

CYPRUS: THE EURO-MED REGION'S ULTIMATE 'COUNTRY OF COMMON INTEREST' IS ABOUT TO HAVE ITS MOMENT



By Roudi Baroudi

Lebanon, Beirut – 07/01/2026

January 1 marked a watershed moment for Cyprus, the first day of a six-month stint in the rotating presidency of the European Union that will give the tiny island nation massive influence, not just over the current agenda, but also the future direction of the entire EU and the destiny of the Eastern Mediterranean region.

The real significance of the moment lay not in the position itself, though, nor even in the considerable (but temporary) increase of Nicosia's raw political power. In fact, this is not even the first time that Cyprus has held the presidency; that came in the second half of 2012.

Instead, what makes this time different is that a) the Cypriot leadership has laid out a highly ambitious agenda, one designed to generate recurring benefits for both the EU and its Mediterranean neighbors; b) regional circumstances cry out for precisely the kind of engagement that Nicosia envisions; and c) Cyprus today is far better-equipped to advance its politico-diplomatic goals than it was in 2012, not just because its economy and finances are in better shape, but also because it is now on the verge of becoming an oil and gas producer and exporter. If well-managed, this latter point figures to drive growth for decades to come, enabling historic investments in education, healthcare, transport, and other drivers of greater economic competitiveness and better living standards, not to mention greater ability to influence – and stabilize – the surrounding region.

None of this has happened overnight. Geography and history have situated Cyprus – both literally and figuratively – athwart what is both our planet's most long-lived maritime trade route and its most famous crossroads of different languages, cultures, faiths, and ethnicities. The island's copper and other resources have always had their own attractiveness, rising or falling in value depending on the period, but it was location – specifically its proximity to each of Asia, Africa, and Europe – that made Cyprus a strategic prize for millennia, and that same location gives it enormous potential today.

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strategic prize for millennia, and that same location gives it enormous potential today.

For decades, the centerpiece of this toolkit has been a foreign policy which seeks friendly relations with as many countries – especially neighboring ones – as possible. And it has worked. Both during and since the Cold War, for example, Nicosia has been able to maintain working relationships with governments on both sides of the East/West divide, and its search for neutrality has been equally assiduous on the Arab-Israeli front. By habitually staking out the middle ground, Cyprus has not only insulated itself against most external problems, but also steadily burnished its bona fides as a helpful player on the international stage.

All of this helped, but it was not enough. Try as Cyprus might to parlay its neutrality into tangible benefits at home and abroad, its economy remained fragile and unbalanced, distracting and undermining the freedom of action of successive governments. After its banks had to be rescued with EU bailout funds in 2012-2013, support began to grow for reforms that would prevent future meltdowns, restore the stability of the financial services industry, and rebuild its ability to finance private and public activities alike.

By the time President Nikos Christodoulides took office in early 2023, Cypriots of all persuasions were fed up with “business as usual”. Because he had run as an independent and attracted support from a broad cross-section of society, he had a strong mandate to make sweeping changes, and these have included an increase in the minimum wage, income tax cuts for working people, more effective financial regulation, and a far-reaching program for digital transformation. His administration also has run a tight fiscal ship, dramatically reducing public debt (from 115% of GDP in 2020 to a forecast 65% for 2025) and thereby making more credit available to the private sector. As a result, Cyprus’ sovereign rating was upgraded by all three of the major credit rating agencies in

2024, and as of this writing, two of them regard its outlook as positive, while the third views it as stable.

At the same time, Christodoulides' background as a professional diplomat has empowered him to focus closely and effectively on foreign policy, recognizing its capacity to help shield the island against exogenous shocks, shore up the stability required to pursue its domestic social and economic development goals, and restore regional stability in the aftermath of the war in Gaza. It is no surprise, therefore, that his government has been at the center of international efforts to assist Palestinian refugees affected by the conflict, making Cyprus the staging ground for a vital flow of relief supplies.

Earlier this year, Christodoulides also teamed up with his Lebanese counterpart, President Joseph Aoun, to make sure their respective negotiating teams finally concluded a long-awaited maritime boundary agreement. The MBA clearly defines who owns what on the seabed, making both countries' offshore hydrocarbon sectors more attractive, especially to the major oil and gas companies whose capabilities will be required to explore, develop, and extract the resources in question. Nicosia and Beirut are considering several other agreements as well, including ones that would expand cooperation in electricity and other fields, but the MBA was crucial because of the doubts it removed and the doors it opened.

All of these factors are steering the entire Eastern Mediterranean region to what can only be described as its "Cyprus moment": the day when this miniscule country finally rises to its full stature as an exemplar of effective governance at home and a voice for peace and prosperity abroad. By some measures, this moment has already arrived, but the first exports of Cypriot natural gas to the European mainland will leave no doubt, and those are currently planned for late 2027.

Some say that timeline will be difficult to meet, but the positive effects are already being felt, and historians looking back will rightly regard the precise start state as a footnote. The economy has responded well to treatment, growth is expected to average 3% for the next couple of years, and diversification is already under way, including a variety of technology-related businesses that are helping to reduce the island's traditional reliance on tourism and construction.

Most importantly, the buzz generated by offshore hydrocarbons has attracted the attention of international investors, and they like what they see: in addition to its prime location and increasingly sophisticated workforce, Cyprus also offers some of the EU's most favorable tax conditions, strong investment protections, and a common law legal system modeled on the United Kingdom's, making it more familiar and easier to use for many outsiders. The result? Over the past few years, hundreds of companies have relocated to Cyprus, including some 270 in 2024 alone, adding at least 10,000 new jobs to the island's economy.

When gas production starts adding extra motive force to the economy, even more opportunities will open up. The advent of domestic energy production will not only spur employment both directly and indirectly, but also reduce the country's need for expensive energy imports, and put downward pressure on domestic energy prices across the board, imparting a key competitive advantage on the entire economy. If all goes according to plan, this would be just the beginning, because while the savings and security enabled by production will be significant, the really lucrative next step will be exports, and Western Europe – the world's hungriest energy market – is right next door.

