدولتين حتى يتم رسم الحدود البحرية بين لبنان وسوريا وقبرص بالكامل وتسويتها رسميًا."

وفي حديثه إلى الحاضرين من قادة قطاع النفط والغاز وكبار المسؤولين الحكوميين في قمة أثينا للطاقة، أشار بارودي إلى عدة أسباب لإعطاء الأولوية لمثل هذه الاتفاقيات، بما في ذلك حقيقة أن لبنان وسوريا لديهما «مجموعات نفط وغاز بحرية محددة تتداخل بهوامش كبيرة».

وإعتبر أنه «إذا لم يتم تصحيح ذلك، فقد تعني النتائج أن المستثمرين سيقفون بعيدين عن كلا الجانبين، أو سيطئون في أنشطتهم

الاستكشافية، أو حتى أن العلاقات قد تتدهور بين البلدين». «وان أي من هذه التطورات من شأنه أن يقوض مصالح جميع المعنيين».

وحدّد بارودي ملاحظاته بضرورة التزام الدول الساحلية بسيادة (UNCLOS) القانون، ولا سيما اتفاقية الأمم المتحدة لقانون البحار.

وأوضح أن «قواعد اتفاقية الأمم المتحدة لقانون البحار متاحة للجميع، وقد تم تحديد معانيها بشكل أكبر من خلال قرارات المحاكم والتحكيم والمعاهدات الثنائية، والتكنولوجيا المطلوبة لتحديد الحدود العادلة هي في متناول جميع الدول تقريبًا». «ما يعني عملياً أنه يمكن للحكومات أن تعرف مسبقاً ما يمكن أن تدلي به المحكمة أو المحكم حول مطالباتها بالحدود البحرية. طالما أن هناك حسن نية من كلا الجانبين، فإن هذا يبسط العملية بشكل جذري».

واردّف بارودي إنه بالإضافة إلى حماية مصالحهم الخاصة، فإن لبنان وجيرانه سيضربون أيضاً مثلاً مفيداً لدول البحر الأبيض المتوسط الأخرى في حل النزاعات الحدودية حياً.

وأشار على وجه التحديد إلى حالة تركيا واليونان وقبرص، حيث يهدد عدم وجود حدود بحرية تركية - قبرصية وتركية - يونانية مستقرة بعرقلة تنفيذ خط أنابيب مخطط لنقل غاز شرق البحر المتوسط إلى البر الرئيسي الأوروبي. حيث يُنظر إلى هذا المشروع على أنه أمر بالغ الأهمية لخطط أوروبا لاستبدال واردات الطاقة من روسيا، والتي تم تقليصها بشكل حاد منذ غزو الأخيرة لأوكرانيا عام 2022، خصوصاً وان الرئيس التنفيذي لشركة الطاقة الإيطالية العملاقة إيني حذر مؤخراً من أنه لن يمضي قدماً دون موافقة تركيا.

وقال بارودي «الأتراك واليونانيون والقبارصة يختلفون حول أشياء كثيرة، لكن لديهم أيضاً مصلحة مشتركة في كل من التنمية الاقتصادية، وبالتالي في الاستقرار المطلوب لتسريع هذه التنمية». وأضاف في هذا المجال فان «اتفاقية الأمم المتحدة لقانون البحار توفر آلية موثوقة، متجذرة في العلم وتطبيقها القائم على القواعد، يمكن أن توفر الإطار لبدء مناقشة اختلافاته هذه الدول بطريقة خاضعة للرقابة».


وقد تضمن عرض الدراسة من قبل بارودي أيضاً الكشف عن العديد من الخرائط الحصرية، بناءً على صور الأقمار الصناعية، والخدمات الجيوتقنية الأخرى. وتشير الخرائط إلى المكان الذي يحتمل أن تحدد فيه الحدود البحرية المقبلة، وفقاً للقواعد التي وضعتها اتفاقية


.الأمم المتحدة لقانون البحار

رودي بارودي، وهو من المختصين في صناعة الطاقة منذ أربعة عقود ولديه خبرة في كل من القطاعين العام والخاص، هو أيضًا مؤلف العديد من الكتب حول هذا الموضوع، بما في ذلك «النزاعات البحرية في البحر الأبيض المتوسط: الطريق إلى الامام». هذا العمل، الذي نشرته شبكة القيادة عبر الأطلسي في عام 2021، اصاب حينما توقع أنه يمكن حل الاتفاقية اللبنانية الإسرائيلية باستخدام المبادئ التوجيهية لاتفاقية الأمم المتحدة لقانون البحار كنموذج واستخدام حلول غير تقليدية لجوانب معينة من نزاعهما الحدودي.



# Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Boundaries: Lebanon needs to complete maritime borders by striking deals with Cyprus and Syria – veteran energy expert





ATHENS, Greece – June 25, 2023: Lebanon should follow up last year’s maritime boundary agreement with Israel by seeking similar deals with Cyprus and Syria, a regional energy expert told a high-profile energy conference in Athens on Wednesday.

“Lebanon should be pursuing open and unbiased dialogues with both of these neighbors, and the parties should continue the talks until their boundaries are fully mapped and officially settled,” said Roudi Baroudi, CEO of Energy and Environment Holding, an independent consultancy based in Doha, Qatar.

Speaking to an audience of industry leaders and senior government officials at the Athens Energy Summit, Baroudi cited several reasons to prioritize such agreements, including the fact that Lebanon and Syria have each “designated offshore oil and gas blocks that overlap by considerable margins.”

“If these are not rectified, the results could mean that investors will stay away from both sides, or they will slow-

walk their exploration activities, or even that relations could deteriorate," he told the audience. "Any one of these developments would undermine the interests of all concerned."

Baroudi rooted his remarks in the need for coastal states to abide by the rule of law, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

"The UNCLOS rules are available to all, their interpretation has been further defined by court verdicts, arbitration, and bilateral treaties, and the technology required to determine fair boundaries is within the financial grasp of virtually all states," he explained. "What this means in practice is that governments can know in advance what a court or an arbitrator would say about their maritime boundary claims. So long as there is good will on both sides, this radically simplifies the process." In addition to protecting their own interests, Baroudi argued, Lebanon and its neighbors would also be setting a useful example for other Mediterranean countries.

He pointed specifically to the case of Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus, where the absence of settled Turkish-Cypriot and Turkish-Greek maritime boundaries threatens to block a planned pipeline that would carry East Med gas to mainland. That project is seen as a crucial for Europe's plans to replace energy imports from Russia, which have been sharply curtailed since the latter's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, but the CEO of Italian energy giant Eni recently warned that it would not go forward without Turkish approval.

"The Turks, the Greeks, and the Cypriots disagree about many things, but they also have a shared interest in both economic development and, therefore, in the stability required to accelerate it," Baroudi said. "UNCLOS provides a reliable mechanism, rooted in science and a rules-based application thereof, which could provide the framework for them to start discussing their differences in a controlled manner."




Baroudi's presentation also included the unveiling of several exclusive maps he commissioned from one of the world's leading providers of high-precision mapping, based on satellite imagery, and other geotechnical services. The maps indicate where, following the rules laid down by UNCLOS, the future maritime boundaries are likely to be situated.

A four-decade veteran of the energy industry with experience in both the public and private sectors, Baroudi is also the author of several books on the subject, including, "Maritime Disputes in the Mediterranean: The Way Forward". That work, published in 2021 by the Transatlantic Leadership Network, rightly predicted that the Lebanon-Israel agreement could be resolved by both using the UNCLOS guidelines as a model and employing unconventional remedies to certain aspects of their boundary dispute.



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# International Law of the Sea Meets Israeli Constitutional Law: The New Israeli-Lebanese Maritime Border Agreement



On Dec. 13, 2022, the Israeli Supreme Court published a 51-page judgment in *Kohelet Forum v. Prime Minister*, providing reasons for its Oct. 23, 2022, decision to greenlight the Israel-Lebanon Maritime Delimitation Agreement. (The agreement was finalized and announced on Oct. 27, 2022.) In its judgment, the court considered and rejected three challenges to the agreement raised by the petitioners: that the agreement involved a transfer of sovereignty over Israeli territory and should have therefore been put to a national referendum; that,

due to its status as a caretaker government, the Government of Israel (GOI) was legally barred from concluding the agreement; and that the GOI was required, by virtue of a constitutional usage or custom, to bring the agreement to a vote before the Israeli Knesset. The judgment offers a number of interesting insights on the interplay between international law and Israeli constitutional law, including a first-of-its-kind analysis of the application of a Basic Law, requiring the holding of a referendum in connection with territorial concessions, to maritime delimitation questions.

