

Qatar's second gas boom about to get underway: PwC



The long-term outlook for Qatar's second gas boom does not fundamentally change whatever the eventual economic impact of Covid-19 be, on both the energy market and the country's non-hydrocarbons economy, a new report has shown.

According to PwC, the current crisis may even work to Qatar's advantage as potential competitors, particularly in the US, delay or cancel major LNG investments.

"The most important economic development in many years was the surprise announcement by Qatar Petroleum in November that new appraisals had extended estimates of both the geographic scope and volume of North Field," PwC said in the "Qatar Economy Watch".

The field, which was previously thought to be only offshore, has been found to extend at least 10 miles onshore and the reserves had been increased to 1,760tcf of gas and 70bn barrels of condensates (oil mixed in with the gas).

This is a “doubling” of gas reserves and more than a “tripling” in oil, compared with Qatar’s most recently published estimates. On the basis of the larger reserves, QP upsized its plans for the North Field Expansion project by 50%, to six new LNG trains, which will add 49mn tonnes/year (tpy) of capacity, about a 64% increase on the currently rated capacity of 77mn tpy.

“This is the fourth time the project has been upsized since the 12-year moratorium on new projects was lifted in 2017,” PwC noted.

However, some private firms have cancelled or delayed final investment decisions on new LNG projects as spot prices have dipped to record lows in recent months, threatening their margins and financing, the report noted.

The current crisis is likely to reduce the new supply that comes onstream in the mid-to-late 2020s but the underlying dynamics for demand growth – as gas replaces coal as a cleaner source of baseline electricity generation – remain unchanged.

The previous LNG expansion phase in 2007-2011 provided “significant opportunities” for firms across many sectors involved directly in the project implementation or indirectly providing services.

“Once in place, the boost to Qatar’s fiscal revenue provided wider spillover benefits to the non-oil economy through government spending,” PwC noted.

“Similar impacts are expected in the new expansion phase, which is of a similar magnitude. Even at current production levels, analysis from the IMF and ratings agencies give Qatar

the lowest breakeven oil price in the region and the Minister of Finance has said the breakeven price should fall further to under \$40 after 2022, even before the new LNG capacity comes online.

“The revenue from the LNG expansion therefore provides clear visibility for Qatar’s long-term finances that enables local firms to develop their post-Covid-19 business plans with minimal risks related to potential changes in tax or spending policy, unlike in other Gulf States where significant changes are required to balance budgets,” PwC said.

**الحدود البحرية الجنوبية الأشد
تعقيدا بارودي: يحق للبنان
أكثر ممّا يُعرض عليه في
المفاوضات**



من خلال خط يتوسّط الخطّين الأحاديين المعلنين من الطرفين، يتبيّن أنّ من حق لبنان بسط سيادته على رقعة أكبر من تلك التي حدّها خط هوف، أو التي عرضت خلال المفاوضات مع الجانب الأميركي، ويمكنه بالقانون الاستحصال على ما لا يقل عن 55% من المنطقة المتنازع عليها.

في الأوّل من كانون الثاني 2007، وقّع لبنان وقبرص معاهدة ثنائية لترسيم الحدود المواجهة للدولتين، لكنها لم تقرّ في مجلس النواب اللبناني اعتراضاً على اتفاق ترسيم الحدود البحرية بين قبرص وإسرائيل الموقعّ في كانون الأوّل 2010 ولا سيّما النقطة 23 جنوباً، وبالتالي لم تدخل حيّز التنفيذ. يبلغ طول خط الحدود البحرية بين لبنان وقبرص نحو 158.8 كلم ويتألف من 6 نقاط تحوّل أساسية، وودّدت من خلال اعتماد الخط ذاته الإحداثيات المتساوية في المساحة البحرية المواجهة لكل من لبنان وقبرص، واستخدمت مخطّات بحرية دقيقة وقاعدة بيانات متطورة للمعلومات الجغرافية.

في دراسة وضعها الرئيس التنفيذي لشركة الطاقة والبيئة القابضة والخبير في صناعة الطاقة رودي بارودي ونشرها معهد عصام فارس في الجامعة الأميركية، يغوص بارودي في تاريخ ملف ترسيم الحدود البحرية اللبنانية، فلبنان أعلن ترسيماً أحاديّاً لحدوده البحرية الشمالية مع سوريا خلال عملية تقسيم المياه الإقليمية إلى بلوكات،

وتمّ ايداع نسخة من الترسيم في مكتب شؤون المحيطات وقانون البحار في الأمم المتحدة على رغم عدم توقيع سوريا لاتفاق الأمم المتحدة لقانون البحار واتفاق جنيف 1958، ويعتقد بارودي الذي تحدث لـ"النهار" أنّّه تمّ استخدام قواعد الخط ذات الاحداثيات المتساوية خلال ترسيم الحدود، واعتماد (Strict Equidistance geodetic line) للبنان وعلى الأرجح (Basic Normal Baselines) خطوط الأساس العادية لسوريا (Basic Coastlines) خطوط السواحل.

تظهر الخرائط المرفقة تداخل البلوكات البحرية لكلا البلدين، إذ تخرق البلوكات اللبنانية المياه الإقليمية السورية بنحو 1.7 كلم، فيما تخرق البلوكات السورية المياه الإقليمية اللبنانية بنحو 15.3 كلم، وينتج من ذلك مساحة متداخلة تقدّر بنحو 832 كلم² بحاجة إلى إعادة ترسيم.