As luck would have it, one of the island's first commercially operational undersea gas fields figures to be Cronos, which lies within easy distance of existing Egyptian infrastructure, meaning its production can be easily piped to the Egyptian

processing facility at Damietta and then delivered to European customers by LNG carrier. Nicosia's plan is for this flow to begin in 2027, but again, that is just the beginning: Cyprus also expects the nearby Aphrodite field to be a major money spinner, and the plan there is to install a Floating Production Storage and Offloading Unit directly above the deposit. This would enable both dry gas shipments for use in Egypt and further production of LNG for export further afield.

In the longer term, other streams are under consideration as well, including undersea pipelines to Greece, Italy, and/or (one day) even Turkey, and possibly a fully fledged liquefaction plant onshore that would be far and away the largest infrastructure project in Cypriot history. The investments being made and planned now are expected to fundamentally alter the path of Cyprus' economic and social development. What is more, if and when the time comes, the same infrastructure could also be used to help neighbors like Lebanon and Syria, both of whose coasts are less than 100 nautical miles away, to get their own gas to market. That could be crucial in enabling both of those countries to start recovering and rebuilding after decades of stagnation, and like Cyprus itself, the EU at large has a vested interest in seeing peace and prosperity spread across the Levant.

These and other factors give Cyprus' strategy a level of importance that goes beyond the purely national. Gas exports to Europe also will help increase the EU's energy independence, for example, further reducing continuing dependence on Russian energy supplies, and strengthening Europe's position in any negotiations over the situation in Ukraine. An LNG plant also would make affordable primary energy supplies available to several African countries, enabling them to pursue the electrification strategies they need to modernize their own economies. Again, Europe has countless reasons to want a stabler, happier Africa on its doorstep, beginning with the fact that this would

automatically reduce the flow of undocumented migrants making their way across the Med.

The Cypriot approach is nothing less than inspiring, especially since it springs from the very same wells of good will, good governance, and good sense that inspired the Barcelona Declaration more than 30 years ago. The EU envisioned by Barcelona, a strong and cohesive bloc closely integrated with vibrant neighborhoods in the MENA region, has been long-delayed by the collapse of what was then a promising Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and some countries have largely given up on that dream.

Clearly, Cyprus is not one of those countries. Instead, it has wagered on cooperation, weaving good governance and sensible diplomacy into a bold and hopeful venture.

No longer is Cyprus just a sunny little island filled with charming holiday homes and ringed with the Mediterranean's cleanest beaches; now it is also going to be a regional energy hub, a magnet for international investment, a docking mechanism to help its non-EU neighbors access European markets, and a catalyst for EU dialogue and engagement with Africa and Asia. In short, the country has refashioned itself into the ultimate "project of common interest" – a venture that serves so many useful purposes, both inside and outside the bloc, that it verily demands support from Brussels.

The before and after contrast is increasingly striking. Once a fragile neophyte dependent on handouts from Brussels, today's Cyprus has transformed itself into the very model of a Euro-Mediterranean country envisioned by the Barcelona process: a hopeful, peaceful, and universally useful land whose success promises only more opportunities for its friends and neighbors.

Cyprus: The Euro-Med region's ultimate 'country of common interest' is about to have its moment

LEBTALKS INTERVIEW: INTERNATIONAL ENERGY EXPERT ROUDI BAROUDI APPLAUDS 'HISTORIC' LEBANON-CYPRUS DEAL, DISMISSES 'BASELESS' CRITICISMS FROM NEIGHBORS



Following criticism of the Lebanon-Cyprus Maritime Boundary Agreement (MBA) by the governments of Israel and Turkiye, LebTalks spoke with energy and policy expert Roudi Baroudi,

who has authored several books and studies on sea borders in the Eastern Mediterranean. Baroudi praised the pact as “full of positives” for the interests of both parties and stressed the words of Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, who pledged after signing the MBA that “this agreement targets no one and excludes no one.”

LebTalks: How significant is the signing of the maritime boundary agreement between Lebanon and Cyprus?

RB: The official signing of the Lebanon-Cyprus deal is a major achievement, one that confers important advantages on both parties. This process was delayed for a very long time for no good reason, so President Joseph Aoun and the government deserve congratulations for having seized the initiative, and for having seen the job through to completion. So do Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides and his team, because they did the same thing. What made this historic agreement possible – after an impasse lasting almost two decades – was that Lebanon finally had a president who both understood the need for an MBA and made achieving it a top priority.

LebTalks: What does Lebanon gain by signing this deal?

RB: The agreement, which was reached by the negotiating teams in September, provides several benefits for both countries in the short, medium, and long terms.

The new equidistance line between the two states, defined according to the rules and guidelines of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), provides a fair and largely uniform boundary between the two brotherly countries' maritime zones. Most of the new turning points used to draw the line have moved in Lebanon's favor compared to the earlier negotiation in 2011, giving it an extra 10,200 meters on its western front while Cyprus received 2,760 meters.

Crucially, the MBA wipes away all overlapping claims caused by previous uncertainty over the precise location of the border.

Accordingly, this eliminates 108 km² of (map attached) Lebanese offshore blocks that were actually in Cypriot waters, as well as 14 km² of Cypriot blocks which were also on the wrong side of the line.

Apart from removing a key risk for would-be investors, the agreement also contributes to stability and security by providing clarity and thereby enabling easier cooperation, not just bilateral, but also, potentially, involving other states as well. It really is full of positives for both Lebanon and Cyprus, and therefore for the region as a whole.

LebTalks: What should Lebanon do to follow up on this agreement?

RB: To make the most of this clearer playing field, the logical next step is for Lebanon and Cyprus to immediately start drafting a joint development agreement, which would allow them to have a smooth partnership in place for any hydrocarbon reserves which are found to straddle their maritime boundary.

Perhaps the most important feature of the Lebanon-Cyprus MBA is that it provides a clear and stable starting point, putting Lebanon in ideal position to finish defining its maritime zones. The new line means that Lebanon's existing maritime boundary arrangements with Israel, signed in 2022, should be tweaked a little, but it also makes it easier to do that – and to negotiate a similar agreement in the north with Syria when that country's new leadership is ready to do so.