## Background Developments

Israel and Lebanon share a land and maritime border, but the boundary line on land and at sea has remained for many years contentious and mostly undelimited. In 2000, Israel unilaterally demarcated a 7.5-kilometer-long security line perpendicular to the de facto land border on the coast through the placing of 10 buoys (that is, the buoys line), and deployed its navy to prevent vessels from crossing that line in proximity to the coast. In 2010, Lebanon deposited with the United Nations a set of maritime boundary coordinates, representing its claim to maritime zones in the boundary area (referred to below as Line 23 or the Southern Lebanese Line). The following year, in 2011, Israel deposited with the U.N. its own coordinates representing its counterclaim to Lebanon's coordinates (namely, Line 1, which effectively constituted a seaward extension of the buoys line). The maritime area locked inside the triangle formed by Line 1 (the Northern Israeli Line), Line 23 (the Southern Lebanese Line), and the beginning of the Cypriot maritime zone (which is parallel to the Israeli/Lebanese coastline, running approximately 130 nautical miles from that coast) comprises some 870 square kilometers.

Following over a decade of negotiations, facilitated by U.S. mediation and featuring many delays and interruptions, Israel and Lebanon reached the Oct. 23, 2022, agreement on maritime

boundary delimitation. This development took place against two competing plans from Israel and Lebanon. Israel has plans to commence the commercial exploitation of a natural gas field (called Karish), south of Line 23, which nonetheless falls inside an area of the Mediterranean Sea that Lebanon claimed at one stage of the negotiations (when it presented a revised line going considerably beyond the line it deposited with the U.N.). Lebanon has plans to commence exploration of another natural gas field (called Qana) that is north of Line 23 but is potentially traversed by Line 1. According to the agreement, Israel would accept Line 23 but would receive a fixed percentage from the proceeds from the Qana field (a separate agreement was concluded in November 2022 between Israel and the private energy companies involved in the exploitation of the Qana field). As part of the deal, the parties agreed to maintain, until the time in which a land boundary delimitation agreement would be concluded, the status quo in and around the first 5 kilometers of the buoys line, effectively accepting Israel's security control of the area south of that line. The parties furthermore agreed that the agreement established a permanent and equitable resolution of their maritime dispute.

The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) has created a map of the newly agreed-upon maritime order:

#### New Israeli-Lebanese Maritime Border



Since the agreement was finalized in the weeks running up to the Israeli general elections, which occurred on Nov. 1, 2022, its conclusion became part of the election conversation. Opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu (who has since returned to power) accused the GOI of unjustifiably surrendering Israeli maritime areas and economic assets to Lebanon, an

enemy state, and to Hezbollah—which Israel and other states consider a terror organization, and which exercises considerable influence on political affairs in Lebanon. By contrast, then-Prime Minister Yair Lapid proclaimed the agreement to be a historical achievement of his government that would increase stability and economic prosperity in the region.

## The Litigation

Following media reports concerning the impending conclusion of the agreement, a number of public interest groups brought petitions in the first half of the month of October 2022 to the Israeli Supreme Court against the GOI, the Knesset, and a number of government ministers, challenging the authority to conclude the agreement. The two initial petitioners—the Kohelet Forum and Lavi Organization (two right-wing civil society groups)—were joined by a group of private citizens and by Itamar Ben Gvir's Otzma Yehudit (also known as Jewish Power, an extreme right-wing party represented in the Knesset). Their request to obtain interim injunctions against the GOI were rejected by the Supreme Court, and following a televised hearing held on Oct. 20 before a panel of three justices, their petitions were rejected on Oct. 23 by a unanimous decision of the panel of three justices assigned to the case. On Oct. 27, the GOI and Lebanon finalized the agreement.

The court's judgment was published on Dec. 13, 2022 (the Oct. 23 decision was announced without an accompanying opinion from the court). It addressed the three main challenges presented by the petitioners: that the agreement involved a transfer of sovereignty over Israeli territory and should have therefore been put to a referendum; that, due to its status as a caretaker government, the GOI was legally barred from concluding the agreement; and that the GOI was required, by virtue of constitutional usage or custom, to bring the agreement to a vote before the Israeli Knesset. In an unusual

manner, the three justices divided between them the task of explaining the court's position on the three questions at issue and expressed agreement with the explanations provided by each other.