يفصل بين الدولتين النهر الكبير شمالاً، وفي حالات مماثلة تحدّد القوانين الدولية منتصف النهر (أو فم النهر المطلّ على البحر) كمركز للحدود الفاصلة بين البلدين. وبالتالي، أعادت الدراسة التي يفنّدها بارودي لـ"النهار" تحديد نقطة التقاء البرّ بالبحر أو النجمة الصفراء كمنطلق لترسيم (Land Terminus Point) المعروفة بـ الحدود البحرية، وليس السياج التقني الحدودي الفاصل بين لبنان وسوريا (النجمة الزرقاء)، الذي يبعد نحو 40 متراً شمالاً ويقع داخل الأراضي السورية وتحديداً عند المعبر الحدودي من الجهة الشمالية للنهر. بعد ذلك، تنطلق الدراسة من هذه النقطة لتحديد خط الحدود البحري بين لبنان وسوريا، الذي يبلغ طوله نحو 131.4 كلم ويتألف من 20 نقطة تحوّل أساسية وصولاً إلى نقطة الالتقاء الثلاثية trijunction point.

لبنان - إسرائيل

تعتبر الحدود البحرية بين لبنان والعدو الإسرائيلي الأشدّ تعقيداً، ليس فقط لأن إسرائيل لم توقّع اتفاق الأمم المتحدة لقانون البحار فحسب، بل أيضاً لأن الدولتين في حالة حرب، وهو ما يرتّب اللجوء إلى وساطة دولية لترسيم الحدود الجنوبية اللبنانية، وأخذ الخط الأزرق المرسم من قبل الأمم المتحدة على البر في الاعتبار. في العام 2007، اعتمد لبنان في مباحثاته مع قبرص على خط "مبهم البداية والنهاية" بحجّة موافقة الطرف الثالث (أي إسرائيل)، ولم تمّ تحديد النقطة المتساوية الأبعاد ما بين قبرص ولبنان وفلسطين بشكل دقيق، والتي عُرّفت بالنقطة (Trijunction point) المحتلّة 23. عام 2010، اقتنص العدو الفرصة خلال المفاوضات مع الجانب

القبرصي، فثبّتت النقطة 23 في مكانها، ما خلق منطقة متنازعا عليها مساحتها نحو 879 كلم².


منذ ذلك الحين، بدأت الوساطات الدولية لحلّ النزاع، وكُرّس الجانب الأميركي كوسيط مفاوض من خلال نائب وزير الخارجية الأميركي لشؤون الطاقة في حينه فريدريك هوف وخليفته أموس هوكشتاين، فزيارات مكوكية للسفير ديفيد هيل وصولاً الى مساعد وزير الخارجية لشؤون الشرق الأوسط ديفيد شنكر، وتمحورت جميعها حول عروض لتقاسم المنطقة بين الدولتين بأشكال مختلفة من دون التوصل إلى حلّ، إلى أن أعلن شنكر أخيراً أن "الكرة في الملعب اللبناني وأن على اللبنانيين أن يتنازلوا عن رفضهم لإطار الاتفاق ويتحرّكوا إلى الأمام".

تنطلق الدّراسة من إعادة تحديد نقطة التقاء البرّ بالبحر أو وترتكز على نقطة بداية الخطّ Land Terminus Point، المعروفة بـ وامتدادها BP.1 الأزرق على البرّ في أعالي تلة صخرية معروفة بـ في البحر. وتظهر الصورة المرفقة نقطة الالتقاء هذه باعتبارها المنطلق نحو ترسيم الحدود البحرية، في حين أن النقطة التي حدّتها اسرائيل (النقطة 31 البحرية) تقع على مسافة 38م شمال غرب هذه النقطة داخل الأراضي اللبنانية، بينما النقطة التي يحدّها المعتمد في هذه الدراسة. من هنا يؤكّد LTP لبنان تبعد 62 م عن الـ بارودي الدور المهم الذي يمكن أن تلعبه قبرص في تحديد نقطة من الجهة المقابلة لحسم خطّ trijunction point الالتقاء الثلاثية الحدود الفاصل. ولكن باستخدام قواعد الخط ذات الاحداثيات التي تعتمد عليها (Strict Equidistance geodetic line) المتساوية المحاكم الدّولية ونقطة ارتكاز أي وساطة، وكذلك أحدث الصور والخرائط والوسائل التقنية، تمّ تحديد حدود بحرية افتراضية بين وامتدادها نحو الحدود البحرية مع قبرص LTP البلدين تربط بين الـ بطول يبلغ نحو 128.1 كلم وفيه 6 نقاط تحوّل أساسية. بالنتيجة، تقسّم المنطقة المتنازع عليها بين 475 كلم² (54%) للبنان و400 كلم² (46%) لإسرائيل، من خلال خطّ يتوسّط الخطّين الأحاديين المعلنين من الطرفين. وبالتالي، يتبيّن أنّ من حق لبنان بسط سيادته على رقعة أكبر من تلك التي حدّها خط هوف، أو التي عرضت خلال المفاوضات مع الجانب الأميركي، ويمكنه بالقانون الاستحصال على ما لا يقل عن 55% من المنطقة المتنازع عليها.

من هنا، تبيّن هذه الدراسة الدور الذي يمكن أن تلعبه السلطات اللبنانية من خلال القنوات الدبلوماسية والحوار مع جميع الوسطاء

على أساس علمي وعادل، استبقاً لأي شروط قد تفرض خلال المحادثات مع صندوق النقد الدولي.