LebTalks: What about the objections voiced by Israel and Turkiye?

RB: With all due respect, these claims and complaints are completely baseless. As President Aoun has stressed from the very day it was signed, this accord targets no one, excludes no one, challenges no one else's borders, and undermines no one else's interests. I know there has been some negative commentary from both Israel and Turkiye, but there really is nothing here for anyone to be upset about. The line agreed to by Lebanon and Cyprus, which Turkiye has claimed is 'unfair' to residents of the self-styled 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus', is literally several kilometers away from any waters claimed by the TRNC. Beirut and Nicosia were very careful to make sure of this.


As for the Israelis, the only material change relating to the Lebanon-Cyprus line is that it pushes the Israel-Cyprus line in Cyprus' favor. But that's not Lebanon's fault. Or Cyprus' or anyone else's. It's just a fact of new mapping technologies, which today are far more precise and more accurate than those used when the Israel-Cyprus line was drawn

in their 2011 treaty.

On that subject, I would also note for all stakeholders in the East Med that while Lebanon and Cyprus are the region's only full-fledged members of UNCLOS, all states are subject to its rules and precedents, which have become part of Customary International Law. Since the Lebanon-Cyprus deal adheres strictly to those rules and the science behind them, the criticisms haven't got a legal leg to stand on. This is especially true with regard to Israel, whose own treaty with Cyprus was negotiated on the basis of the very same laws, rules, and science.

I have to assume that a lot of this is posturing, that both Israel and Turkiye will settle down once they've had more time to analyze the deal and see that, far from damaging them in any way, it could help all concerned by contributing to regional stability and economic growth. And again, I would go back to Aoun's words on signing day, when he declared that "this agreement should be a foundation for wider regional cooperation, replacing the language of violence, war, and ambitions of domination with stability and prosperity."

اتفاية ترسيم الحدود البحرية مع قبرص



https://euromenaenergy.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/WhatsApp-Video-2025-11-05-at-21.02.16_2f318946.mp4

What Africans want from COP30



The upcoming UN Climate Change Conference (COP30) will be the first to take place in the Amazon, sending a powerful symbolic message about the central role developing economies must play in the global response to the climate crisis. But at a time of geopolitical fragmentation and low trust in multilateralism, symbolism is not enough. Developing economies must plan and propel the green transition. Africa is no exception.

So far, Africa's climate narrative has been one of victimhood: the continent contributes less than 4% of global greenhouse-gas emissions, but it is highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. This disparity fuelled the calls for "climate justice" that helped to produce ambitious climate-financing pledges from the industrialised economies at past COPs. But with those pledges going unfulfilled, and Africa's climate-finance needs rising fast, moral appeals are clearly not enough.

A shift to a more strategy-oriented discourse is already underway. The Second Africa Climate Summit (ACS2), which took place in Addis Ababa last month, positioned the continent as a

united actor capable of shaping global climate negotiations. It also produced several initiatives, such as the Africa Climate Innovation Compact and the African Climate Facility, that promise to strengthen Africa's position in efforts to ensure a sustainable future.

Instead of continuing to wait for aid, Africa is now seeking to attract investment in its green transition, not because rich countries "owe" Africans – though they do – but rather because Africa can help the world tackle climate change. But success will require progress on four fronts, all of which will be addressed at COP30.

The first is the cost of capital. Because systemic bias is embedded in credit-rating methodologies and global prudential rules, African countries face the world's highest borrowing costs. This deters private capital, without which climate finance cannot flow at scale. While multilateral development banks (MDBs) can help to bridge the gap, they typically favour loans – which increase African countries' already-formidable debt burdens – rather than grants.

At COP29, developed economies agreed to raise "at least" \$300bn per year for developing-country climate action by 2035, as part of a wider goal for all actors to mobilise at least \$1.3tn per year. If these targets are to be reached, however, systemic reform is essential. This includes changes to MDB governance, so that African countries have a greater voice, and increased grant-based financing. Reform also must include recognition of African financial institutions with preferred creditor status, and the cultivation of a new Africa-led financial architecture that lowers the cost of capital.

The second area where progress is essential is carbon markets. Despite its huge potential for nature-based climate solutions, Africa captures only 16% of the global carbon-credit market. Moreover, the projects are largely underregulated and poorly priced, with limited community involvement. Africa is now at

risk of falling into a familiar trap: supplying cheap offsets for external actors' emissions, while reaping few benefits for its people.

While some African countries are developing their own carbon-market regulations, a fragmented system will have limited impact. What Africa needs is an integrated carbon market, regulated by Africans, to ensure the quality of projects, set fair prices, and channel revenues toward local development priorities, including conservation, renewable energy, and resilient agriculture. This system should be linked with Article 6 of the Paris climate agreement, which aims to facilitate the voluntary trading of carbon credits among countries.

The third imperative for Africa at COP30 is to redefine adaptation. Rather than treating it primarily as a humanitarian project, governments must integrate adaptation into their industrial policies. After all, investment in climate-resilient agriculture, infrastructure, and water systems generates jobs, fosters innovation, and spurs market integration.

By linking adaptation to industrialisation, Africa can continue what it started at ACS2, shifting the narrative from vulnerability to value creation. Africa should push for this approach to be reflected in the indicators for the Global Goal on Adaptation, which are set to be finalised at COP30. The continent's leaders should also call for adaptation finance to be integrated into broader trade and technology frameworks.

The final priority area for Africa at COP30 is critical minerals. Africa possesses roughly 85% of the world's manganese, 80% of its platinum and chromium, 47% of its cobalt, 21% of its graphite, and 6% of its copper. In 2022, the Democratic Republic of the Congo alone accounted for over 70% of global cobalt production.

But Africa knows all too well that natural-resource wealth does not necessarily translate into economic growth and development. Only by building value chains on the continent can Africa avoid the “resource curse” and ensure that its critical-mineral wealth generates local jobs and industries. This imperative must be reflected in discussions within the Just Transition Work Programme at COP30.

