Column: Even before price plunge, hedge funds were abandoning oil

LONDON (Reuters) – Even before the OPEC+ output agreement broke down on Friday, sending oil prices into a tailspin, hedge funds had launched a second wave of oil-related selling and established one of the most bearish positions since the price crisis of 2014-2016.
Hedge funds and other money managers sold the equivalent of 133 million barrels in the six most important petroleum futures and options contracts in the week ending on Tuesday.
Funds were sellers of Brent (60 million barrels), NYMEX and ICE WTI (31 million), U.S. gasoline (25 million), U.S. diesel (4 million) and European gasoil (12 million).
Over the last eight weeks, portfolio managers have sold a total of 579 million barrels, more than reversing purchases of 533 million in the final quarter of 2019.
The hedge fund community’s overall long position had been slashed to just 392 million barrels by March 3, down by 60% from 970 million at the start of the year, and the lowest since the start of 2019.
Fund managers have a in-built bullish long bias: they have never held a net short bearish position at any point in the last seven years, according to an analysis of data from regulators and exchanges.
But the data can be adjusted to remove “structural” elements from long and short positions (the minimum number of long and short positions which never change) to show the underling “dynamic” position more clearly.
On March 3, portfolio managers had a dynamic position that was net short by 99 million barrels, the most bearish since the start of 2019 (tmsnrt.rs/38xhDyp).
Overall, funds now hold just two bullish long positions for every bearish short, down from a ratio of almost 7:1 at the start of the year, and among the most bearish ratios at any point in the last seven years.
Portfolio managers have become especially negative about the outlook for distillate fuel oils such as diesel and gasoil, the refined products most closely connected with the business cycle.
Unusually mild winter weather throughout the northern hemisphere has cut heating oil consumption; now the coronavirus epidemic threatens an extended slowdown in global manufacturing and trade.
As a result, funds’ long-short ratio in middle distillates has fallen to just 0.7:1, compared with 2.4:1 in crude and 5.3:1 in gasoline.
Funds are more bearish on distillates than at any time since the global economy was still struggling to emerge from the commodity slump and mid-cycle manufacturing slowdown of 2015/16.
These bearish positions in crude and fuels had all been established before Saudi Arabia and Russia failed to agree on extending and/or deepening their output cuts at the OPEC+ meeting on Friday.
The combination of unrestrained production and weakening consumption has sent Brent prices down by a further $16 per barrel (31%) since Tuesday as investor sentiment has soured on the economy and oil even further.
Since Friday, Brent prices have experienced their sharpest one-day fall since U.S. forces moved to end Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait in January 1991, as traders respond to the unexpected collapse of the OPEC+ supply accord.
With Russia and Saudi Arabia now likely to lift output cuts and produce at their maximum capacity, prices will adjust down to the level set by the marginal producer, which in the last five years has been U.S. shale.
Related columns:
– Hedge funds paused oil sales, before coronavirus prompted second wave of selling (Reuters, March 2)
– Oil traders price in coronavirus-driven recession (Reuters, Feb. 28)
LONDON – With her recent announcement of the European Central Bank’s long-overdue strategy review, new ECB President Christine Lagarde has generated high expectations. The review’s outcome will be the first important signal of how Lagarde intends to lead the institution – and of how the ECB is likely to address persistently low inflation in the eurozone.
The world is very different than it was in 2003, when the ECB’s strategy was last revised, and the institution has itself undergone deep changes since the 2008 financial crisis. Faced with a global recession and then the 2011-2012 eurozone debt crisis, the ECB abandoned the traditional approach of passively meeting banks’ demand for liquidity – its initial response to the financial crisis. Instead, the ECB started actively managing its balance sheet in order both to ease monetary policy and stabilize the financial system.