Différends Maritimes en Méditerranée Orientale: Comment en Sortir



Les différends de frontières maritimes en Méditerranée orientale empêchent l'exploitation raisonnée des récentes découvertes énergétiques dans la région : un nouveau livre montre comment résoudre pacifiquement les conflits frontaliers maritimes.

L'ouvrage se présente comme une feuille de route pour aider les pays côtiers à exploiter les ressources offshore

Un nouveau livre de l'expert en politique de l'énergie Roudi

Baroudi met en lumière des mécanismes souvent négligés qui pourraient aider à désamorcer les tensions et débloquer des milliards de dollars en pétrole et en gaz.

“Maritime Disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean: the Way Forward” («Différends Maritimes en Méditerranée Orientale: Comment en Sortir») -distribué par Brookings Institution Press- décrit le vaste cadre juridique et diplomatique dont disposent les pays qui cherchent à résoudre les conflits de frontières maritimes. Dans ce livre, M. Baroudi passe en revue l'émergence et l'influence (croissante) de la Convention des Nations unies sur le droit de la mer (CNUDM), dont les règles et les normes sont devenues la base de pratiquement toutes les négociations et de tous les accords maritimes. Il explique également comment les progrès récents de la science et de la technologie, notamment dans le domaine de la cartographie de précision, ont accru l'impact des lignes directrices de la CNUDM en éliminant les conjectures de tout processus de règlement des différends fondé sur celles-ci.

Comme le titre l'indique, l'ouvrage se concentre en grande partie sur la Méditerranée orientale, où les récentes découvertes de pétrole et de gaz ont souligné le fait que la plupart des frontières maritimes de la région restent discutées. L'incertitude qui en résulte ralentit non seulement l'utilisation des ressources en question (et le réinvestissement des recettes pour lutter contre la pauvreté et d'autres problèmes de société), mais augmente également le risque d'un ou plusieurs conflits meurtriers. M. Baroudi fait toutefois remarquer que, tout comme ces problèmes et leurs conséquences existent dans le monde entier, leur résolution juste et équitable dans une région pourrait contribuer à restaurer la croyance qu'ont les peuples et leurs dirigeants dans le multilatéralisme, et servir ainsi d'exemple.

Si les pays de la Méditerranée orientale acceptaient, en vertu des règles de la CNUDM, de régler leurs différends de manière juste et équitable, écrit-il, “cela donnerait une chance de

démontrer que l'architecture de sécurité collective de l'après-guerre reste non seulement une approche viable mais aussi une approche vitale... Cela montrerait au monde entier qu'aucun obstacle n'est trop grand, aucune inimitié si ancrée et aucun souvenir si amer qu'il ne puisse-t-êre surmonté en suivant les règles de base auxquelles tous les États membres des Nations unies ont souscrit en y adhérant: la responsabilité de régler les différends sans violence ou menace de violence".

Le livre rappelle, de manière générale et spécifique, qu'il existe des leviers permettant d'uniformiser les règles du jeu diplomatique, une contribution utile à un moment où l'ensemble du concept de multilatéralisme est attaqué par certains des pays qui ont autrefois défendu sa création. L'ouvrage est écrit dans un style engageant, empruntant à plusieurs disciplines -de l'histoire et de la géographie au droit et à la cartographie- le rendant accessible et d'intérêt pour tous, des universitaires et des décideurs politiques aux ingénieurs et au grand public.

En attendant sa parution papier, ainsi que sa traduction en français prévue dans les prochaines semaines, le livre est disponible au format e-book. Dans le contexte actuel qui a forcé les maisons d'édition à adapter leur stratégie de lancement, l'ouvrage a fait l'objet ce jeudi d'un lancement organisé par TLN via zoom, avec la participation autour de l'auteur, de deux représentants éminents du Département d'État américain – Jonathan Moore (premier sous-secrétaire adjoint principal, Bureau des océans et des affaires environnementales et scientifiques internationales) et Kurt Donnelly (sous-secrétaire adjoint pour la diplomatie énergétique, Bureau des ressources énergétiques).

Palestinian Authority 'ready to sign maritime exclusive economic zone deal with Turkey'



A pact with Palestine could strengthen Turkish oil and gas claims in the Mediterranean

The Palestinian Authority (PA) is ready to negotiate a maritime delimitation deal with Turkey and cooperate with Ankara on natural resources in the eastern Mediterranean, a PA envoy told Turkish media on Monday.

Faed Mustafa, Palestine's ambassador to Ankara, said in an interview that the PA could follow Turkey's maritime delimitation deal with Libya and sign its own pact.

“We are open for every idea to deepen our relations with Turkey, and this includes a deal on exclusive economic zones,” Mustafa told the Aydinlik newspaper.

“We also have rights in the Mediterranean. Palestine has shares in oil and gas located in the eastern Mediterranean. We are ready to cooperate in these areas and sign a deal.”

With the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian territories have a coastline along the eastern Mediterranean that makes it eligible for maritime rights. Since 2007, Gaza has been ruled by the Hamas movement, which has fractious relations with the Fatah-dominated, West Bank-based PA.

Mustafa said Israel had been restricting Palestinian efforts to conduct exploration and drilling activities in the Gaza Marine gas field, which was discovered in 1999 approximately 30km off the besieged coastal enclave’s shore.