### The Inapplicability of the Referendum Basic Law

The first, and probably most interesting, challenge made by the petitioners related to the interplay between the agreement and Israeli constitutional law on the transfer of sovereign territory. As part of an effort by right-leaning members of the Knesset to render it more difficult for the GOI to agree on territorial concessions in future peace deals, the Knesset passed in 1999 a law that was amended in 2010 (the formal title of the law is "Administration and Law Procedures (revocation of application of law, jurisdiction and administration) Law"), providing that a GOI decision to revoke the application of Israeli "law, jurisdiction and administration" with respect to a territory to which it applies must be approved by a majority of at least 61 members of the Knesset and a referendum or, alternatively, by a vote of 80 (out of 120) members of the Knesset. The Knesset reiterated this in 2014 when it passed the Basic Law: Referendum, which repeated the language found in the 2010 law, while affording it with a constitutional status.

The petitioners claimed that the agreement involved the transfer of sea territory from Israel to Lebanon and that, as a result, it fell under the terms of the Basic Law: Referendum. To make this argument, the petitioners relied on the Territorial Waters Law (1956), which resulted in extension of Israeli law to the 12 nautical miles area adjacent to the coast, and on the Undersea Water Lands Law (1953), which proclaimed the coastal continental shelf as "State territory." The Attorney General's Office claimed, by contrast, that maritime areas outside the territorial sea are not part of the sovereign territory of the State of Israel (although Israel has certain sovereign rights in respect of them) and that the

northern boundary of the territorial sea has not been conclusively delimited before the agreement was concluded.

Justice Uzi Vogelmann rejected the petitioners' claims regarding the application of the Basic Law: Referendum to the agreement. He held that the Basic Law was enacted with the specific aim of limiting the power of the GOI to transfer territories in East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights—areas in relation to which Israel clearly and explicitly applied its laws through Knesset legislation and/or GOI decisions. He did not consider the maritime areas found outside Israel's territorial sea to meet a comparable “clear and explicit application” standard, given the ambiguity of existing legislation and the lack of sovereignty in economic waters (exclusive economic areas and continental shelves) under customary international law. (Note that Israel is not a party to the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, but it regards most of the convention's provisions as customary in nature.) Whereas Vogelmann was willing to consider the territorial waters as falling under the Basic Law, he accepted the GOI's position that Line 1 was submitted to the U.N. merely as a negotiating position and not as a conclusive act of demarcation of the outer limit of Israeli territory for Israel law purposes. In effect, he noted that, beyond the first 5 kilometers of the buoys line, Israel did not enforce its laws north of Line 23. Hence Vogelmann reasoned that the small territorial sea area affected by the agreement (the area between the relevant segments of the two lines, located 3-12 miles from the coast; a gap averaging 300 meters in breadth) is not de jure or de facto subject to Israeli law.

### The Powers of a Caretaker Government

Israeli Supreme Court President Esther Hayut addressed in her opinion the second challenge raised by the petitioners, pertaining to the powers of a caretaker government. After new elections were called on June 30, 2022, the outgoing government continued to serve as a caretaker government—which



under the Israeli public law jurisprudence means a government with limited powers. According to the Supreme Court's case law, it would be inappropriate for such a government to make appointments or adopt measures in order to bind the next government or to sway the elections. As a result, the court has held that a caretaker government must exercise its powers with moderation and restraint. Still, the government might justifiably—and, at times, even be required to—take measures that serve a vital public interest even before the elections, so as to avoid creating a decision-making vacuum.

In the case at hand, Hayut accepted the GOI's position that the conclusion of the agreement before the elections served a vital and time-sensitive public interest. She noted that the government was presented with classified reports composed by Israeli security agencies (which the court also reviewed *ex parte*, with the consent of the parties to litigation), which identified a unique "window of opportunity" for concluding the agreement in light of political developments in Lebanon (presumably the end of President Michel Aoun's term in late October 2022) and overriding security considerations (presumably Hezbollah threats to attack the Karish natural gas field, should extraction commence by Israel without an agreement). Against these facts, and in light of the broad discretion that the GOI enjoys in the field of foreign relations and national security (which extends *mutatis mutandis* to a caretaker government), Hayut held that there were no grounds for judicial intervention.