Furthermore, the ECB has radically expanded its operational tools. In 2014, it introduced negative interest rates on banks’ deposits with national central banks, and began providing the market with “forward guidance” concerning its future policies. And, since 2015, the ECB has engaged in asset purchases (known as quantitative easing, or QE), causing its balance sheet to double compared to 2008. Finally, the ECB has assumed larger prudential supervisory responsibilities vis-à-vis European banks under the Single Supervisory Mechanism.
The first phase of the ECB review will be narrow, focusing on defining the bank’s inflation target, the role of monetary aggregates as signals of medium- to long-term inflation, and communication. This is expected to be concluded in the first half of 2020, to be followed by a second phase of reflection.
Any meaningful review of these issues must objectively and critically analyze the decade since the financial crisis, during which average eurozone inflation has been well below the ECB’s objective of “below, but close to, 2%,” and also lower than in the United States and the United Kingdom. In particular, the review should quantify the costs of tolerating a systematically below-target level of inflation, relative to pursuing other policy options.
There are at least three hypotheses to explain the ECB’s inability to achieve its inflation objective. The “policy mistakes” hypothesis maintains that the ECB should have implemented more aggressive policies – in particular, QE – between 2012 and 2014. If these “mistakes” stemmed from an ill-defined ECB strategy, then its strategy will have to be adjusted; if they were the result of political constraints, then its decision-making process should be changed.
The second explanation highlights the inadequate coordination of fiscal, financial, and monetary policy in the eurozone. In 2009, for example, monetary easing was accompanied by a delayed cleanup of the banking sector and fiscal austerity, leading to a second recession that the ECB was late to identify. And in 2012-2014, a neutral fiscal stance was coupled with both insufficient monetary stimulus and banking-sector deleveraging.
Both hypotheses suggest that the ECB would have fared better had it clearly committed to a symmetric quantitative target for inflation or nominal GDP. That would have implied, for example, not increasing interest rates in 2011 (as the ECB did) in response to the temporary inflationary effect of higher oil prices. It also would have implied starting asset purchases in 2012 instead of 2015, and not stopping them in 2018.
The third hypothesis, favored by some central bankers, is that persistently low eurozone inflation reflects structural factors such as adverse demographics, low growth expectations, and the associated increase in demand for safe assets. This explanation thus draws parallels between the eurozone and Japan, where aggressive monetary and fiscal policies since 2013 have failed to lift the economy out of its two-decade-long slough of low inflation.
Advocates of the structural view argue that it would be better for the ECB’s policymakers to adopt a lower inflation target rather than try to engineer a monetary stimulus that ends up inflating asset prices and jeopardizing financial stability. After all, their argument implies, there is little evidence that stable low inflation is bad for welfare.
But this third hypothesis can lead to two alternative policy recommendations. The first is a “do-nothing” approach, coupled with a downward adjustment of the ECB’s inflation target in line with actual inflation. Such a course of action is justified if policymakers assume that potential output growth in the eurozone has declined independently of past fiscal and monetary stabilization policies. The second option, as under the first two hypotheses, is to maintain an accommodative monetary policy, possibly in coordination with fiscal policy. This would be the right thing to do if policymakers believed that persistent slack in the real economy would end up affecting potential output.
Most analyses imply that ECB policy has in general been too cautious during the last decade. Moreover, even if one accepts the structural explanation for trend inflation and takes the view that inflation expectations have fallen independently of past policies, the “do-nothing” option is likely to cause expectations to spiral further downward, possibly leading to a deflationary trap. One then has to consider the costs linked both to the associated relative price adjustments and to the effect that the resulting upward pressure on the real interest rate would have on the burden of private and public debt. These costs are likely to be greater than those associated with the financial-stability risk of doing “too much,” which in any case can be addressed using prudential tools.
The ECB’s new strategy will have to be based on the kind of quantitative analysis needed to answer these questions. But it also must recognize that economists are still a long way from understanding the dynamics of low inflation. Given this uncertainty, the ECB should aim to adopt robust policies that cause the least damage under a broad range of scenarios.