With Israel and Egypt keeping Gaza under strict blockade, and conflicts and flare-ups common, the field, which is estimated to contain one trillion cubic feet of gas, has remained dormant for nearly 20 years since its discovery.

“We couldn’t benefit from the gas due to Israeli pressure,” Mustafa said.

Turkey and Libya’s UN-recognised Government of National Accord last November signed a memorandum of understanding to delimit maritime zones in the eastern Mediterranean in an attempt to block further Greek and Cypriot energy drilling activities in the area.

A deal with the PA could further embolden Turkish attempts to minimise Greek ambitions to restrict Turkish activity into a tight coastline.

Turkey and Greece are Nato allies but have long been at loggerheads over Cyprus, which has been ethnically split

between Greek and Turkish Cypriots since 1974, when the island was divided after a brief Greek-inspired coup triggered a Turkish invasion.

The Republic of Cyprus in the south of the island is a member state of the EU, while the north of the island is controlled by the Turkish Republic of Cyprus, which is only recognised by Turkey. Several peacemaking efforts have failed and the discovery of offshore resources in the eastern Mediterranean in the 2000s has complicated the negotiations.

According to the UN Law of the Sea, coastal states have a right to 320km of maritime territory from their shoreline where they can declare an “exclusive economic zone” (EEZ), and where they have the right to explore and exploit natural resources.

However, because of the concave shape of the eastern Mediterranean, there is an overlap between the areas that each country can claim, requiring negotiations and compromise – and opportunity, some say, for leverage in ongoing conflicts.

Neither Turkey nor Greece have made official EEZ claims, but that has not stopped them from fighting over the territory they envision to be their own.

PARIS : Webinaire, La Méditerranée Orientale à la Croisée des Chemins



Le Transatlantic Leadership Network annonce la publication de *Maritime Disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean : The Way Forward*, de Roudi Baroudi.

La Méditerranée orientale à la croisée des chemins : Les questions énergétiques au premier plan

Jeudi 11 juin 2020 9 H 30 – 11 H 00 EST

Avec la participation de : Dr. Roudi Baroudi, directeur général, Energy & Environment Holding ; Jonathan Moore, U.S. Department of State ; Senior Bureau Official/Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs ; Kurt Donnelly, U.S. Department of State. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Energy

Diplomacy, Bureau of Energy Resources. Sous-secrétaire adjoint pour la diplomatie énergétique, Bureau des ressources énergétiques.

Remarques préliminaires : John B. Craig, Ambassadeur, Senior Fellow, Transatlantic Leadership Network.

Modéré par : Debra Cagan, Distinguished Energy Fellow, Transatlantic Leadership Network

« Un commentaire d'expert et un travail de fond ».

John B. Craig, ambassadeur, ancien assistant spécial du président George W. Bush pour la lutte contre le terrorisme, et ancien ambassadeur des États-Unis à Oman

« Baroudi plaide avec force pour un compromis afin que les États de la région puissent dépasser leurs différends coûteux et récolter les bénéfices de la coopération. L'approche de M. Baroudi a beaucoup à nous apprendre et, espérons-le, contribuera à des progrès pacifiques, si seulement les parties adverses l'écoutent ».

Andrew Novo, professeur associé d'études stratégiques à l'Université de la défense nationale

« ...Les pays de la région, ainsi que les États-Unis et l'Union européenne, devraient adopter l'approche de Baroudi pour réduire les tensions et profiter des avantages de cette manne d'énergie ».

Douglas Hengel, maître de conférences dans le cadre du programme sur l'énergie, les ressources et l'environnement de l'université Johns Hopkins, SAIS et chercheur au German Marshall Fund


À propos de l'auteur

Roudi Baroudi a 40 ans d'expérience dans les domaines du pétrole et du gaz, de la pétrochimie, de l'électricité, de la

réforme du secteur de l'énergie, de la sécurité énergétique, de l'environnement, des mécanismes de commerce du carbone, de la privatisation et des infrastructures. Ses avis sur ces questions et d'autres questions connexes sont fréquemment sollicités par des entreprises locales et internationales, des gouvernements et des médias.

Ενα Νέο Βιβλίο Δείχνει τον Δρόμο για την Ειρηνική Επίλυση των Διαφορών Αναφορικά με τα Θαλάσσια Σύνορα

THE TRANSATLANTIC LEADERSHIP NETWORK IS PLEASED TO ANNOUNCE THE PUBLICATION OF MARITIME DISPUTES IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN: THE WAY FORWARD, BY ROUDI BAROUDI



TLN TRANSATLANTIC LEADERSHIP NETWORK Through BROOKINGS PRESS

Ενας Οδικός Χάρτης Μπορεί να Βοηθήσει τα Παράκτια Κράτη να Επωφεληθούν του Υποθαλάσσιου Πλούτου

ΟΥΑΣΙΓΚΤΟΝ: Ο ειδικός σε θέματα ενέργειας, Ρούντι Μπαρούντι, στο νέο του βιβλίο αναδεικνύει μηχανισμούς μείωσης της έντασης, οι οποίοι συχνά ξεχνιούνται αλλά μπορούν να βοηθήσουν

στην εκμετάλλευση πετρελαίου και φυσικού αερίου αξίας δισεκατομμυρίων δολλαρίων.