These four priorities are linked by a deeper philosophical imperative. The extractive logic of the past – in which industrialisation depended on exploitation and destruction – must give way to a more holistic, just, and balanced approach, which recognises that humans belong to nature, not the other way around. Africa can help to lead this shift, beginning at COP30.

The barriers to progress are formidable. China likes to tout South-South solidarity, but it does not necessarily put its money where its mouth is. The European Union is struggling to reconcile competing priorities and cope with political volatility. The US will not attend COP30 at all, potentially emboldening others to resist ambitious action. If consensus proves elusive, parties might pursue “mini-lateral” deals, which sideline Africa.

When it comes to the green transition, Africa’s interests are everyone’s interests. If the continent is locked into poverty and fossil-fuel dependency, global temperatures will continue to rise rapidly. But if Africa is empowered to achieve green industrialisation, the rest of the world will gain a critical ally in the fight for a sustainable future. – Project Syndicate

- *Carlos Lopes, COP30 Special Envoy for Africa, is Chair of the African Climate Foundation Board and a professor at the Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance at the University of Cape Town.*

بارودي يهنئ باتفاق الترسيم ويدعو لتعاون لبناني - قبرصي في الحقول البحرية



قال الخبير في شؤون الطاقة رودي بارودي في مقابلة حصرية مع إن اتفاقية الحدود البحرية بين لبنان وقبرص خطوة "LebTalks: رائعة وضرورية وتعطينا الأمل، لأنها لا تقتصر على تحديد أساس للتعاون بين الفريقين، بل تسهم أيضاً في تقليص المخاطر عليهما، وتُظهر للمنطقة والعالم مدى فاعلية الحوار والديبلوماسية

ولفت بارودي إلى أن "هذه الخطوة تُتوّج مساراً تأخر بلا داع لما يقارب العقدين أذ كان مجمّداً منذ العام 2007، ما يجعل الإنجاز أكثر قيمة، معتبراً أن رئيس الحكومة نواف سلام وفريقه قاموا بدورهم من خلال دعم الاتفاق، لكن الفضل في تحريك الملف من الجانب اللبناني يعود بالدرجة الأولى إلى الرئيس عون، ولذلك يُعتبر هذا إنجازاً شخصياً له، وينطبق الأمر ذاته على الرئيس القبرصي نيكوس خريستودوليدس، فهذه محطة تاريخية للبلدين معا

وعن أهمية هذه المعاهدة، أوضح بارودي أن "تسوية الحدود البحرية أمر بالغ الأهمية في الوقت الراهن، لأنها تفتح الباب أمام فرص جديدة، فالاتفاق يجعل لبنان أكثر جاذبية للشركاء الدوليين الكبار الذين يحتاج إليهم لتطوير قطاع النفط والغاز البحري الناشئ. وإذا تمكّن هذا القطاع من أن يحقق جزء بسيط من إمكانياته، فإن الفوائد ستصل إلى كل الاقتصاد اللبناني تقريباً، ما يجعل من هذا الاتفاق "سبباً للاحتفال الوطني. والأمر نفسه ينطبق على قبرص".

و هذاً بارودي الحكومة اللبنانية على قرار منح حقوق الاستكشاف في البلوك البحري رقم 8 إلى ائتلاف دولي قوي وذو سمعة ممتازة يضم شركات توتال اينرجي الفرنسية وإيني الإيطالية وقطر للطاقة القطرية، لافتاً إلى أن هذين القرارين يمهدان الطريق أمام مستقبل يصبح فيه لبنان دولة منتجة ومصدرة للغاز، ما يوفر زخماً غير "مضبوق لاقتصاد في أمس الحاجة إلى كل دعم".

لكن بارودي حذّر من أن الطريق لا يزال طويلاً أمام التنفيذ الفعلي، قائلاً: "الخطوة الأهم الآن هي المتابعة فعلى الحكومة أن تُنفّذ سلسلة من الإصلاحات المطلوبة منها، وأن تستثمر في بناء القدرات، وتُبقي على الكفاءات والخبرات لإدارة الموارد البحرية وصونها كما أن لبنان يحتاج إلى اتفاق لترسيم الحدود البحرية والبرية مع سوريا، وتحديد نقطة ثلاثية على ذلك الجانب بين لبنان وقبرص وسوريا، وهناك مؤشرات إيجابية مع الحكومة السورية الجديدة".

وتابع بارودي قائلاً إن على بيروت أيضاً أن تضع خطة واضحة لتطوير قطاع النفط والغاز البحري؛ و"أغتئم هذه المناسبة لأقترح أن تبادر الحكومة اللبنانية فوراً إلى دعوة نظيرتها القبرصية للتفاوض حول اتفاق تطوير مشترك، ينظّم تقاسم أي موارد نفطية أو غازية مشتركة تقع على جانبي الحدود البحرية، فإبرام اتفاق بهذا الخصوص سيجعل قطاعي الطاقة البحريين في كلا البلدين أكثر جاذبية للمستثمرين". وختم بارودي بحماسة قائلاً: "هذه هي الأبواب التي فُتحت أمامنا بفضل اتفاق ترسيم الحدود البحري. لذا، مرة أخرى، نتقدّم بالشكر والتهنئة إلى الرئيس عون والرئيس خريستودوليدس على حكمتهما في "السعي وراء هذا الاتفاق، وشجاعتهما في المثابرة حتى النهاية".

Baroudi congratulates Lebanese government on boundary deal with Cyprus



The decision of the Council of Ministers to approve Lebanon's maritime boundary agreement (MBA) with Cyprus is a genuine tour de force, a feather in the cap for President Joseph Aoun and his government.

This step caps a process that was unnecessarily delayed for almost two decades, but that only makes this achievement more gratifying.

Having settled maritime boundaries is crucial right now because of the opportunities it opens up. The agreement makes Lebanon much more attractive to the major international partners it needs to develop its nascent offshore oil and gas sector. If and when that sector reaches even a small fraction

of its potential, the benefits should flow to virtually every corner of the Lebanese economy, so everyone in the country should really celebrate this.

As if to punctuate the moment, the Council of Ministers also awarded the rights to a key offshore area, Block 8, to a reputable international consortium consisting of France's TotalEnergies, Italy's ENI, and Qatar's QatarEnergy.

