By Andy Home
LONDON, July 30 (Reuters) – The alumina market has collapsed over the last three months with both Chinese and Western prices now at their lowest levels in two years.
The action in China has been particularly brutal. Spot prices surged to a six-month high of 3,170 yuan per tonne in May as production in the province of Shanxi was disrupted by environmental closures.
So violent has been the subsequent sell-off to below 2,500 yuan that producers are now voluntarily cutting output to try to support prices.
Since alumina is the key metallic input to the aluminium smelting process, bombed-out alumina prices are bad news for an aluminium market that is itself treading heavy water right now.
The London Metal Exchange (LME) three-month aluminium price is currently trading just above the $1,800 per tonne level after touching an 18 month low of $1,745 in June.
Lower alumina prices serve to lower the aluminium production cost-curve, the break-even point for smelters that helps define the market’s downside.
Global smelter profitability is once again beholden to the gyrations of the alumina price with still little evidence that such volatility is being hedged in either the CME Group’s or LME’s new futures contracts.
THE RETURN OF ALUNORTE
The CME alumina price, tellingly, never reacted to the May spike in the Chinese price but rather kept grinding lower to today’s $305 per tonne, a level last visited in June 2017.
The core driver has been the return of the giant 6.3-million tonne per year capacity Alunorte plant in Brazil.
Alunorte had been operating at half capacity since February 2018 under a court order related to allegations of run-offs from a tailings dam holding the “red mud” generated in the refining process.
Operator Hydro was given clearance to resume full output in May this year and Alunorte was already running at 80-85% capacity in June, the company said in its Q2 results. That should rise to 85-95% in the fourth quarter.
Alunorte’s return closes a supply gap in the Western market which had to be filled by Chinese exports, an unusual occurrence in the alumina market.
Chinese exports mushroomed to 1.5 million tonnes last year from just 56,000 tonnes in 2017.
The tide has since turned. Exports have dropped off sharply and the country has returned to being a net importer since January.
The extra supply is no longer needed thanks to the return of Alunorte, the continuing ramp-up of new capacity by Emirates Global Aluminium and stagnant aluminium production.
Metal output outside of China was down by 0.6% in the first half of 2019, according to the International Aluminium Institute.
CHINESE BOOM AND BUST
Chinese alumina prices have boomed and bust in the space of just three months.
Environmental closures in May, triggered by a “red mud” leak at Xinfa Group’s Jiaokou alumina refinery in Shanxi, spooked the local supply chain.
Any impact from those closures, however, has been fleeting. National output dipped appreciably in May but has since bounced back to 6.41 million tonnes in June, the highest monthly run-rate since May 2017.
Cumulative alumina output rose by 3% in the first half of the year and with China’s own aluminium production also flat-lining this year, analysts at Morgan Stanley calculate a 200,000-300,000 tonne surplus in the country. (“Stopping alumina’s slide”, July 29, 2019).
Previous fears of a supply shortfall have been rapidly dialled back and spot prices are now at a level where higher-cost producers in northern regions are suffering “serious losses”, according to Antaike, the research arm of the China Nonferrous Metals Industry Association.
Producers have announced a collective temporary curtailment of 1.5 million tonnes, Antaike says.
As ever with such coordinated announcements by Chinese producers, there’s an element of window-dressing previously scheduled maintenance work, but the real significance is what it says about the margin pain occasioned by falling prices.
Higher-cost producers have in the past been able collectively to support prices around $300 per tonne but with alumina’s own input costs falling, it remains to be seen how disciplined supply will be this time around.
There is growing speculation among analysts that China’s alumina sector is heading for the same sort of structural reform treatment already imposed on the smelter segment of the production chain.
That might be a source of long-term support to the alumina price but for now it’s down to whether Chinese producers can curtail output sufficiently to balance the domestic market.
RIDING THE ROLLER COASTER
Alumina has been on a high-tempo, high-volatilty price trajectory over the last couple of years.
It was above $600 per tonne as recently as September 2018 before crashing to its current producer pain levels.
The price of alumina was once linked to that of aluminium. Producers embraced spot trading several years ago, arguing that alumina supply-demand fundamentals were different from those of the metallic product.
They have turned out to be right, although not perhaps in the way they imagined. Alumina has turned out to be a much more volatile package of drivers than aluminium.
What’s curious is that all this volatility hasn’t inspired much interest in using the paper market to hedge price risk.
The LME’s newly-launched alumina contract didn’t trade at all through June. CME’s contract, which started trading in 2016, has seen only sporadic volumes since inception. Activity this year has almost totally dried up with just 240 contracts traded in January-June.
The Shanghai Futures Exchange (ShFE) is undeterred and has promised its own contract later this year.
It’s possible that last year’s high prices actively deterred producer hedging interest but with the outlook increasingly bearish, that might change.
Morgan Stanley sees “near term price support around $300 per tonne, with risk to the downside”.