Το βιβλίο *Διαφωνίες επί των θαλασσιών Συνόρων στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο: Μια Πρόταση Επίλυσης* διανέμεται από το Ινστιτούτο Μπρούκινγκς και σκιαγραφεί το εκτενές νομικό και διπλωματικό πλαίσιο το οποίο διατίθεται για χώρες με διαφιλονεικούμενα θαλάσσια σύνορα. Ο συγγραφέας Ρούντι Μπαρούντι συζητά την αυξάνουσα επιρροή του Διεθνούς Δικαίου της Θάλασσης υπό την αιγίδα των Ηνωμένων Εθνών (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – UNCLOS), οι κανόνες του οποίου αποτελούν πια την βάση για την επίλυση όλων, σχεδόν, των διαπραγματεύσεων και συμφωνιών στην θάλασσα. Εξηγεί, επίσης, πως οι πρόσφατες εξελίξεις στον επιστημονικό και τεχνολογικό τομέα – και ειδικά στην χαρτογράφηση ακριβείας – έχουν αυξήσει περαιτέρω την επιρροή των κανόνων του Διεθνούς Δικαίου της Θάλασσας, αφαιρώντας κάθε ενδεχόμενη ασάφεια από οποιαδήποτε διαπραγμάτευση που βασίζεται στους κανόνες του Δικαίου.

Το βιβλίο εστιάζει στην ανατολική Μεσόγειο, όπου οι πρόσφατες ανακαλύψεις υδρογονανθράκων ανέδειξαν το γεγονός ότι τα περισσότερα θαλάσσια σύνορα της περιοχής παραμένουν ακαθόριστα. Η αβεβαιότητα την οποία δημιουργεί αυτή η κατάσταση όχι μόνο καθυστερεί την εκμετάλλευση των πόρων και την διοχέτευση του πλούτου προς όφελος των κοινωνιών, αλλά δημιουργεί και κινδύνους θερμών επεισοδίων και πολέμων. Τέτοιου είδους προβλήματα υπάρχουν σε όλη την Γή. Ο Μπαρούντι σημειώνει, ωστόσο, ότι η δίκαιη επίλυσή τους σε μία περιοχή μπορεί να ενδυναμώσει την εμπιστοσύνη στους πολύπλευρους μηχανισμούς σε κάθε περιοχή.

Σε περίπτωση, σημειώνει, που οι χώρες της ανατολικής Μεσογείου συμφωνούσαν σε μια δίκαιη επίλυση των διαφορών τους με βάση το Διεθνές Δίκαιο, «θα ήταν μια έμπρακτη απόδειξη ότι η μεταπολεμική αρχιτεκτονική συλλογικής ασφάλειας παραμένει όχι μόνο εφικτή αλλά και απαραίτητη... θα απεδείκνυε σε όλον τον κόσμο ότι κανένα εμπόδιο δεν είναι τόσο μεγάλο και καμμία ιστορική εχθρότητα τόσο βαθιά ριζωμένη ώστε να μην

υπερσκελίζεται από τον βασικό κανόνα στον οποίο συναίνεσαν όλα τα μέλη των Ηνωμένων Εθνών με την συμμετοχή τους σε αυτόν – την ευθύνη να επιλύουν τις διαφορές τους χωρίς την χρήση ή την απειλή βίας.»

Το βιβλίο μας υπενθυμίζει πως υπάρχουν μοχλοί οι οποίοι μπορούν να αμβλύνουν τις διπλωματικές ανισότητες, και αυτό είναι ιδιαίτερα χρήσιμο σε μια εποχή όπου η όλη ιδέα της πολυπλευρικής προσέγγισης βάλλεται από τις ίδιες χώρες οι οποίες την δημιούργησαν. Ο τρόπος γραφής του βιβλίου ζωντανεύει ένα θεματικό πλέγμα ιστορίας, γεωγραφίας, δικαίου και χαρτογραφίας, καθιστώντας τα θέματα αυτά προσιτά στο ευρύ κοινό στο οποίο απευθύνεται, καθώς και σε πολιτικούς και διπλωμάτες.

Ο Μπαρούντι εργάζεται εδώ και τέσσερις δεκαετίες στον ενεργειακό τομέα. Ανάμεσα στις πολυεθνικές εταιρείες, κυβερνήσεις και διεθνείς θεσμούς που έχει συμβουλέψει στο διάστημα αυτό συγκαταλέγονται τα Ηνωμένα Έθνη, η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή, το Διεθνές Νομισματικό Ταμείο και η Παγκόσμια Τράπεζα. Οι εξειδικευμένες γνώσεις του βρίσκονται στους τομείς του πετρελαίου και φυσικού αερίου, τα πετροχημικά, τον ηλεκτρισμό, την ενεργειακή ασφάλεια και την μεταρρύθμιση του ενεργειακού τομέα για να αντιμετωπίσει περιβαλλοντικά ζητήματα, την αγορά του άνθρακα, τις ιδιωτικοποιήσεις, και τις υποδομές. Είναι Διευθύνων Σύμβουλος της ανεξάρτητης συμβουλευτικής εταιρείας Qatar Energy and Environment Holding, με έδρα την Ντόχα του Κατάρ.

Το βιβλίο αυτό είναι απόσταγμα πολυετούς προσωπικής έρευνας, ανάλυσης και υπεράσπισης θέσεων του Μπαρούντι. Την επιμέλεια του κειμένου ανέλαβε η Debra L. Cagan, (Distinguished Energy Fellow, Transatlantic Leadership Network) και ο Sasha Toperich (Senior Executive Vice President, Transatlantic Leadership Network).