Together, these moves help to pave the road toward a future in which Lebanon becomes an energy producer and exporter, adding unprecedented momentum to an economy that desperately needs it.

These are both major milestones, and the government – along with President Joseph Aoun, whose own leadership on the border deal was crucial to initiating the negotiations – deserves plenty of credit.

The important part now is the follow-up. The government still needs to implement a long list of reforms, invest in capacity building, and retain competent personnel and managers to steward and safeguard the country's offshore resources. It also will need to do its homework on how best to nurture that offshore business.

There is so much to be done – but so much to be claimed by doing it! Getting the MBL with Cyprus finalized was at the top of the list, and resolving Block 8 was not far down, so the government deserves congratulations for both.

And since I mentioned nurturing, I also take this opportunity to propose that the Lebanese government immediately invite its Cypriot counterpart to negotiate another crucial deal: a joint development agreement, or JDA, which would govern the sharing of any oil and/or gas resources which straddle their border at sea. Setting up a JDA now would not only prevent possible delays in the future – it also would make both countries' offshore energy sectors even more attractive to investors.

بارودي: استجرار الكهرباء والغاز من قبرص ينوع مصادر الطاقة ويحميها من أي تداعيات جيوسياسية

ARTISTIC MAP
ILLUSTRATION OF CYPRUS BLOCK 6
GAS & ELECTRICITY PLAY



تبدو العلاقات اللبنانية القبرصية في حال تطور سريع وقد فتح هذا الباب رئيس الجمهورية العماد جوزاف عون فلاقى استجابة ورغبة عارمة لدى نظيره القبرصي كريستو دوليديس تجاه تطوير العلاقة بين البلدين

الجارين وما لفت أن الرئيس القبرصي هو الذي بادر وطرح على الرئيس عون استئجار الكهرباء من قبرص إلى لبنان وقد تلقى رئيس الجمهورية اللبنانية هذه المبادرة وطلب من وزير الطاقة جو صدي متابعة الموضوع.

وفي هذا السياق أثنى خبير الطاقة الدولي رودي بارودي على مبادرة الرئيس القبرصي واللبناني، مؤكداً وجوب الترحيب بأي خطوة من هذا النوع باعتبارها نقطة انطلاق مهمة لتأمين الكهرباء للبنانيين وحل أزمة القطاع المستفحلة جزئياً منذ عقود وأن هذه الخطوة تأتي بعد الإعلان عن استئناف مفاوضات ترسيم الحدود البحرية بين البلدين. كما أثنى بارودي على الدور الذي يلعبه الرئيس عون في ملف الطاقة ككل واعتباره أولوية لما فيه من فائدة على الاقتصاد وتعزيز القدرات الاجتماعية للمواطنين اللبنانيين.

ولفت بارودي إلى أن هذه الخطوة ستتيح تزويد لبنان ما بين 150 و300 ميغاواط وفق مراحل متعددة ولا سيما بعد عام أو عامين على الأكثر عندما تبدأ قبرص بإنتاج الكهرباء من الغاز المستخرج من ENI & TOTAL ENERGIES حولها البحرية خاصة حقل كرونوس الذي يديره كل من شركتي ما يعزز تنوع مصادر الطاقة وبأسعار مقبولة لا سيما وأن الحقل المعني في قبرص لا يبعد عن حقل زهر المصري سوى 60 كلم ما يعني أن كلفة الإستخراج ستكون مماثلة لتلك المعتمدة في الحقل المصري وهي كلفة رخيصة نوعاً ما.

ولفت بارودي إلى وجود محطتين رئيسيتين لإنتاج الكهرباء في قبرص، بين ليماسول Vassiliko إحداها بين لارنكا وليماسول، والأخرى في وبافوس، بقدرة إجمالية تقارب 1600 ميغاواط من دون الكهرباء المنتجة من الطاقة الشمسية وبالتالي يمكن للبنان الاستفادة من هذه الطاقة بكلفة يتم التوافق عليها موضحاً أن الكلفة ستكون أقل بكثير من كلفة الكهرباء المنتجة في لبنان عندما تبدأ قبرص العام المقبل باستخدام الغاز المستخرج من حولها البحرية لإنتاج الكهرباء. ولاسيما البلوك رقم 6.

بارودي طالب الحكومة اللبنانية بالإسراع بوضع الأطر الإصلاحية والتنظيمية للقطاع بشأن استئجار الكهرباء من قبرص وبإعداد دراسة جدوى اقتصادية تأخذ في الاعتبار كلفة الاستئجار ولفت أن محطة هي المحطة التي تصدر الغاز في 2026، على أن يواصل Vassiliko لبنان مساعيه لربط شبكته بالشبكة السورية للحصول على دعم إضافي كهربائي عن طريق محطة دير نبوح، بما في ذلك محطة الكسارة في

**Israel-Iran war needs to stop
before we all get burned**



The long-feared war between Israel and Iran is now fully under way, and the repercussions threaten to include significant disruptions – not just for the two belligerents, but also for economies, peoples, and governments around the world.

To understand how and why an armed conflict between two regional powers could have such a widespread impact, start by considering the following:

1. Iran's reserves of crude oil and natural gas are, respectively, the second- and third-largest in the world;
2. While Israel has posited Iran's alleged nuclear activities as its reason for going to war, its strikes have also focused on Iran's oil and gas infrastructure;
3. At the time of this writing, five of Iran's nine major oil refineries had been hit and knocked out of service, along with storage depots and other facilities;
4. Israeli forces also started a huge fire at the South Pars gas field, which Iran shares with Qatar – and which holds almost as much gas as all of the other known gas fields on Earth.
5. For good measure, Iranian strikes against the Israeli refinery complex at Haifa have led to the shutdown of several offshore platforms, further crimping regional hydrocarbon output;

Now consider that it gets worse. The destruction or shutdown of Iran's ability to extract, process, distribute, and export hydrocarbons would cause tremendous problems at home, and put upward pressure on prices everywhere, although the global impact would likely be manageable. The situation would be far more disruptive if Israeli attacks hit Bandar Abbas area. That could cause prices for gas – and other forms of energy – to soar on world markets.