However, given the excitement of the last two years, you wouldn’t bet against a few more spins of what Antaike calls the alumina “roller coaster”.
($1 = 6.8876 yuan)
LONDON – If indications of disappointing economic growth in the eurozone are confirmed, the European Central Bank will loosen monetary policy further in September. Last week, outgoing ECB President Mario Draghi signaled a further likely cut in the ECB’s rate on commercial banks’ overnight deposits with the central bank, which is already -0.4%. In addition, the ECB is discussing a new program of asset purchases.
Economic stimulus is clearly needed. Annual inflation is well below the ECB’s target of “close to, but below 2%,” and financial markets expect it to remain so for years. What’s more, the eurozone has grown more slowly than the US economy since the 2008 global financial crisis. Growth has flagged since peaking in the third quarter of 2017, and slowed again in the second quarter of this year.
It is also clear that national governments in the eurozone are reluctant to provide a coordinated fiscal stimulus, despite the urgings of the ECB and many economists. Willingly or not, the ECB remains the only game in town.
The question is whether monetary policy alone can help to improve real growth and the inflation outlook in the eurozone. Monetary policy can be a powerful tool. The key to President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s successful effort to revive the US economy in the 1930s was not deficit spending, but rather the large monetary stimulus resulting from America leaving the gold standard before continental European countries did. Today, the ECB needs to engineer something similar with different tools.
In principle, taking the ECB deposit rate further into negative territory should remove the restriction on future expected short-term interest rates turning negative, and therefore flatten the forward yield curve. A rate cut should also put downward pressure on the euro’s exchange rate, potentially making eurozone exporters more competitive.
But such a move would be controversial, in particular because it would dent the profitability of banks that cannot pass on negative ECB deposit rates to their customers. Such policies have heterogeneous effects across banks, and mitigating action, although feasible, requires complex engineering.
According to an analysis by the ECB’s staff, “strong” eurozone banks are able to pass on negative rates to their corporate clients; “weak” banks cannot.
The ECB is therefore considering ways to mitigate this – in particular by granting very favorable conditions on the special loans that it will offer under the TLTRO III program, which are likely to be taken by the “weak” banks. In addition, a tiering system is being considered in which reserves below a certain threshold would not be subject to negative rates. But this is likely to benefit the strongest banks of stronger core eurozone countries such as Germany, France, and the Netherlands, which together hold about one-third of total deposits at the ECB.
Beyond these technical considerations, policymakers must grapple with two root causes of excess demand for central-bank reserves among strong eurozone banks. One is very high demand for safe assets in general – and banks in core eurozone countries have little incentive to hold their own governments’ debt when the interest rate is below the ECB deposit rate. Another cause is the segmentation of the eurozone’s interbank market, which, if the ECB implemented tiering, would prevent strong banks from benefiting from arbitrage opportunities by lending to weak banks at a rate above -0.4%. Both causes are the result of the eurozone’s dysfunctional banking system, in which demand for safe assets involves both a “home bias” and a strong demand for core countries’ sovereign debt.
In these circumstances, the ECB will not find it easy to implement a policy that would remove the constraint of the zero lower bound on interest rates, while ensuring that the policy’s distributional effects on banks and EU member states are neutral. Doing so will involve many instruments and complex design, far from the simple one-tool-for-one-target framework that was best practice before the financial crisis.
Moreover, negative rates become less effective over time and, if protracted, may have undesirable effects – for example, by inducing savers to de-risk, thereby potentially generating asset-price bubbles and increasing financial disintermediation. The positive stimulus from the depreciation of the euro’s exchange rate could offset these effects, but only if other central banks – and in particular the US Federal Reserve – do not ease at the same time. And on July 31, the Fed announced a widely expected quarter-percentage-point cut in its benchmark interest rate, while further future cuts cannot be excluded.
But the main problem is that neither negative rates nor quantitative easing can by themselves address the pervasive risk aversion holding back the eurozone economy. The ECB is trying to discourage demand for safe assets by making them more expensive to hold, but it cannot address the causes of the increase in such demand. This is a global trend driven by several factors, including demographic changes, widespread uncertainty linked to technological transformation, and political risks such as trade wars and nationalism. But in the eurozone they are exacerbated by the lack of reform of the single currency.
More than ten years after the financial crisis, the eurozone’s financial markets are still fragmented, and the supply of safe assets is limited by the conservative fiscal policy of northern European countries, particularly Germany. Eurozone policymakers must, therefore, find the political will to design a comprehensive package of financial and fiscal measures aimed at injecting new energy into the European project. Such a combined approach is essential to address the deep-rooted risk aversion sapping growth across the eurozone.
In the 1930s, America’s key stimulus was monetary rather than fiscal, but a vital ingredient of success was a comprehensive set of reforms coupled with a strong message capable of unifying the country. Today, Europe needs a twenty-first-century version of that policy.