Το βιβλίο *Διαφωνίες επί των θαλασσίων Συνόρων στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο: Μια Πρόταση Επίλυσης* εκδίδεται από το Transatlantic

Leadership Network (TLN), μια ένωση δικηγόρων, παικτών του ιδιωτικού τομέα και αναλυτών οι οποίοι στοχεύουν στον διαρκή εκσυγχρονισμό των σχέσεων Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών και Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης. Η αρχική μορφή του βιβλίου ήταν ηλεκτρονική. Τώρα διανέμεται από τις Εκδόσεις του Ινστιτούτου Μπρούκινγκς, που ιδρύθηκαν το 1916 για την έκδοση ερευνών του Ινστιτούτου, το οποίο θεωρείται από πολλούς ως το πιο αξιόσεβαστο ινστιτούτο έρευνας των ΗΠΑ.

Πολλοί εξειδικευμένοι παρατηρητές πλέκουν το εγκώμιο του βιβλίου. Παραθέτουμε λίγα αποσπάσματα:

Douglas Hengel, Professional Lecturer in Energy, Resources and Environment Program, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Senior Fellow at German Marshall Fund of the United States, and former State Department official: “Μέσα από αυτό το στοχαστικό και γλαφυρό βιβλίο, ο Ρούντι Μπαρούντι μας δίνει ένα πλαίσιο... το οποίο μας δείχνει τον δρόμο προς μια δίκαιη και ειρηνική λύση... οι χώρες της περιοχής, καθώς και η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση και οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες, θα έπρεπε να ασπαστούν την προσέγγιση του Μπαρούντι.

Andrew Novo, Associate Professor of Strategic Studies, National Defense University: “... Ένα καλά ισορροπημένο, καινοτόμο και θετικό μήνυμα το οποίο μπορεί να βοηθήσει πολλά θέματα να προοδεύσουν που δεν φαίνονται να επιδέχονται επίλυση. Χρησιμοποιώντας το Διεθνές Δίκαιο, γεω-στοιχεία υψηλής ακρίβειας και μια ισχυρή οικονομική λογική, ο Μπαρούντι προσφέρει ένα πειστικό επιχείρημα υπέρ ενός συμβιβασμού, εφόσον, φυσικά, οι εμπλεκόμενες πλευρές θέλουν να ακούσουν.”

Betting against Qatar's Energy Sector Ignores a lot of history



By Roudi Baroudi

Some of the latest punditry has it that Qatar's economy is teetering on the brink of disaster because of the COVID-19 crisis, which has been steadily eroding demand for the country's most important export, natural gas. Obviously the situation is less than ideal, but much of the doom and gloom stems from a failure to appreciate just how well prepared the country is for all manner of obstacles.

Journalists and other observers have watched the market for crude oil collapse to the point where prices for some futures contracts recently went into negative territory – i.e. producers in some parts of North America actually had to pay customers to take oil off their hands. This, in turn, is causing a slew of US and Canadian oil companies, especially smaller ones, to stop extracting crude, and many are going bankrupt. Similar pressures will arise for gas producers, these folks argue, and since Qatar is the world's leading producer and exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG), it will face the biggest problems.

To be sure, the global crisis caused by COVID-19 has subjected the entire world to some freakish pressures, including unprecedented drop-offs in demand for certain goods and services, among them several energy products previously soaked up by (now idled) planes, trains, and automobiles (not to mention cruise ships, factories, hotels, etc.). Thus far the consequences for LNG have been less dramatic than those for crude oil, but nor can they be ignored, especially for developing countries whose economies and financial stability are heavily dependent on constant flows of gas revenues from exports.

For multiple reasons, however, Qatar has to be considered far more resilient than other major LNG producers. For one thing, it has much deeper pockets that give it considerable wherewithal to withstand even a prolonged period of lower gas revenues. For another, Qatar's energy interests go far beyond the extraction of its gas resources for export. It is now fully engaged at several points along the hydrocarbon value chain, and this in multiple countries, all of which provide diversification of revenues and therefore dilution of negative impacts. Perhaps most importantly, for almost three years now, the country has been fortifying itself against the effects of an illegal economic and transport blockade led by Saudi Arabia and followed by several other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states, plus Egypt and others. To say the least, Qatar has proved a tough nut to crack: in fact, the experience has made the whole country much more efficient, far more self-sufficient, and even more self-confident than ever before.

One of the drivers of this success has been government-owned Qatar Petroleum (QP), one of the strongest and most influential companies on the planet, and it has not got to this position by simply opening a spigot in the sand and then spending the proceeds. Instead, QP reached its current lofty status by, first, making its bet on LNG at precisely the right time in history, just as the environmental concerns associated

with oil made natural gas a more palatable choice and the world's energy mix started transitioning to a higher proportion of renewables and other alternative technologies. Second, Qatar then used its role as the world's most important LNG exporter to become a force for stability in a burgeoning global gas market, maintaining safe and reliable supplies that have allowed customers around the world to grow their economies.