And yet even this is not the greatest peril threatened by this war. That desultory honour goes to the possibility that traffic could be disrupted in the Strait of Hormuz, the relatively narrow channel that connects the Gulf to the open ocean. The passage is only 40 kilometres at its narrowest spot, wending for over 150 kilometres between Oman and the United Arab Emirates, to the west and south, and Iran's Hormozgan Province to the east and north. Hormozgan is also home to the famous port city of Bandar Abbas, which hosts a

giant oil and petrochemical complex that has already been struck at least once by Israeli forces.

What really matters for our purposes is that Hormuz also connects several other of the world's most prolific oil and LNG producers – including Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia – to their overseas clients. As a result, every day, about a quarter of the world's crude oil and LNG requirements exit the Gulf through Hormuz, making it the most strategically important chokepoint of our times. If this flow were halted or even significantly slowed, the consequences could be disastrous for much of the world. Although most of these exports are typically bound for markets in Asia, even a brief reduction in available oil and gas could send crude prices, currently a little more than \$70 a barrel, shooting past \$100 or even \$120 in short order.

If such a supply crisis lasted any length of time, the global economy would enter uncharted territory. Not only would sky-high energy prices cause inflation to rise across the board, but fuel shortages could also be expected to cripple businesses of every size and sort. Transport and manufacturing, food processing and medical research, power generation, household heating and cooling, even the Internet itself: everything that depends on energy could slow to a trickle. A global recession would almost certainly ensue, and given the current trade environment, that might lead to another Great Depression.

So what might cause such an interruption? There are several possibilities, including the accidental sinking or crippling of a supertanker or two in just the right (i.e., wrong) place(s). Even if one or more accidents did not make Hormuz physically impassable, they could make insurance rates prohibitively expensive, causing many would-be off-loaders to decide against hazarding their ships amid the crossfire. Alternatively, Iran could decide to close the strait in order to punish the “international community” in general, for not

doing enough to rein in the Israelis.

Whatever the rationale, the potential for global economic ruin – not to mention the ecological and public health risks posed by leaks of oil, nuclear materials, and/or other toxins into the environment – is simply not a risk that most intelligent people want to run. It therefore behooves those with the power to change the situation to do everything they can to end the conflict before its costs become more than a fragile world economy can bear.

Another is how to get Iran to behave itself, and that, too, shapes up as a difficult task. The Islamic Republic has spent most of the past half-century seeking to undermine US and Israeli influence over the region, and its substantial investments in proxy militias abroad and its own military at home may be skewing high-level decision-making. As the saying goes, when all you have is hammer, everything starts to look like a nail.

Despite these obstacles, it remains a fact that war is almost never preferable to negotiation. Iran and Israel agree on very little, their objectives are often in direct opposition to one another, and each views the other as a murderous and illegitimate state. Nonetheless, whether they realise it or not, both sides have a vested interest in ending the current conflict. Given the massive disparities in their respective strengths and weaknesses, this conflict could turn into a long-term bloodletting in which the value of anything achieved will be far outstripped by the cost in blood and treasure.


But who will get the two sides to so much as consider diplomacy when both of them are increasingly committed to confrontation? Although several world leaders have offered to act as mediators, the belligerents don't trust very many of the same people. To my mind, this opens a door for Qatar, which has worked assiduously to maintain relations with all parties – and which already has a highly impressive record as

a peacemaker – to step up in some capacity.

Whether it provides a venue for direct talks, a diplomatic backchannel for exchanging messages, or some other method, Doha has proved before that it can be a stable platform and a powerful advocate for peaceful negotiations. Let us hope it can do so again.

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AS AMERICA “PIVOTS TO ASIA”, SAUDI ARABIA IS ALREADY THERE – BY ROUDI BAROUDI



The biggest news in the energy industry last week was that a state-owned Chinese company had completed a massive offshore oil and gas platform for Saudi Aramco. Breathless media reports shared impressive details about the facility's record-setting size, weight, and output capacity, with some describing it as a massive bet on continuing strong demand for fossil fuels despite the meteoric rise of renewables.

The real significance of this news, though, is not to be found at the Qingdao shipyard where it was made, at the headquarters of the China Offshore Oil Engineering Company that built it, or at the Marjan field off Saudi Arabia's east coast where it will be installed and operated.

In fact, in order to truly appreciate the implications involved, one needs to travel back in time a little more than 50 years. For on 8 June 1974, the United States and Saudi Arabia reached a historic agreement that has bound the two countries ever since.

Signed by then-US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and then-Minister of Interior Prince Fahd bin Abdulaziz, the pact

established two joint commissions tasked, respectively, with increasing bilateral economic cooperation and with determining the kingdom's military needs. It also created several joint working groups responsible for specific elements to support growth and development, including efforts to: a) expand and diversify Saudi Arabia's industrial base, beginning with the manufacture of fertilizers and other aspects of the petrochemical sector; b) increase the number of qualified scientists and technicians available to make the most of technology transfers; c) explore partnerships in areas like solar energy and desalination; and d) find ways to cooperate in agriculture, especially in the desert.



Henry Kissinger with Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia, 1974

Contrary to widespread misperceptions, the agreement did not say anything about Saudi crude being priced and/or transacted

exclusively in US dollars. In a side-deal that remained secret until 2016, however, the United States pledged full military support in virtually all circumstances and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia committed to investing a massive share of its oil revenues in US Treasury bills. While there was no public quid pro quo, therefore, this was to some extent a distinction without a difference: the world's biggest oil exporter ended up spending hundreds of billions of dollars on American debt and American-made weapons, making it only sensible that the vast majority of its crude sales would be in greenbacks. By extension, the sheer weight of Saudi oil in world markets – and especially within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries – virtually guaranteed that the dollar would become the de facto default currency of those markets, Petrodollars.