#### Approval of the Agreement by the Knesset

Justice Noam Sohlberg dealt in his opinion with the third objection raised by the petitioners pertaining to the role of the Knesset in approving international agreements. According to Israeli constitutional law, the GOI is competent to sign and ratify international agreements (this is pursuant to the British model, which associates such powers with the prerogatives of the Crown). Under the relevant Knesset and GOI

by-rules, there is an obligation to deposit with the Knesset international agreements two weeks prior to their ratification (unless exceptional reasons of urgency or secrecy preclude this). During that time, different Knesset committees and the Knesset plenary may discuss the pending agreement. Still, the GOI has tended to bring important political agreements, such as peace agreements, to a vote of approval before the Knesset. There is some academic literature claiming that this practice amounts to a binding "constitutional usage" or "custom."

Sohlberg noted that, in the case at hand, the GOI deliberated on whether or not to submit the agreement for Knesset approval and decided against it, citing that the classified reports on which it relied when supporting the agreement would not be available to all Knesset members (they can be presented only in a security-cleared Knesset subcommittee meeting behind closed doors). Under these circumstances, it opted for pursuing the standard two weeks deposit track (which involved, *inter alia*, a subcommittee discussion). Sohlberg held that, in following this path, the GOI was exercising its lawful discretion. As for the petitioners' claim that the government should follow past precedents and submit the agreement to the Knesset for approval, Sohlberg was of the view that practices of past governments do not bind the existing GOI (or, in other words, that there is no established legal doctrine of binding custom generated by past parliamentary practices). In any event, he opined that past practice on submitting important agreements to a vote did not generate clear criteria as to what constitutes an "important agreement" that would merit Knesset approval. It is noteworthy in this regard that the 2010 maritime delimitation agreement between Israel and Cyprus was not brought to a Knesset vote. Having found no basis in law for requiring the GOI to submit the agreement to a vote by the Knesset, Sohlberg rejected this part of the petitioner's case as well.

Judicial Conservatism in Support of Progressive Foreign

## Policy?

The proceedings in Kohelet Forum represent an interesting reversal of roles. Conservative groups that have often criticized the court for excessive judicial activism, including broad construction of constitutional instruments in ways that limit the power of the legislative and executive branches, have called on the court to do exactly that: to review a decision placed squarely within the government's power to conduct foreign policy and protect national security. It is also interesting to note that the three justices on the panel acted in unison to reject the petitions, notwithstanding the fact that they have greatly diverged in the past on questions of judicial activism. (Sohlberg is considered among the most conservative justices on the court and Vogelmann among the most activist of justices.) Their joint decision seems to underscore that, despite its tradition of expansive judicial review, the court is still apprehensive about interfering with high-stakes foreign policy and national security matters, and does not wish to assume responsibility for any political or security fallouts that might have ensued from the derailing of the agreement.

The judgment also offers a first-of-its kind engagement with the Basic Law: Referendum, which has not received much attention until now in Israel and beyond. Such limited attention can be explained by the lack of any serious peace talks vis-a-vis Syria or the Palestinians that might result in the transfer of territory currently subject to Israeli law. It could also be explained by the assumption that, if push comes to shove, the GOI will amend or abrogate the Basic Law (a simple majority of 61 out of 120 members of the Knesset may achieve that). The Israel-Lebanon agreement, however, presented a unique case in which it was plausible to argue that a transfer of territory governed by the Basic Law was being contemplated, without there being a realistic option of amending the Basic Law given the collapse of the governing

coalition (a factor that can also explain the reluctance to bring the agreement to a Knesset vote). The approach that the Supreme Court took for this agreement—a narrow interpretation of the scope of application of the Basic Law, limiting its application to territories clearly and explicitly subject to Israeli law—may reflect unease on the part of the court with the institution of a national referendum (Israel has never held a national referendum, on any issue), as well as concerns about the implications for the government's ability to effectively conduct foreign policy and protect national security if it were to operate under an overly tight constitutional straightjacket.