Second, QP has not remained a one-trick pony. Instead, it and its subsidiaries have diversified with gusto – and not just in the usual sense of producing petrochemicals, aluminum, and fertilizers on their home turf. Rather, the company has reached far beyond Qatar, the GCC countries, and even the broader Middle East and North Africa region to make acquisitions around the globe. Acting alone or in concert with major partners like Britain's Shell, France's Total, Italy's ENI, and the USA's Chevron and ExxonMobil, the past couple of years have seen QP take up or renew stakes in exploration, production, and/or processing assets in at least a dozen countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Cyprus, Congo Brazzaville, Guyana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Oman, South Africa, and even the United Arab Emirates.

Perhaps the biggest play of the past few years has been in the United States, where QP's activities have included partnering with ExxonMobil (Qatar's single largest foreign investor) for a \$10 billion project to build a two-train LNG export facility adjacent to the existing Golden Pass import terminal in Texas. QP also added to its footprint in the USA by teaming with Chevron Phillips Chemical, a joint venture between Chevron and Phillips 66, to develop what could be the world's largest ethane cracker and derivatives units somewhere on the US Gulf Coast. QP will have a 49% stake in the \$8 billion complex, and Chevron Phillips Chemical has agreed to build virtual twin of it at Ras Laffan – hub of Qatar's gas

industry.

Alongside its solid American investments, the company also continues to consolidate its access to existing markets in Europe and Asia, and to increase its capacity to supply those markets. It has recently signed long-term processing and/or storage contracts at terminal facilities serving key LNG markets, including Montoir-de-Bretagne, France (3 million tons per annum [MTA] until 2035), and Zeebrugge, Belgium (100% of regasification capacity until 2044). In addition, QP subsidiaries hold stakes in major terminals like the United Kingdom's South Hook (67.5%) and Italy's offshore Adriatic facility (23%). In April, it signed a \$3 billion contract to book a Chinese shipbuilder for the construction of new LNG carriers, some 100 of which it expects to need in the coming few years.

All the while, QP has continued to rack up agreements with both new and existing customers, including LNG sales to Kuwait and Vietnam; naphta deals with Japan's Marubeni Corporation, Shell, Thailand Chemicals, and Vietnam; condensate feedstock sales to ExxonMobil in Singapore; and liquefied petroleum gas contracts with China's Oriental Energy and Wanhua Chemicals.

And all this is not to mention QP's massive undertaking to expand LNG output from 77 MTA to more than 110 MTA. When the COVID crisis hit, far from fretting the short- and medium-term obstacles, the company's response was to double down and take advantage of lower prices for construction materials by increasing capacity to a whopping 126 MTA by 2027.

It should be recalled, too, that QP has managed all of these feats while its home country has been fending off the aforementioned Saudi-led siege. Qatar's public and private sectors alike have demonstrated world-class resilience since the blockade was imposed in 2017, so there is no reason to believe they will shrink before this new challenge. On the contrary, Qatar is – and will remain – a trusted source of

stabilization in global markets.

Whatever the temporary inconveniences caused by the pandemic, both Qatar and QP remain bullish on the future – and with good reason. They did not get to where they are by accident, rather by well-timed investments and a commitment to ensuring stable markets for their customers. In fact, it could be fairly stated that Qatar and its flagship gas company created the modern global gas market, and they did so in such a way as to deliberately avoid much of the volatility associated with crude oil – for instance by eschewing the establishment of a cartel like OPEC. The current crisis could well require Qatar to make uncomfortable decisions, but its long-term trajectory – to keep expanding its role as a force for good in energy circles by providing win-win scenarios – is unlikely to be affected.

Roudi Baroudi is a four-decade veteran of the energy industry who currently serves as CEO of Energy and Environment Holding, an independent consultancy based in Doha.

LNG cargoes cancelled as virus compounds export glut in US



A buyer of liquefied natural gas has cancelled two cargoes from Cheniere Energy Inc, the biggest US exporter, as a glut pummels prices for the fuel and threatens to shut a key outlet for shale production.

Spanish utility owner Naturgy Energy Group SA has decided not to take delivery of two shipments from Cheniere, according to people with direct knowledge of the matter. The cargoes, one of which was scheduled for April delivery, were rejected by Naturgy's clients Repsol SA and Endesa SA, who had originally purchased the volumes from Naturgy and will now pay a contractual fixed fee, the people said.

Cancellations of US cargoes were closely watched and highly anticipated amid a grim outlook on global prices. It could be an early sign that global oversupply is poised to hammer the US gas market, which is already straining under the weight of a domestic glut. Prices in Europe and Asia collapsed as storage levels rose during a mild winter, making it tougher for LNG buyers to make a profit reselling US cargoes abroad.

The coronavirus outbreak in China is stifling LNG demand from the world's fastest-growing importer. While the Asian nation hasn't directly imported any US cargoes in more than a year amid trade tensions, the virus has contributed to the global price rout.

The virus has wreaked havoc on commodity markets from LNG to copper while disrupting global industrial production, travel and supply chains. As Chinese demand for the fuel declined, PetroChina Co is said to have delayed discharge of multiple cargoes. The world's biggest LNG trader, Royal Dutch Shell Plc, said they're working with customers to reschedule or reroute deliveries. While lower prices are opening up demand in places such as India and Turkey, they're also testing Europe's ability to absorb extra supply in a weak market.

"We are seeing supply reduction before demand maximization in Northwest Europe," said Verena Viskovic, an analyst at BloombergNEF. Even with European benchmark Title Transfer Facility prices crashing more than a fifth since the start of the year, those TTF levels still "are not low enough to fully maximize lignite-to-gas switching," she said.