These arrangements suited both sides at the time, which featured a very particular set of circumstances. The previous year, as Egypt and Syria attempted to regain territories occupied by Israeli forces since the 1967 war, US President Richard Nixon authorized an unprecedented airlift of weaponry – everything from tanks, artillery, and ammunition to helicopters, radars, and air-to-air missiles – to Israel. Arab oil producers responded by playing their strongest card, announcing an oil embargo against states that supported the Israeli war effort. That led directly to supply shortages, soaring prices, and long lines at filling stations across the United States and many other countries, too, and indirectly to several years of higher inflation. Although the embargo had been lifted in March 1974, Washington was keen to prevent similar shocks in the future.

The American economy was particularly vulnerable to longer-term repercussions because of several factors, including a general slowdown caused by its long, expensive, and ultimately unsuccessful war in Vietnam. The real problem, though, stemmed from another issue: in 1971, as the dollar continued to lose ground against major European currencies, Nixon had taken the

United States off the gold standard, gutting the Bretton Woods arrangements put in place after World War II and throwing foreign exchange markets into disarray. With the Cold War as backdrop, America appeared to be losing ground in its strategic competition with the Soviet Union.

The so-called “side-deal”, then, was actually far more important than the public agreement because it would restore the dollar’s primacy in international markets, making it once again the world’s favorite reserve currency, while simultaneously reducing the likelihood of future Arab oil embargos. The new system worked very well for a very long time: the US economy regained its stability, and Saudi Arabia embarked on a long program of socioeconomic development that continues to this day. Even as the Americans have sought further protection by reducing their reliance on Saudi and other OPEC crude, their bilateral partnership and the dollar’s general prevalence in the oil business have likewise persisted despite all manner of diplomatic spats, crises, and other obstacles.

Back in the present-day, the Soviet Union is no more, and although the United States has an even more formidable strategic rival in China, this competition carries neither the day-to-day intensity nor the seeming inevitability of nuclear Armageddon that the Cold War engendered. In addition, the United States is now producing more crude oil than any country ever has, further insulating its economy against exogenous shocks, while China’s rapid expansion has made it the world’s most prolific energy importer. In fact, Washington is years into a “pivot to Asia” that will see it focus less attention on the Middle East.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia is now led by Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), a young and highly ambitious ruler who has shown himself more than willing to act independently of American desires or even demands. Accordingly, it should not surprise anyone that the behemoth facility now being

transported to Marjan is just the most visible tip of the Sino-Saudi iceberg. Theirs is a burgeoning relationship driven by complementary needs, with both parties investing in one another's economies and cooperating on large-scale energy and industrial projects.

Given all of the foregoing, it is much too early to declare the end of an era. Even if rumors that the Saudis will soon start selling oil futures contracts in yuan or other currencies turn out to be true and the results include an erosion of the dollar's value, the US-Saudi economic relationship remains very much in place, as do defense ties ranging from procurement and maintenance to joint exercises and training. This is not to mention the approximately 60,000 Saudi students who study at American universities every year, or the countless other business and/or personal ties nurtured over decades.



Then, US President, Jimmy Carter receiving the Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia at the White House in Washington, 1977. Seeing the continuation of the Petrodollar Agreement.

All the same, a new era has definitely begun: just as the Americans have opened up other avenues to secure their energy needs, the Saudis are now moving decisively to diversify their foreign partnerships and have been doing so for many years. Inevitably, the global oil and gas economy's center of gravity will shift eastward, but how could it be otherwise when China and several other Asian economies have become such powerhouses? The diversification path will almost certainly include occasional stretches where Riyadh will have to make difficult decisions, but this, too, reflects the confidence that MBS has in his country's ability to determine its own destiny.

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السعودية - الصين: شراكة نفطية ترسم معالم عصر جديد في الطاقة

يمثل #التعاون النفطي بين السعودية والصين أحد أهم الشراكات الاستراتيجية في العصر الحديث، إذ يجمع بين أكبر مصدر للنفط في العالم وأكبر مستورد له. إلا أن هذا التعاون لا يقتصر على تجارة النفط وحدها، بل يشمل استثمارات مشتركة تهدف إلى تعزيز العلاقات الاقتصادية الثنائية، خصوصاً مع توسع "#أرامكو السعودية" في السوق الصينية.

!"منصة "مرجان

بلغت #الاستثمارات الصينية في السعودية 16,8 مليار دولار في عام 2023، في مقابل 1,5 مليار دولار في عام 2022، استناداً إلى بيانات بنك الإمارات دبي الوطني. في هذا الإطار، يوضح الدكتور خالد رمضان، الخبير النفطي ورئيس المركز الدولي للدراسات الاستراتيجية بالقاهرة، لـ "النهار" أن هذا #لتعاون النفطي السعودي - الصيني يؤثر إيجاباً في #أسواق الطاقة العالمية، "وما منصة 'مرجان' النفطية البحرية التابعة لأرامكو في الصين إلا ترجمة فعلية لهذا التعاون"، وستستخدم لزيادة الإنتاج السنوي لحقل المرجان النفطي إلى 24 مليون طن.

وتعد منصة "مرجان" أثقل منصة نفط وغاز بحرية في الصين مخصصة للأسواق الخارجية، وواحدة من أكبر المنصات في العالم، فهي أطول من مبنى مكون من 24 طابقاً، وتعادل مساحة سطحها 15 ملعب كرة سلة، ويمكنها جمع ونقل 24 مليون طن من النفط و7,4 مليارات متر مكعب من الغاز سنوياً.

شراكة في التنمية

يضيف رمضان: " أبرمت أرامكو السعودية في عام 2023 صفقات بقيمة 8 مليارات دولار مع شركاء صينيين في قطاعي المنبع أي الاستكشاف والإنتاج، والمصب أي التكرير والتوزيع". إلى ذلك، توظف نظرتها المتفائلة إلى إمكانات النمو في الصين على المدى الطويل، والفرص عالية الجودة، "من أجل توسيع عملياتها المتكاملة في قطاع الصناعات التحويلية الصينية، والتي يمثل الاستثمار فيها أهمية". "استراتيجية لنمو أعمال أرامكو في آسيا

يلفت رمضان إلى أن دور أرامكو يتجاوز الاستثمار، "لأنها تريد أن تكون شريكاً رئيسياً في التنمية الاقتصادية في الصين، والاستفادة من الفرص الجديدة التي تلوح في الأفق، من خلال شراكات استراتيجية تعزز وجودها في قطاع الصناعات التحويلية في الصين، بما فيها المواد الكيميائية والمواد المركبة المتقدمة والمواد غير المعدنية".