Finally, it is noteworthy that the court conducted its analysis of the legal status of the different maritime areas in relation to which Israel has legal rights in light of customary international law rules on sovereignty rights at sea (reading down the terms of the Undersea Water Lands Law accordingly). This implies that although there is no clear doctrine of interpretive compatibility between Israeli constitutional law and international law, the content of the latter significantly informs the former.

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**Lebanon-Israel deal counts as big win for both parties – and for US diplomacy**



The United States accomplished a diplomatic tour de force in October when Lebanon and Israel agreed to settle most of their maritime boundary.

Of course, credit for this achievement is also due to the principals, but U.S. mediation was essential to setting the stage for the mostly indirect negotiations, regaining momentum when it looked like the process might be permanently stalled, and keeping the parties on-course until they reached agreement. Simply put, in this instance, the U.S. really was the “indispensable nation” it has so often strived to be.

The very fact that an agreement was reached is itself a remarkable departure from decades of mutual enmity between Lebanon and Israel. After all, the deal is anything but the usual sort between two sides that have recently been at odds over one or more particular issues.

Instead, from the moment of Israel’s establishment in 1948, a state of war has existed between it and Lebanon. A cease-fire was agreed to the following year, but since then there have been countless confrontations between the two sides, including at least three full-scale wars (1978, 1982, 2006), multiple smaller conflicts, a 22-year occupation of South Lebanon

ending (for the most part) in 2000, and hundreds of skirmishes. Although the Lebanese have sustained far more than their share of losses in blood and treasure alike, the Israelis also have paid a painful price. Each side has plenty of reasons to distrust the other, and any Lebanese or Israeli advocating accommodation between the two risks running afoul of powerful domestic constituencies bent on continued mutual hatred.

It took more than a decade of intermittent contacts, virtually all of them consisting of messages exchanged through American intermediaries, but eventually logic prevailed, and the deal got done. And it's a good deal for both sides. The Israelis have been extracting offshore gas since 2004 and exporting some of it to Jordan since 2017, but the agreement enhances their ability to expand production and tap enormous markets in Europe. Lebanon's gas industry is far less advanced, so recognition of its maritime boundaries is even more important: Recognition of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) makes it a viable destination for the foreign investment required for offshore hydrocarbon activities, and the country's crippling economic and financial crises make the chance to become energy self-sufficient and even earn badly needed export revenues even more attractive.

If it was patience that kept hope alive despite repeated periods of soaring tensions threatened to derail the process, it was creative diplomacy that proved the wisdom of that patience by identifying practical compromises both sides could see as fair and equitable.

For one thing, the agreement bridged proverbial gaps between the two sides' positions by leaving actual gaps in the line separating their respective maritime zones. One of these is at the western end of the agreed boundary, where it stops just under a kilometer short of the line established bilaterally by Israel and Cyprus in 2010. This leaves for future negotiation the precise location of the "trijunction" point where the

Israeli and Lebanese zones will meet up with that of Cyprus. The other gap is at the eastern end, leaving a much longer (approximately 5 kilometers) stretch of open water between the agreed maritime boundary and the land terminus point (LTP) of the two countries' terrestrial border. Since Lebanon and Israel have yet to agree on a location for that LTP, and since the most promising resource areas – in particular the Qana Prospect thought to constitute a significant reservoir of natural gas – lay much farther offshore, it made sense to lock in the rest of the line now and leave this coastal section for later.

A similarly pragmatic approach was applied to the Qana Prospect itself, believed to straddle the agreed boundary between Lebanon's Block 9 and adjacent Israeli waters. Here the challenge stemmed from Lebanon's longstanding withholding of diplomatic recognition from Israel and, therefore, its refusal to engage directly with its neighbor. The solution was to have an independent third party – specifically the international company, France's Total Energies, licensed to act as the Block 9 operator – handle any necessary communications with, and prospective financial compensations of, the Israeli side.

For all of these (and other) reasons, the Lebanon-Israel agreement is nothing short of remarkable, not only because of what it says about the principals and their intermediary, but also because of the example it sets for the resolution of other maritime disputes around the world.

With a lot of effort, both Lebanon and Israel demonstrated politico-diplomatic maturity by recognizing that their interests were best served by embracing dialogue (however indirect) and accommodation, not the bombast and self-defeating dogmatism that only deepen divisions without solving problems.