At current forward prices of US and European gas, the profit margins of delivering US LNG to Europe and to Asia are thin, according to a BloombergNEF noted last week. Exporters of US LNG may be forced to keep gas at home during the next seven months despite the potential demand in the German power sector.

At least two Japanese buyers are also considering cancelling cargoes from the US that they had expected to load before summer, according to traders with knowledge of the matter, adding that no final decisions have been made.

LNG exports have been a relief valve for US gas producers as output from shale basins soars to record highs. In the Permian Basin of West Texas and New Mexico, where gas is extracted as a byproduct of oil drilling, prices have slid below zero amid pipeline bottlenecks; that means producers are paying others to take their supply.

More gas-fired power plants would have to be built in the US and abroad to ease the current supply glut, said Campbell Faulkner, chief data analyst for commodities broker OTC Global Holdings.

Mideast can deliver 8,500bcm gas at \$2.5 per MMBtu average breakeven prices by 2030: Report



The Middle East can deliver approximately 8,500bn cubic metres (bcm) of gas with average breakeven prices of \$2.5 per MMBtu [Million British Thermal Units] by 2030, a new report has shown.

While recent record low gas prices are due in part to oversupply in the global market, low-cost gas reserves are abundant, and the structural cost competitiveness of gas is improving, a joint report by Boston Consulting Group, Snam and International Gas Union reveals.

The natural gas market in the Middle East is experiencing a substantial growth phase, with its cost of supply remaining competitive in the long-term despite shale revolution. The recent report reveals that the Middle East and Asia-Pacific have demonstrated the strongest growth in gas demand the past

ten years – growing at an average of 4.6% per year, double the rate of global primary energy demand.

The potential future for natural gas in the Middle East is strong, but realising it at full will require consistent support and coordinated action by industry, national governments, and the international community.

Although Middle East gas prices are largely subsidised and pricing structures largely regulated, the downward trajectory of gas prices is making gas more competitive with other fuels on a levelised basis. Costs rising above \$2.5 per MMBtu indicate a requirement for subsidies to keep prices low for end users.

The report forecasts that the Middle East could maintain its best-in-class position to 2030 despite an expected rise in production costs. However, infrastructure investment will need to grow faster across gas value chains to meet growth expectations.


Implementing growth levers for gas will require concerted actions from various stakeholders. These include the development of new business models and technologies from gas industry participants, effective policies from governments, and sustained capital commitments from financial institutions.

“The Middle East’s gas market has experienced dramatic growth in the past decade. Our research shows that access to gas and growth faces limitations in terms of local market regulations and infrastructure as well as the scale of investment in cross-border pipelines,” said Pablo Avogadri, partner and associate director at BCG.

“The region could realise enormous benefits through connecting gas reserves with end-use markets at a low cost, infrastructure investment, and policy support and adoption.”

Asian LNG prices rise as

buying interest jumps



Asian spot prices for liquefied natural gas (LNG) rose this week after five weeks of declines, as lower prices sparked cargo purchasing interest from various buyers.

The average LNG price for April delivery into northeast Asia was yesterday estimated at around \$3.00 per million British thermal units (mmBtu), some \$0.30 per mmBtu higher than the front-month price last week, which was assessed for March.

"Many players are trying to buy due to low price levels, there are lots of tenders and bids," an LNG trader said.

Fears that the coronavirus outbreak in China would weigh on demand are receding, two industry sources said, which has also supported the prices.

Indian buyers who have been active in the market over the past several weeks on an LNG price drop to record low levels, continued issuing spot and multi-cargo tenders.

India is estimated to import about 2.36mn tonnes of LNG in February, record monthly volumes for the South Asian nation.

Among companies which sought cargoes for delivery to India were Reliance Industries with a five-cargo tender for April to June supply, Emirates National Oil Company (ENOC) with April

to November delivery eight-cargo tender and Gail India with a swap tender for three cargoes in February to March.

There were single cargo tenders from India's Gujarat State Petroleum Corp (GSPC) who sought a March cargo and Indian Oil who was looking to buy an April cargo.

Prices in some of the tenders were ranging from around \$2.50/mmBtu to just below \$3.00/mmBtu, several market sources said.

Additionally, Qatargas' Al Hamla LNG tanker is currently on route to India's newly commissioned Mundra LNG Terminal to deliver the first commercial cargo at the facility, Kpler said.

Buying interest also came from Jordan's Nepco who was looking for an April cargo, as well as Turkey's Botas who sought three March cargoes.

Botas awarded all three cargoes, three sources said, and prices could be as low as around \$2.50/mmBtu, one of them added.

There was also a tender from Taiwan's CPC in the past fortnight, two sources said, with one adding that the tender was for three cargoes to be delivered from April to June.

The number of bids on S&P Global Platts Market on Close window also grew this week, with some bids reaching \$3.00/mmBtu for late March and early April yesterday.

The global LNG market remains heavily oversupplied, however, with spreads between gas prices globally shrinking and market players expecting production cuts.

Spain's Naturgy has cancelled loading of one LNG cargo in the United States in April amid a slump of global gas prices, with several other companies having considered cancellations as well, sources told Reuters.

In terms of supply offers, Gail India was selling three US cargoes as part of a swap tender to sell and buy cargoes.

Angola LNG closed a tender for mid-March delivery and opened another for late March, a market source said.

Royal Dutch Shell said on Tuesday it had temporarily suspended production at its Prelude floating LNG facility off northwest

Australia following an electrical trip on February 2.