وهكذا، تظل الصين محورية في استراتيجية أرامكو لتنويع محفظتها،

لتشمل منتجات كيميائية أكثر تخصصًا وعالية القيمة، خصوصاً أن الصين تمثل 40 في المئة من مبيعات المنتجات الكيميائية العالمية. تعزيز سلاسل التوريد

الصين ثاني أكبر اقتصاد في العالم، لذا تعد أكبر مستورد للنفط الخام، إذ تستهلك 14 مليون برميل يوميًا، تليها أوروبا بنحو 12,8 مليون برميل يوميًا. من ناحية أخرى، تعد السعودية أكبر مصدر للنفط الخام في العالم، تليها روسيا وكندا والنرويج ونيجيريا وانطلاقاً من هذا الواقع، "سهل أن نرى كيف يمنح توسيع التعاون النفطي بين الصين والسعودية الأسواق استقراراً أكبر، ويعزز أمان سلاسل الإمداد النفطية، ويزيد فرص المنافسة في الأسواق العالمية"، بحسب ما يقول الخبير النفطي الدولي رودي بارودي.

ويضيف لـ "النهار": "بالنسبة إلى السعوديين، سيضمنون شريكاً استراتيجياً طويل الأمد، لن يشتري النفط الخام فحسب، بل يستثمر أيضاً في سلسلة النفط اللاحقة، من المصافي إلى مصانع البتروكيماويات". فأرامكو السعودية، أكبر شركة نفط في العالم، مستثمر كبير في مشروع "رونغشينغ سينوبيك فوجيان" للتكرير (Rongsheng Sinopec Fujian Refining & Petrochemical venture) والبتروكيماويات وفي شركتين كبيرتين للبتروكيماويات هما (Rongsheng Petrochemical) و"رونغشينغ (Hengli Petrochemical) "هينغلي وتفاوض أرامكو لشراء 10 في المئة في "هينغلي"، (Rongsheng Petrochemical). وتسعى لإبرام صفقات مماثلة مع شركتين صينيتين أخريين، بعدما أبرمت صفقة منفصلة قيمتها 3,4 مليارات دولار لشراء حصة في شركة "رونغشينغ" في العام الماضي.

تحالف مؤثر

في الضفة الأخرى، استثمرت الصين مليارات الدولارات في السعودية، "حيث دخلت الشركات الصينية على خط مشاريع سعودية واسعة النطاق تركّزت في معظمها في التكرير والبنية الأساسية للغاز"، بحسب بارودي، الذي يضيف: "من شأن التعاون الطويل الأجل بين البلدين أن يعيد تشكيل أجزاء من المشهد النفطي والبتروكيماوي العالمي ويؤكد الخبير النفطي الدولي أن أرامكو السعودية مستثمر كبير في صناعة الهيدروكربون في الصين، "والجانبان يركزان جهودهما على توسيع مصانع إنتاج السوائل وتحويلها إلى كيماويات في مصفاة الجبيل بالسعودية، وفي وحدة البتروكيماويات في نينغبو تشونجين بالصين".

ويرى بارودي أن هذا التطوّر في العلاقة التصنيعية والتحويلية هو "نتاج علاقة استراتيجية دبلوماسية سعودية - صينية، بدأت تحاك قبل أكثر من ثلاثة عقود، لا تقتصر على التجارة والاستثمارات المتبادلة، بل تتعداها إلى تحالف تنعكس آثاره على الاقتصاد العالمي، ما من شأنه أن يقلل من تأثير أي تباطؤ اقتصادي في المستقبل، وأن يحمي "أسواق الهيدروكربون والبتروكيماويات".

إلى جانب ذلك، يعزز التعاون بين السعوديين والصينيين التحول العالمي في مجال الطاقة، بفضل التوافق في الرؤى التنموية بين البلدين. رؤية "السعودية 2030" ومبادرة "الحزام والطريق" الصينية تستهدفان إضافة المزيد من الاستثمارات في الطاقة المتجددة. ومن هنا، تستهدف أرامكو الاستفادة من الطلب المتزايد على الصناعات الخضراء الناشئة في الصين، "ليتطور التعاون الصيني - السعودي في مجال الطاقة من مجرد تعاون في مصادر طاقة تقليدية ليشمل قطاع الطاقة الجديدة"، بحسب رمضان.

شراكة تبادلية

يقول بارودي إن هذا التعاون يرتقي يوماً بعد يوم إلى مستوى الشراكة التبادلية، "الفوائد متبادلة، ويعمل كل من الطرفين على تنويع إيراداته، وخفض إنفاقه الإنتاجي"، مذكراً بأن هذا التعاون "يدعم قدرة البلدين على تحقيق استقرار الاقتصاد العالمي، إذ يبشر بتغيرات مالية ضخمة".

فمحتمل جداً أن تبدأ السعودية بقبول اليوان الصيني، من بين عملات آسيوية أخرى، بوصفه عملة معتمدة في التبادلات النفطية. وهذا، برأي بارودي، يمنح الصين والسعودية مزايا اقتصادية كبيرة، خصوصاً أن المملكة جادة في مسيرة تنويع مصادر اقتصادها، والخروج من دائرة "الاعتماد الكلي على الإيراد النفطي".

يضيف بارودي: "إن تحققي المملكة هذا الهدف سيشكل نقطة تحول أساسية في سياستها الاقتصادية عموماً، والنفطية خصوصاً، إذ ستكمل تحررها من قيود البترو-دولار بعد اتفاقية مع الولايات المتحدة دامت 50 عاماً، وبعد دخولها مع الصين في مجموعة الـ 'بريكس' التي وضعت نصب عينيها الوقوف في وجه هيمنة الدولار الأميركي على الاقتصاد العالمي".