Arriving at such an agreement required each side to exercise a

measure of strategic empathy toward the other, no small feat for parties so accustomed to viewing one another as enemies. It is fair to predict, too, that if and when the parties decide to settle other aspects of their dispute, or even when they just need to defuse some future crisis without bloodshed, this experience will be a useful touchstone.

For the U.S., its successful stewardship of the Israeli-Lebanese negotiations proves that it still matters in the Middle East and North Africa region, and comes at a time when some Arab capitals have been questioning American reliability and resolve. Washington's performance shows that it can get things done without having to take or threaten military action.

For parties to maritime disputes worldwide, the Lebanon-Israel agreement offers proof that even sworn enemies can find mutually acceptable outcomes on at least some of the issues that divide them.

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## محاضرة بارودي في جامعة سيده



ستفند اتفاق NDU اللويزة  
الترسيم وتحدد فوائده

# HOLISTIC ANALYSIS OF THE HISTORIC MARITIME BORDER AGREEMENT BETWEEN LEBANON & ISRAEL

BY ROUDI BAROUDI

Thursday, Nov. 17, 2022  
Abou Khater Auditorium



يوم الخميس الواقع في 17 تشرين الثاني الجاري سيعرض الخبير الدولي في مجال الطاقة رودي بارودي بحضور رئيس جامعة سيدة اللويزة NDU الأب بشارة خوري، وعدد من الأساتذة والطلاب من جميع

كليات الجامعة، وممثلين من الجامعات الأخرى، والعديد من المهتمين والاعلاميين. تحليلاً شاملاً لإنجاز ترسيم الحدود بين لبنان وإسرائيل، والذي تم عبر دبلوماسية ابداعية استخدمت للتوصل إلى هذا الاتفاق.

وسيركز بارودي على آثاره المحتملة على لبنان، مستنداً إلى رسم خرائط حصرية للمنطقة البحرية المعنية و نقاط البداية والنهاية الدقيقة للحدود المتفق عليها في البحر.

محاضرة بارودي في جامعة سيدة اللويزة NDU ستفند اتفاق الترسيم وتحدد فوائده

يوم الخميس الواقع في 17 تشرين الثاني الجاري سيعرض الخبير الدولي في مجال الطاقة رودي بارودي بحضور رئيس جامعة سيدة اللويزة NDU الأب بشارة خوري، وعدد من الأساتذة والطلاب من جميع كليات الجامعة، وممثلين من الجامعات الأخرى، والعديد من المهتمين والاعلاميين. تحليلاً شاملاً لإنجاز ترسيم الحدود بين لبنان وإسرائيل، والذي تم عبر دبلوماسية ابداعية استخدمت للتوصل إلى هذا الاتفاق.

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وسيتناول حديث بارودي التدايعات المفترضة ان يشهدها لبنان بعد التوقيع على الاتفاق من خلال الإجابة على الأسئلة التالية:

ماذا ستكون الآثار الحقيقية لهذا الاتفاق؟ هل حصل لبنان على صفقة عادلة؟ ماذا يعني الاتفاق بالنسبة لآفاق البلد كمنتج للهيدروكربون؟ ماذا سيقدم للمواطن اللبناني العادي؟ وغيرها من التدايعات المحتملة للاتفاق على مجموعة متنوعة من الجبهات، بما في ذلك أمن الطاقة والنمو الاقتصادي والأمن القومي، فضلاً عن التنمية البشرية والاجتماعية.

كما سيشرح العرض التنفيذي لبارودي كيف كانت الوساطة الأمريكية حاسمة في التوصل الى معاهدة فعلية فريدة من نوعها تتجاوز عقبات كبيرة خصوصاً عدم وجود علاقات دبلوماسية بين لبنان وإسرائيل، وكيف ان الاتفاقية تمنح العديد من المزايا الحيوية للبنان.

كما سيوضح بارودي، كيف قبل الفريقان حلاً عملياً لخلافهما المستمر حول النقطة البرية لحدودهما: نظراً لأن هذه البقعة تُستخدم عادةً

كنقطة انطلاق لخط الحدود البحرية، وسيتضمن حديث بارودي، لأول مرة في منتدى عام، الموقع الدقيق لنقطة البداية تلك والمهمة في عمليات الترسيم.